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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the principles surrounding the operation of set-off in South 
African law.  It is evident that no uniform answer exists to the question of how set-off 
operates: it either operates automatically as soon as its requirements are met or in 
terms of a declaration by one of the parties, but with retrospective effect.  This thesis 
examines the uncertainty and problems surrounding these two opposing approaches 
to the operation of set-off, and further considers the impact of sections 90 and 124 of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) on set-off. 
In order to evaluate the two approaches to set-off, their historical origin, practical effect 
and the policy considerations informing them are analysed.  This analysis is also 
informed by comparative perspectives on the operation of set-off adopted in civilian 
jurisdictions.  The thesis further examines the circumstances in which a party will be 
precluded from relying on set-off.  It focuses on an agreement between the parties to 
exclude set-off, waiver of a party’s right to set-off and the circumstances in which a 
party can be estopped from invoking set-off. 
It is shown that neither of the approaches to set-off adopted in South African law 
provides an adequate explanation for the way in which set-off is applied in practice.  
The thesis illustrates that this can be attributed to the fact that the automatic approach 
affords insufficient recognition to the autonomy of contracting parties and that the 
retrospective approach leads to practical difficulties.  The uncertainties which exist 
regarding the exclusions of the right to invoke set-off are also highlighted, as well as 
the difficulty in reconciling these exclusions with the automatic approach to set-off. 
The examination of sections 90 and 124 of the NCA focuses on the interpretation of 
these sections, and considers whether and to what extent, a limitation on a credit 
provider’s right to invoke set-off is desirable.  It is concluded that these sections are 
unclear and that, although certain limitations of a credit provider’s right to invoke set-
off are justified, the conditions set by the NCA are too stringent. Legislative reforms 
are suggested to clarify and improve the protection granted by the NCA. 
Finally, it is argued that South African courts should take note of international 
developments regarding the operation of set-off and opt for a solution which is more 
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in line with modern commercial reality.  Such a solution can be found in the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European 
Contract Law, which recommend that set-off should be effected by a notice with 
prospective effect.  It is shown that this approach ensures legal certainty and offers a 
solution which aligns legal and practical reality. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie fokus op die beginsels rakende die werking van skuldvergelyking in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg.  Dit blyk dat geen eenvormigheid bestaan oor die wyse waarop 
skuldvergelyking plaasvind nie: dit vind òf outomaties plaas sodra die vereistes aan 
voldoen is òf in terme van ‘n verklaring deur een van die partye, maar met 
terugwerkende effek.  Hierdie tesis ondersoek die onsekerheid en probleme ondervind 
met hierdie twee teenstrydige benaderings tot die werking van skuldvergelyking, en 
oorweeg verder die impak van artikels 90 en 124 van die Nasionale Kredietwet 34 van 
2005 (NKW) op skuldvergelyking. 
Ten einde die twee benaderings tot skuldvergelyking te evalueer, word hul historiese 
oorsprong, praktiese effek en die relevante beleidsoorwegings ontleed.  Hierdie 
ontleding steun ook op ‘n regsvergelykende perspektief op die werking van 
skuldvergelyking in sivielregtelike jurisdiksies.  Die tesis ondersoek verder die 
omstandighede waaronder ‘n party verhoed sal word om op skuldvergelyking te steun.  
Dit fokus op ‘n ooreenkoms tussen die partye om nie op skuldvergelyking te steun nie, 
afstanddoening van ‘n party se reg tot skuldvergelyking en die omstandighede 
waaronder estoppel ‘n beroep op skuldvergelyking sal verhoed.  
Daar word aangedui dat geeneen van die benaderings tot skuldvergelyking gevolg in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg ‘n voldoende verduideliking bied van die wyse waarop 
skuldvergelyking in die praktyk toegepas word nie.  Hierdie tesis illustreer dat dit 
toegeskryf kan word aan die feit dat die outomatiese benadering onvoldoende 
erkenning gee aan die outonomie van kontrakspartye, asook die praktiese probleme 
ondervind deur die terugwerkende benadering.  Die onsekerheid wat bestaan rakende 
die uitsluitings van die reg om op skuldvergelyking te steun word ook uitgelig, asook 
die onversoenbaarheid van hierdie uitsluitings met die outomatiese benadering tot 
skuldvergelyking. 
Die ondersoek na artikels 90 en 124 van die NKW fokus op die interpretasie van 
hierdie artikels, en oorweeg ook of en tot watter mate ‘n beperking op die reg van ‘n 
kredietverskaffer om op skuldvergelyking te steun wenslik is.  Daar word bevind dat 
hierdie artikels van die NKW onduidelik is en dat, alhoewel sekere beperkings op die 
reg van ‘n kredietverskaffer om op skuldvergelyking te steun regverdigbaar is, die 
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voorwaardes gestel deur die NKW te streng is.  Statutêre wysigings word voorgestel 
om die beskerming gebied deur die NKW uit te klaar en te verbeter. 
Ten slotte word daar aangevoer dat Suid-Afrikaanse howe kennis moet neem van 
internasionale verwikkelinge rakende die werking van skuldvergelyking en ‘n 
oplossing moet nastreef wat meer in lyn is met hedendaagse kommersiële realiteit.  
Sodanige oplossing kan gevind word in die UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts en die Principles of European Contract Law, wat aanbeveel dat 
skuldvergelyking moet geskied deur middel van ‘n kennisgewing met vooruitwerkende 
krag.  Daar word aangedui dat hierdie benadering regsekerheid verseker en ‘n 
oplossing bied wat juridiese en praktiese werklikheid versoen. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Problem identification 
Set-off is one method by which obligations, whether arising contractually or otherwise 
(for instance ex delicto), can be terminated without requiring the exchange of 
performances.1  It operates where two parties are mutually indebted to each other2 and 
extinguishes obligations as effectively as if they have been discharged by 
performance.3  If the debts are for the same amount, both are extinguished 
simultaneously; if not, the smaller debt is extinguished while the larger debt is reduced 
by the amount of the smaller.4  
Set-off is often regarded as a form of payment5 and operates pro tanto as if payment 
was made.6  However, these two methods of debt-extinction must be differentiated.7  
Set-off does not require an agreement between the parties8 and does not entail the 
physical exchange of money9 or the electronic transfer of funds.10 
The basic premises regarding the effect of set-off are thus straightforward: if A owes B 
R100, and B is indebted to A in the amount of R100, there is little practical benefit for 
the parties to pay these debts to each other, although legally these payments are 
required to release them from their respective obligations.11  To prevent this back-and-
forth payment, the law allows the debts to be extinguished by set-off.  The difficulty, 
 
                                            
1  JC de Wet & AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 272-284; 
S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 4 
ed (2012) 469; DJ Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 286-293; ADJ van 
Rensburg, JG Lotz, TAR van Rhijn & RD Sharrock “Contract” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The 
Law of South Africa 9 3 ed (2014) para 433; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 760-761; RH Christie & GB Bradfield Christie’s The Law 
of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 494; Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Transvaal) v Pretoria 
Municipal Pension Fund 1969 2 SA 78 (T) 85C. 
2  Van der Merwe et al Contract 469. 
3  475. 
4 LTC Harms “Obligations” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 19 2 ed (2006) para 243. 
5  It has been described as a payment effected brevi manu (Faatz v Estate Maiwald 1933 SWA 73 87; 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Transvaal) v Pretoria Municipal Pension Fund 1969 2 SA 78 (T) 86A). 
6 Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286 289. 
7 ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1998 1 SA 242 (SCA) 251: “When a customer pays a 
cash amount equal to the debit balance of his overdrawn account into that account, there is no 
question of set-off operating. He simply pays the amount owing to the bank.” 
8 Van der Merwe et al Contract 469. 
9  See n 1 above. 
10  Although a bank may appropriate money from a bank account by relying on its right to set-off (see 
ch 5 (5 2 2)), it can be argued that this is an accounting entry rather than a transfer of money. 
11  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 272 
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however, lies in determining how and when set-off will operate.  As we shall see, the 
principles surrounding the operation of set-off are fraught with problems and De Wet 
describes it as “een van die ingewikkeldste gebiede van die verbintenisreg hier by 
ons.”12 
To a large extent, these problems can be attributed to the fact that, despite the general 
acceptance and use of set-off, its exact nature remains uncertain.13  It has been 
described as “either the automatic extinction of debts by operation of law on grounds 
of policy, or a juristic act whereby one party effects the extinction of debt by means of 
a unilateral juristic act.”14  These alternative descriptions stem from the fact that there 
is no general agreement about how and when set-off will operate: does it operate 
automatically by operation of law or only retrospectively, once a party seeks to rely on 
it? 
The uncertainty which exists in this regard often results in contradictory statements in 
case law.  An example of this is the following dictum by Lichtenberg J, where he states 
that: 
“it is trite law that set-off operates automatically and that, once set-off is claimed or relied 
on, it relates back to the time when the two respective debts were mutually in existence.  
However, if a party to an action wants to obtain the benefit of set-off, he must claim to be 
entitled to set-off.”15 
Another example is the statement by Hefer JA that 
“[a]lthough set-off occurs automatically by operation of law, it only operates retrospectively 
if and when the debtor ... elects to rely on it.”16 
These statements acknowledge the automatic operation of set-off, but still make the 
operation of set-off dependant on a decision by one of the parties to invoke it by stating 
 
                                            
12  “One of the most complex areas of our law of obligations” (own translation) – De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 1 272. 
13  Van der Merwe et al Contract 469. 
14  Van der Merwe et al Contract 469.  Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 243 describes it as one 
debt being cancelled by another, but see the criticism levelled against this view by Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 469. 
15  Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 676. 
16  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum CC 2012 5 SA 283 (SCA) para 33.  Also see 
the discussion of this statement in ch 3 (3 4 3 4). 
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that “if a party … wants to obtain the benefit of set-off”17 or “elects to rely on it”.18  The 
apparent contradiction stems from the tension between the notion that set-off should 
operate automatically and the value of contractual autonomy.  These conflicting 
considerations lie at the core of the main question regarding the ipso iure operation of 
set-off, namely whether set-off should operate irrespective of the wishes of the 
parties.19 
Before evaluating the two approaches to the operation of set-off, it is necessary to 
determine whether they render a different practical result, or whether, as averred by 
Christie and Bradfield, the debate surrounding the two opposing views to the operation 
of set-off is “something of a storm in a teacup”.20  This will be done in greater detail in 
chapter 3,21 but it may be mentioned here that there are at least two scenarios where 
these approaches to set-off result in different practical outcomes. 
The first is where A and B are jointly and severally liable to C, but A also has a 
counterclaim against C.  If C attempts to collect the debt from B, the latter may not  
declare set-off in terms of the retrospective approach, but if the ipso iure approach is 
followed B should be able to rely on the automatic operation of set-off between A and 
C.22 
The second example is provided by Loots and Van Warmelo.23  A owes an 
unenforceable gambling debt24 to B, but B is also indebted to A.  B pays his debt 
towards A after the requirements for set-off were met.25  B now wants to enforce the 
debt owed to him by A.26  Because B’s original claim is unenforceable, he would have 
 
                                            
17  Own emphasis. 
18  Own emphasis. 
19  Joubert Law of Contract 286. 
20  Law of Contract 494. 
21  See ch 3 (3 4 2). 
22  See ch 3 (3 4 2 1). 
23  JH Loots & P Van Warmelo “Compensatio” (1956) 19 THRHR 267 267. 
24  This will not include a legal gambling debt in terms of the National Gambling Act 7 of 2004, which 
will be enforceable. 
25  It is not entirely clear whether set-off can operate in respect of unenforceable wagers, but the courts 
seem to favour the view that it should be allowed (see Van der Merwe et al Contract 182 n 148; 
Fensham v Jacobson 1951 2 SA 136 (T); Allison v Massel & Massel 1954 4 SA 569 (T); Rosen v 
Wasserman 1984 1 SA 808 (W). For an opposing view, see Gibson v Van der Walt 1952 1 SA 262 
(A)).  Also see ch 3 (3 2 n 37). 
26  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4) for a discussion on the status of payments made after the debt is susceptible to 
set-off. 
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to consider another basis for his claim against A.  If B can prove that, in terms of the 
ipso iure approach, set-off operated automatically before he paid his debt, the debt 
would have been extinguished before payment was made.  Any payment made by B 
would thus constitute an undue payment and B would be able to reclaim his payment 
with the condictio indebiti, provided all the requirements for that remedy are met.  
However, if the retrospective approach is followed, it is no longer possible to declare 
set-off, because one of the debts has ceased to exist by virtue of B’s payment.27  B’s 
only cause of action will therefore be the original (unenforceable) debt.  In this scenario, 
the approach to set-off which is followed will determine whether B has an enforceable 
claim in terms of unjustified enrichment or whether he has to rely (fruitlessly) on his 
original unenforceable claim.28 
De Wet and Van Wyk further point out that adopting one approach rather than the other 
will have an impact on the requirements for set-off to operate.29  More specifically, the 
approach which is followed will be crucial in determining whether both debts need to 
be liquidated and enforceable before set-off can take place.30  In other words, rather 
than being a “storm in a teacup”, a particular approach to set-off not only has practical 
implications but it also determines when the debts will be susceptible to set-off. 
Furthermore, the approach to set-off that is adopted will affect the principles relating to 
the exclusion of a party’s right to rely on set-off, whether by way of agreement, waiver 
or estoppel.31  For instance, if it is accepted that set-off automatically occurs on the 
date that the debts become susceptible to its operation, it is questionable whether a 
party should be allowed to waive his right to rely on set-off after such date.  The 
principles regarding the circumstances where a party will be precluded from relying on 
this form of debt-extinction are not clearly defined, which adds to the uncertainty 
surrounding the operation of set-off. 
A last aspect of set-off which requires clarification is the extent to which the right of 
credit providers to rely on set-off is restricted in terms of sections 90 and 124 of the 
 
                                            
27  See ch 3 (3 4 1), where it is explained that, despite the retrospective effect attributed to a declaration 
of set-off, it is no longer possible to declare set-off if the debt has ceased to exist due to payment. 
28  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 267. 
29  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 273-281. 
30  See ch 3 (3 2). 
31  See ch 4. 
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National Credit Act 24 of 2005 (NCA).  In terms of these provisions, a clause in a credit 
agreement which authorises the credit provider to appropriate money from an account 
of a debtor to satisfy an obligation in terms of a credit agreement must comply with 
certain requirements.  This will clearly affect the right of a bank, operating as a credit 
provider, to rely on set-off by utilising funds from a client’s transactional account 
towards repayment of that client’s loan. 
However, the extent to which this right is affected is uncertain.  The relevant sections 
seem to indicate that the prescribed conditions only relate to a provision in a credit 
agreement that authorises a charge against an account (and therefore set-off).32  If this 
interpretation is correct, it would mean that, in order to circumvent a restriction of its 
right to invoke set-off, a credit provider has to refrain from stipulating the right in the 
credit agreement.  Whether this interpretation is in line with the spirit and purposes of 
the NCA warrants investigation.  It must further be determined whether any restriction 
on the right of a credit provider to invoke set-off is justified, and what the extent of such 
a restriction should be. 
1 2 Purpose of the thesis, research questions and methodology 
Although the following observation was made in the American context, one can argue 
that also in South Africa 
“[s]etoff is … a valuable commercial tool – a tool which should be standardized to avoid 
frustrating the reasonable expectations of those who deal in the fast-paced, modern world 
of … commerce.”33   
Set-off features perhaps most prominently in the banking sector,34 and that sector “has 
been particularly attracted by the virtues of simplification, efficiency, and security 
inherent in the idea of set-off.”35  To understand why set-off plays such an important 
 
                                            
32  This is the interpretation supported by the banks – see ch 5 (5 2 4). 
33 SL Sepinuck “The Problems with Setoff: A Proposed Legislative Solution” (1988) 30 Wm. & Mary 
Law Review 58. 
34 R Zimmermann Comparative Foundations of the European Law of Set-Off and Prescription (2002) 
22. 
35  C Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis 
(2011) 12. 
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role in modern society as a method of debt settlement, 36 it is necessary to identify its 
various functions. 
Set-off primarily functions as a convenient method of effecting performance;37 it is 
unnecessary for one party to pay the other, only to have the same performance 
returned.38  Set-off thus avoids circuity of performance, and enhances efficiency39 by 
facilitating the speedy settlement of debts and eliminating the need for costly 
duplication of performance.40 
Set-off also performs a security function,41 by allowing the creditor to enforce fulfilment 
of the debtor’s obligations, even in circumstances where such fulfilment would 
otherwise be difficult or even impossible to enforce.  This function of set-off is perhaps 
most evident where one party becomes insolvent.42  In such circumstances a creditor 
of the insolvent who was able to invoke set-off before concursus creditorum, is allowed 
to rely on set-off,43 provided such set-off meets the requirements of section 46 of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.44  The notion of set-off providing security upon insolvency 
has been criticised by various authors, since it contravenes the pari passu principle.45  
As Pichonnaz states, “this [security] function is not an intrinsic aim of set-off but rather 
a remnant of its historical evolution.”46  The operation of set-off in cases of insolvency 
 
                                            
36  S Scott “Skuldvergelyking – Toe (ex tunc) en Nou (ex nunc)” 2006 TSAR 595 959; PR Wood English 
and International Set-Off (1989) vii. 
37  Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 9.  Voet explains that the origin of set-off or compensatio comes from 
the ancient custom of weighing up bronze, where “an equal amount of bronze which was due on 
either side ceased, when weighed together, to be due on either side, and only that which because of 
its preponderance was not weighed together remained in credit on the one side.” (J Voet 
Commentarius ad Pandectas 16 2 1 tr P Gane The Selective Voet being the Commentary on the 
Pandects by Johannes Voet and the Supplement to that Work by Johannes van der Linden 3 (1956) 
148). 
38  Joubert Law of Contract 286. 
39  Fountoulakis Set-off Defences 1; P Pichonnaz “Set-Off” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (2005) 1033 1035, 1036. 
40  Van der Merwe et al Contract 469-470. 
41  Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 1-2, 11; C Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: 
Position Paper” (2000) UNIDROIT 1 <http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2000/study50/s-50-
062bis-e.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015); Pichonnaz “Set-Off” in UNIDROIT Principles 1036. 
42  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470. 
43 Siltek Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) t/a Workgroup v Business Connexion 2009 1 All SA 571 
(SCA); Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 497. 
44  See ch 3 (3 4 2 3 n 135) for the wording of this section. 
45  Pichonnaz “Set-Off” in UNIDROIT Principles 164; R Derham The Law of Set-Off 3 ed (2003) 245-
246; Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 44. 
46  “Set-Off” in UNIDROIT Principles 1036. 
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is discussed in more detail later,47 where it is argued that the role of set-off in this 
context should depend on the relevant policy considerations in the law of insolvency, 
rather than on the principles of set-off. 
Finally, as Voet recognised, set-off rests on the “highest equity”.48  Set-off thus plays 
a role in ensuring a fair outcome.49  According to Fountoulakis, there are three ways in 
which set-off ensures fairness.50  First, set-off provides a defence to a debtor against 
a claim from his creditor while the debtor has a counterclaim against the creditor.  In 
other words, it is seen as unfair for the creditor to demand payment from the debtor 
where the former also owes certain amounts to the debtor.51  Secondly, it enables the 
creditor to enforce an obligation which is due, but which the debtor is unable or 
unwilling to fulfil.52  It is thus a reliable method of debt collection.  A third manner in 
which set-off ensures an equitable outcome is where a debtor does not have the 
financial means to effect payment of his debt, but can fulfil his obligations towards the 
creditor by way of set-off.53  In that way, set-off prevents the debtor from defaulting on 
his payment obligations and thus suffering the consequences of breach, such as 
cancellation of the contract or the invocation of an acceleration clause. 
The functions fulfilled by set-off illustrate why it is an important tool used by large 
corporations and small businessmen alike, and “is of very considerable practical 
significance, on both a national and an international level.”54  As mentioned above, it 
is a widely accepted method used in the banking industry to collect payment on loans, 
and it is important for both banks and their customers to have clarity about the 
principles surrounding the application of set-off.  Failure to achieve certainty regarding 
the operation of set-off may defeat its purpose as an efficient and equitable remedy 
that eliminates unnecessary delays and litigation costs. 
Thus, this dissertation addresses the areas of uncertainty surrounding set-off, as briefly 
set out above.  The questions which will be investigated, and which serve as the focal 
 
                                            
47  See ch 3 (3 4 2 3 & 3 8); ch 6 (6 3 1). 
48 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 16 2 1 tr Gane The Selective Voet 3 148. 
49  Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: Position Paper” UNIDROIT 1. 
50  Set-Off Defences 11. 
51  10. 
52  11. 
53  11. 
54 Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 22. 
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points of the chapters of this thesis,55 are the following: (i) how did the principles 
regarding the operation of set-off develop;56 (ii) what is the exact nature of set-off and 
how should it operate in modern South African society;57 (iii) can the right to rely on 
set-off be excluded and if so, how;58 and (iv) how is the operation of set-off affected by 
the NCA?59 
The problems experienced with regards to certain aspects of set-off are not limited to 
South African law.  An analysis of these aspects can benefit greatly from adopting a 
comparative perspective.  Therefore, certain civilian jurisdictions, which share a similar 
historical background with South Africa in respect of the development of set-off, will be 
considered to evaluate its nature and operation.  Analysing the approaches 
recommended by the PICC60 and the PECL61 can also be highly beneficial.  In 
formulating these approaches, the respective committees responsible for drafting the 
provisions relating to set-off engaged in both an historical and a comparative analysis 
of the approaches to set-off adopted in civilian jurisdictions.  Perhaps more importantly, 
they also considered the application of set-off in modern society.  An investigation of 
the reasons leading to the recommendation of a specific approach by these 
committees may thus be of assistance in determining whether the South African 
approaches to set-off are outdated and whether there is a need for reform. 
In evaluating the origin and purpose of sections 90 and 124 of the NCA, the dissertation 
examines the following: (i) the reports and policy documents prepared during the 
drafting of the NCA; (ii) the objectives of the NCA; and (iii) the jurisdictions considered 
in drafting the NCA.  These considerations can also be instructive in suggesting the 
extent to which statutory restrictions on a credit provider’s right to invoke set-off is 
desirable. 
 
                                            
55  Also see the more detailed chapter analysis at 1 4 below. 
56  Ch 2. 
57  Ch 3. 
58  Ch 4. 
59  Ch 5. 
60  Art 8.  Also see Pichonnaz “Set-Off” in UNIDROIT Principles 1035-1075. 
61 Art 13:101-13:107.  Also see O Lando, H Beale, A Prüm & R Zimmermann (eds) The Principles of 
European Contract Law: Part III (2003) 139-155. 
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1 3 Limitation of the study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the general principles relating to set-off.  
Therefore, it does not contain an in-depth discussion of the rules regarding set-off in 
insolvency.62  Whether set-off invoked by a creditor of an insolvent will be effective and 
binding depends upon the specific rules prescribed by the law of insolvency, and 
specifically section 46 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.63  This dissertation only 
considers the operation of set-off within the context of insolvency to the extent that its 
application in this area will be impacted by adopting a specific approach to set-off.64 
1 4 Chapter analysis  
The thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 deals with the development of set-off in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law and discusses how these developments have 
influenced the operation of set-off in South African law.  In particular, it focuses on the 
origin of the dispute regarding the manner in which set-off operates and considers 
whether the different approaches to the operation of set-off might be based on a 
misinterpretation of Justinian’s decrees. 
Chapter 3 sets out the requirements for set-off, and further analyses the nature of set-
off, paying particular attention to the question whether it operates automatically or 
whether a party must raise it before it is applicable.  The practical effect of these 
approaches and the policy considerations informing them are also examined.  
Furthermore, this chapter investigates the approaches adopted in civilian jurisdictions 
in an attempt to determine whether they offer possible solutions to the current problems 
surrounding the operation of set-off in South African law. 
Chapter 4 considers the circumstances in which a party will be precluded from relying 
on set-off.  It focuses on an agreement between the parties to exclude set-off, waiver 
of a party’s right to invoke set-off and the circumstances in which a party can be 
estopped from invoking his right to set-off.  It highlights the uncertainties which exist 
 
                                            
62  Much has been written internationally on this topic: see for instance W Johnston & T Werlen (eds) 
Set-Off Law and Practice: An International Handbook (2006), where each chapter (each dealing with 
a different jurisdiction) has a separate section dealing with set-off upon insolvency; Wood Set-Off ch 
7; Derham The Law of Set-Off chs 6 & 8; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration chs 15 & 16. 
63  See ch 3 (3 4 2 3 n 135) for the wording of the section. 
64  See ch 3 (3 4 2 3). 
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regarding these exclusions, as well as the difficulty in reconciling the exclusion of set-
off with the ipso iure approach to set-off. 
The impact of sections 90 and 124 of the NCA on set-off is considered in chapter 5.  
The origin and purpose of these provisions, as well as the policy considerations 
informing them, are examined to establish whether and to what extent a limitation on 
a credit provider’s right to invoke set-off is desirable. 
Finally, chapter 6 offers suggestions for reform based on the possible solutions which 
become evident in the preceding chapters of the dissertation.  It will be argued that, 
instead of focusing on the debate regarding the two opposing views to set-off, South 
African courts should take note of international developments and opt for a solution 
which is more in line with modern commercial reality. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SET-OFF 
2 1 Introduction 
The operation of set-off in modern South African law, as in most other legal systems 
that derive their rules relating to set-off from Roman law, is not without problems.1  To 
a large extent, these difficulties can be attributed to a lack of clarity in Roman law,2 or 
more specifically to what Zimmermann describes as “Justinian’s somewhat half-
hearted attempts to consolidate the rules of classical Roman jurisprudence.”3  The 
uncertainty found in modern legal systems with regards to the operation of set-off, both 
here and abroad, may therefore be understood better by examining its origins and 
development.4  The fact that the South African and civilian legal systems share the 
same historical foundations regarding the operation of set-off also provides a basis for 
the comparative study of different modern legal systems. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the development of set-off from its Roman law 
origins to the application of set-off in Roman-Dutch law.  The principles applied in 
Roman-Dutch law were eventually adopted in South African law and form the basis of 
our understanding of the operation of set-off, as will become apparent in the next 
chapter.  Criticism levelled by modern jurists against the interpretation of historical 
sources will also be considered.   
2 2 Compensatio in classical Roman law 
In classical Roman law, set-off or compensatio operated purely as a procedural 
mechanism,5 which meant that it could only operate in the context of judicial 
proceedings.  There was also no rule providing for the general application of set-off.6  
 
                                            
1  JH Loots & P Van Warmelo “Compensatio” (1956) 19 THRHR 166 166; JC de Wet & AH van Wyk 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 272. 
2  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 166. 
3 R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 761; M 
Kaser Römisches Privatrecht 10 ed (1977) tr R Dannenbring Roman Private Law 3 ed (1980) 265. 
4  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 166. 
5  Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman Private Law 265; Zimmermann Obligations 761 
n 100, with reference to G IV 61 sqq; Inst IV 6; R Zimmermann Comparative Foundations of the 
European Law of Set-Off and Prescription (2002) 24. 
6  JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 107. 
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According to the Institutes of Gaius,7 which provides the best source of the principles 
applicable in classical Roman law and the earliest surviving document discussing set-
off,8 compensatio was initially only recognised in three specific instances, except 
where the parties reached an agreement regarding set-off.9  These were bonae fidei 
actions, actions by bankers and actions by the purchaser of an insolvent estate 
(bonorum emptor).  Each of these actions had its own requirements, although they all 
required that the claims existed between the same persons.10  
2 2 1 Bonae fidei iudicia 
In bonae fidae actions, the judge was tasked with determining what was due to the 
plaintiff ex fide bona.11  The formula used by the plaintiff in these types of actions 
included a specific reference to good faith, which resulted in the judge having some 
discretion to decide what the defendant owed.12  Because it was not fair for the 
defendant to be held liable for more than the balance owing from a transaction, the 
judge could take into account counterclaims that arose from the same transaction,13 
and reduce the amount awarded to the plaintiff accordingly.14  Compensatio in this 
instance was a natural consequence of bona fidei actions15 rather than a form of set-
off created by an emperor or legislator with specific policy considerations in mind. 
The judge was, however, not obliged to deduct the counterclaim, and whether or not 
he did so was left entirely to his discretion.16  Therefore, set-off in these cases did not 
occur automatically17 and could not be said to have taken place ipso iure (automatically 
 
                                            
7  See G IV 61-68 tr E Poste Gaii Institutionum Iuris Civilis Commentarii Quattuor or Elements of Roman 
Law by Gaius 3 ed (1890) 445-447. 
8  C Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis 
(2011) 27; ME Tigar “Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: Compensatio from Rome to 
California” (1965) 53 Calif L Rev 229. 
9  See 2 2 2 3 below. 
10  D 16 2 9, D 16 2 23; P Pichonnaz “The Retroactive Effect of Set-Off (Compensatio): A Journey 
through Roman Law to the New Dutch Civil Code” 2000 TR 541 559, with reference to Gordian C 4 
31 9. 
11  Thomas Roman Law 108. 
12  D Johnston Roman Law in Context (1999) 116. 
13  G IV 61; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 10, 26-27. 
14  G IV 61. 
15  RW Leage & CH Ziegler Roman Private Law 2 ed (1948) 427; R Sohm Institutionen: Geschichte und 
System des römischen Privatrechts 12 ed (1905) tr JC Ledlie The Institutes: A Textbook of the History 
and System of Roman Private Law 3 ed (1907) 441; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 27. 
16  G IV 63; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 27. 
17  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 167. 
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by operation of law without requiring any action by the defendant).  If the judge refused 
to take the claim of the defendant into account, the defendant was allowed to sue 
thereon in a separate action.18  From this it can be deduced that where the defendant 
failed to raise set-off as a defence for consideration by the judge, he did not lose his 
original claim and retained the right to enforce it.  This provides a further indication that 
the debts were not reduced automatically, but only where the defendant raised (and 
the judge allowed) compensatio as a defence. 
Compensatio in this form was quite limited: it was only available in bonae fidei actions, 
it could only be effected by the judge or praetor if he decided to do so, and only 
counterclaims arising from the same transaction could be raised.19  Furthermore, 
although it was not specifically stated by Gaius, a reasonable inference can be drawn 
that the debts had to be due and enforceable,20 although it is uncertain whether the 
debts had to be of the same kind.21 
2 2 2 Actiones stricti iuris 
Thus far, the focus was on actions governed by good faith. These actions stood in 
contrast to actiones stricti iuris, where the judge enjoyed no discretion to adjudicate 
according to the standard of good faith.  Thus, in the context of stricti iuris actions, the 
judge generally had no opportunity to consider the possibility of set-off.22  However, in 
certain circumstances compensatio could be relied on in such actions.  These 
situations were limited to the two exceptions mentioned below (i.e. actions by bankers 
and actions by purchasers of insolvent estates),23 an agreement between the parties 
to reduce their claims24 or where the exceptio doli was used. 
 
                                            
18  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 168, citing Solazzi La compensazione nel diritto romano (1950) 
22 sq. 
19  Zimmermann Obligations 762; Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman Private Law 265. 
20  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 167. 
21  Some authors are of the opinion that the debts had to be of the same kind and easily ascertainable 
(P van Warmelo An Introduction to the Principles of Roman Civil Law (1976) 239; Loots & Van 
Warmelo 1956 THRHR 167), whereas others state that it was not required that the performance 
owed had to be of the same kind and nature (Zimmermann Obligations 762). 
22  Zimmermann Obligations 762. 
23  G IV 61-68; Thomas Roman Law 108. 
24  Zimmermann Obligations 762; Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman Private Law 265. 
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2 2 2 1 Actions by bankers (argentarii) 
The first exception where set-off was allowed in stricti iuris actions, was in the case of 
an action instituted by a banker (argentarius) against his client.  The relationship 
between a client and his banker was characterised by a number of transactions 
performed with or on behalf of each other, each of which constituted a separate cause 
of action.25  For example: the client deposited 100 sestercii with his banker; the banker 
paid 60 sestercii to the client, and the banker thereafter paid 80 sestercii to a third party 
pursuant to an instruction by the client.  In so far as the payment of the 60 sestercii did 
not constitute a solutio or repayment of the debt, these constituted three separate legal 
actions: the client had a claim of 100 against the banker under the original loan, and 
the banker usually had two separate claims of 60 and 80 each against the client.   
However, in Roman law a banker was only allowed to sue his client for the net balance 
of the client’s account.26  To use the example above, the banker was compelled to take 
into account the 100 sestercii deposited by the client, as well as his payment to the 
client of 60 sestercii.  He could therefore only claim 40 sestercii from the client, which 
was the difference between the 80 sestercii he advanced on the client’s behalf and the 
remaining 40 sestercii he still owed the client.  If the banker claimed more than the 
balance, he was guilty of pluris petitio,27 which was a penalty that was imposed where 
the plaintiff claimed an amount in excess of the amount to which he was entitled.28  In 
such a case, the consequences were drastic: the judge could refuse the banker’s entire 
action and he would lose any future action based on that claim, even if he only over-
claimed by an insignificant amount (e.g. 41 sestercii instead of 40).29 
The potential quantity of transactions involved in this type of relationship meant that it 
was clearly desirable to acknowledge compensatio in order to prevent a multiplication 
of claims.30  However, this form of compensatio only took place where the banker 
instituted action, and not where the client claimed from the banker.31  The rationale 
 
                                            
25  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 168-169. 
26  G IV 64. 
27  Zimmermann Obligations 765. 
28  See G IV 53-60. 
29  G IV 68; Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman Private Law 265. 
30  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 169. 
31  170. 
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behind compelling the banker to effect compensatio and the dire consequences 
imposed on him if he failed to do so, was that the banker was the one responsible for 
bookkeeping,32 whereas it was unlikely that the client possessed the necessary 
accounting skills to record the transactions.33   
This type of compensatio was confined to claims of the same kind34 and the banker 
only had to take account of debts that were already due.35  Set-off was prescribed by 
law – it occurred ipso iure36 and did not depend on the discretion of a judge.37  There 
are however questions regarding the time set-off took effect and the extent to which it 
took place automatically.  For example, it is unclear what effect compensatio had on 
the running of interest and whether the client could be held liability for penalties due to 
late payment in circumstances where set-off could have operated. 
2 2 2 2 Actions by purchasers of insolvent estates 
The second exceptional instance of compensatio in the context of stricti iuris actiones 
in classical law operated in the context of a bonorum emptor who bought the estate of 
an insolvent (defraudator).  Where a person was unable to fulfil his obligations, his 
assets were sold as a unity to a buyer (bonorum emptor).38  In return for receiving 
these assets, the buyer undertook to pay a dividend to creditors of the insolvent 
estate.39 
The assets forming part of the insolvent estate and sold to the bonorum emptor might 
have included claims against debtors of the estate.  The bonorum emptor was allowed 
to institute action to collect these claims.  However, if one of the debtors was also a 
creditor of the insolvent estate, the bonorum emptor could only claim from such a 
debtor the balance of the amount owed by the debtor to the estate. 40  In other words, 
where a debtor of the insolvent estate had a counterclaim against the estate, the debtor 
 
                                            
32  170. 
33  Thomas Roman Law 108. 
34  G IV 66. 
35  G IV 67. 
36  Zimmermann Obligations 764 n 114; Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 239-240; Loots & Van Warmelo 
1956 THRHR 168.  
37  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 170. 
38  170. 
39  170. 
40  G IV 65. 
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could insist that the amount claimed from him by the bonorum emptor be reduced by 
the amount of his counterclaim.41 
As stated above, the purchaser of an insolvent estate was obliged to pay a dividend, 
for instance 70%, to all the creditors of an insolvent estate.  For example, if the 
insolvent owed A 100 sestercii, A could only claim 70 sestercii from the bonorum 
emptor.  However, some authors are of the opinion that a debtor who was 
simultaneously a creditor of the estate, could set off the full amount of his claim.42  For 
example, if the defraudator (or bonorum emptor as his “successor”) had a claim of 300 
sestercii against A, the latter could deduct the full 100 sestercii and only pay 200 
sestercii to the bonorum emptor.  This clearly benefited A, because if set-off did not 
operate in this context, the defraudator would have a claim of 300 sestercii against A, 
but A would only be entitled to 70 sestercii from the bonorum emptor.  This benefit may 
provide a possible explanation for recognising compensatio in this context.  Why a 
creditor would receive this form of protection is not certain, but perhaps it was regarded 
as unfair to expect a creditor to pay the full amount of his debt to the insolvent estate 
where he only received a percentage of the amount owed to him. 
In this instance, even where the debt was of a different genus it had to be deducted.43  
To use the same example as Gaius, if the insolvent estate owed B corn or wine, the 
value thereof had to be deducted by the bonorum emptor if he instituted a claim against 
B for money owed to the insolvent estate.44  Furthermore, a debt which was not yet 
due also had to be taken into account.45  These two deviations from the principles 
applicable to the other forms of compensatio mentioned above further benefited the 
creditor of the insolvent estate, since it increased the number of debts which were 
susceptible to set-off. 
The bonorum emptor was not held to the same strict rules as the banker however and 
where he sued for an amount in excess of the balance, he would not forfeit his entire 
 
                                            
41  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 170-171. 
42  172. 
43 G IV 66. 
44  G IV 66.  
45  G IV 67. 
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claim.46  The judge was tasked with determining and balancing the two claims,47 similar 
to bonae fidei actions, with the important distinction that here it did not depend on his 
discretion.48  The compensatio therefore did not take place ipso iure49 (unlike the case 
of the banker), but once a counterclaim was proved, the judge was obliged to decrease 
the award by the amount of such a demand.50 
2 2 2 3 Agreement between the parties and the exceptio doli 
Roman law allowed the parties to come to an agreement (which could be informal) to 
set their claims off against each other51 in the form of a pactum for release.52  In the 
absence of such an agreement (or the application of the exceptions referred to above), 
the parties had to sue each other in separate actions.53 
Initially, the stringent formula applied in stricti iuris actions did not allow for equitable 
considerations:54 the judge only had to determine whether the claim contained in the 
formula was due or not.55  The defendant was allowed to deny the existence of the 
claim, but could not plead a counterclaim.56  However, these strict principles were later 
relaxed and the praetor could take compensatio into account.57  This could only be 
done if the defendant had a counterclaim which was due and of the same kind as the 
claim of the plaintiff, and such a counterclaim became evident during the course of the 
proceedings before the praetor.58  Another important requirement was that the 
counterclaim had to be certain as to its existence and its amount,59 sometimes referred 
to as having to be ‘liquidated’.60  In those circumstances, the praetor could request the 
plaintiff to reduce his claim with the amount of the counterclaim.61  If the plaintiff refused 
 
                                            
46  G IV 68. 
47  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 171; Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 240. 
48  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 171; Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 240. 
49  Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 240. 
50  240. 
51  Zimmermann Obligations 762; DH van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law (1983) 357. 
52  Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman Private Law 265. 
53  Zimmermann Obligations 762. 
54  Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 151; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 28. 
55  Tigar 1965 Calif L Rev 227. 
56  Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 25. 
57  Zimmermann Obligations 762-673. 
58  762. 
59  Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 28. 
60  28. 
61  Zimmermann Obligations 762. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   18 
 
  
in circumstances where either the counterclaim was undisputed or the defendant was 
able immediately to prove the existence and amount of his claim, the judge could deny 
the plaintiff’s action.62  The reason for the denial was that condemnation in the full 
amount would not be fair and proper.63  
Difficulty arose where the praetor was uncertain about the defendant’s counterclaim, 
or the claim was not liquidated, since the strict formula of stricti iuris actions did not 
provide an opportunity for the praetor to evaluate the counterclaim.64  As a solution, 
shortly after the time of Gaius,65 a special regulation by Marcus Aurelius made it 
possible for a debtor to raise a counterclaim in stricti iuris actions66 through the use of 
the exceptio doli.67  This meant that the defendant had the option to insert the exception 
in the formula68 and effect compensatio, even in respect of a counterclaim which was 
not liquidated.69  However, the defendant was not obliged to do so.70  By introducing 
this exception, the Emperor discarded the requirement that the claims had to arise out 
of the same transaction,71 although the debts probably had to be of the same kind.72 
Compensatio in this instance was achieved through the intervention of a judge73 after 
being raised as an exception, and therefore could not have been said to take place 
ipso iure.  However, unlike bonae fidei actions, set-off did not depend on the discretion 
of the judge.74 
Exactly how this compensatio took place in the context of these stricti iuris actions is 
still somewhat uncertain.75  The exceptio doli was a procedural defence which could 
be used where there was fraud underlying the establishment of a claim.76  If fraud was 
 
                                            
62  762. 
63  Zimmermann Obligations 762; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 10. 
64  Zimmermann Obligations 763; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 28. 
65  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 172. 
66  Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 240. 
67  Inst IV 6 30; C 14 31 4, 4 31 14; DJ Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 287; 
Zimmermann Obligations 763. 
68  Zimmermann Obligations 763. 
69  Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 28. 
70  Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 240. 
71  Poste Elements of Roman Law 521-522; Tigar 1965 Calif L Rev 231. 
72  JAC Thomas The Institutes of Justinian (1975) 297. 
73  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 173. 
74  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 175-176; Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman 
Private Law 266. 
75  Zimmermann Obligations 764; Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 173. 
76  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 174. 
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proven by the defendant, the praetor would dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.77  The 
application of the exceptio doli in the context of compensatio was problematic in two 
ways.  First, the exceptio doli normally required mala fides, which could not necessarily 
be said to be present where the plaintiff disputed the existence of a counterclaim.78  
Secondly, there was no middle ground.  Either the plaintiff’s claim was successful and 
the full amount awarded, or his entire claim was dismissed.79  This would not have 
been a problem where the defendant’s claim was in excess of the plaintiff’s demand, 
for in such a case it made sense for the plaintiff’s claim to be dismissed.  For instance, 
if the defendant had a counterclaim of 200 against the plaintiff’s claim of 100, it was 
justifiable for the plaintiff not to be awarded anything.  However, it would have been 
unfair towards the plaintiff where the defendant’s claim was a lot smaller than the 
plaintiff’s claim.80 
Different theories regarding the operation of the exceptio doli in this context have been 
formulated.81  The theory that is most commonly accepted is that the plaintiff was asked 
to reduce his claim with the amount of the counterclaim.82  If he accepted, the praetor 
could award the amount of the reduced claim.83  However, if he refused, he ran the risk 
of losing his whole claim instead of it just being reduced.84  According to this theory, 
where the plaintiff refused to reduce his claim despite the fact that the existence of the 
defendant’s counterclaim was proven, he was no longer acting bona fide and therefore 
it was not inequitable if the judge refused his claim and absolved the defendant.85 
The strict formal requirements for compensatio were later relaxed,86 so that by relying 
on the exceptio doli the claim could be reduced.87  Presumably the exceptio doli also 
 
                                            
77  174. 
78  G IV 119. 
79  G IV 53-57; Zimmermann Obligations 763; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 25; Loots & Van Warmelo 
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81  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 174; Zimmermann Obligations 764. 
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reduce the amount awarded (1965 Calif L Rev 231; Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences 28 n 33) 
83  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 175; Zimmermann Obligations 764. 
84  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 175; Zimmermann Obligations 764. 
85  Zimmermann Obligations 764. 
86  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 175. 
87  Sohm Institutionen tr Ledlie The Institutes 443. 
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later made it possible for set-off to operate in bonae fidei iudicia where the counterclaim 
was not based on the same causa.88  These developments paved the way for Justinian 
to recognise a more generalised form of set-off.89 
It is clear that the classical Roman jurists failed to develop a “uniform, logical and 
systematic approach to the problem of set-off”.90  In some instances the debts had to 
be of the same kind, in other situations it was not a requirement.  For certain types of 
compensatio the obligations had to arise from the same transaction, whereas for other 
types of set-off this was not a requirement.  Set-off could be said to take place ipso 
iure in certain instances, but at other times depended wholly on the discretion of the 
judge.  Undeniably, a more standardised set of rules was desirable and the time for 
reform was ripe.  
2 3 Compensatio in post-classical Roman law: Justinian’s decrees 
In the post-classical period, the distinction between the different forms of compensatio 
started to disappear91 and a trend towards generalisation became apparent.92  This 
resulted in Justinian attempting to formulate a rule93 allowing for set-off to take place 
by operation of law in all possible situations94 where the claim was capable of 
immediate assessment95 (regardless of whether it was an iudicium stricti iuris or bonae 
fidei),96 and without leaving it to the discretion of the judge.97  He stated that: 
“A constitution of our own, however, has allowed more generally those set-offs which 
obviously arise so that, as a matter of law, they reduce claims…”98 
and elsewhere: 
“We decree that set-offs shall take place by operation of law in all lawsuits, without making 
any distinction between real or personal actions.”99 
 
                                            
88  Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman Private Law 266. 
89  Zimmermann Obligations 766. 
90  765. 
91  Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 173, 176. 
92  Zimmermann Obligations 766. 
93  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 272. 
94  Sohm Institutionen tr Ledlie The Institutes 446. 
95  Thomas Roman Law 109. 
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97  176. 
98  Inst IV 6 30 tr JAC Thomas The Institutes of Justinian (1975) 288. 
99  C 4 31 14 tr SP Scott The Civil Law VI (1973) 77. 
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To a large extent, the procedure used in bona fidei actions was extended to all actions.  
The judge determined the amount to which the defendant was condemned, but in 
calculating the amount he had to take into account any liquid counterclaims and set-
off no longer depended on his discretion.100  Only the balance was regarded as the 
amount of the debt.101  Importantly, it was no longer required that the actions arose 
from the same cause,102 although the performances owed had to be of the same 
nature.103 
However, the meaning of the decrees by Justinian that set-off takes place ipso iure 
(i.e. by operation of law)104 is so unclear, that since the Middle Ages different views 
have developed regarding the operation of set-off.105  The ordinary meaning of the 
phrase in this context is that compensatio takes place automatically, without requiring 
any action by the parties or the judge.106  Therefore “[b]oth claims [were] regarded as 
being satisfied without any intervention of either of the parties being necessary”107 and 
were regarded as having been extinguished merely by having co-existed.108 
There is evidence supporting the abovementioned interpretation.  For instance, it is 
stated in the Digest109 that where a debtor has paid his debt in a situation where set-
off could have operated, he could reclaim the monies paid with the condictio indebiti 
“as if what was not owing had been paid.”110  This seems to indicate that if a debt was 
susceptible to set-off, the debtor no longer owed that debt to the creditor, because it 
had been extinguished automatically.  Justinian also indicated that interest will cease 
to accrue on a debt which is susceptible to compensatio,111 which further supports the 
notion that the debt was no longer due if set-off could operate. 
 
                                            
100  Inst IV 6 39; Zimmermann Obligations 766; Kaser Römisches Privatrecht tr Dannenbring Roman 
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On the other hand, there are also texts which indicate that compensatio did not take 
place ipso iure in the sense described above.  For instance, in his Codex, Justinian 
states that “set-off can be pleaded”.112  Various other texts employ phrases such as 
“being ready to make set-off”,113 “allowing set-off”114, having the “option [to] … demand 
set-off”115 or that “the judge … shall order … set-off”,116 none of which are in line with 
the automatic operation set-off.  It can be argued that the use of the phrase “ipso iure” 
only meant that it was no longer necessary for set-off to be raised by way of an 
exception,117 although it still had to be pleaded before a judge.118  Another possible 
explanation is that “ipso iure” referred to the type of compensatio which a banker was 
required to effect in classical law,119 which was prescribed by law and was not effected 
by the judge.120  It is therefore possible that Justinian only intended a form of set-off 
which was not dependent on a judge to become effective, and that he further attributed 
ex nunc effect to set-off.121 
In the light of the above, it comes as no surprise that subsequent jurists have struggled 
to formulate a universally accepted theory of how Justinian’s set-off operated. 
2 4 The subsequent interpretation of the post-classical Roman-law 
approach to set-off 
2 4 1 The Glossators 
The result of the uncertainty with regards to Justinian’s decrees was that as early as 
the time of the Glossators two views developed regarding the operation of set-off.122  
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One group (which included Marthinus Gosia) held that compensatio takes place 
automatically123 and therefore no declaration is required.  According to them, the judge 
was obliged to deduct a liquid counterclaim, regardless of whether the defendant 
raised set-off.124  This position was later adopted by the French historical school,125 
and Pothier also understood ipso iure to mean that compensatio occurs automatically 
without any person having to do anything to bring it about.126 
The majority of Glossators (which included Azo)127 recognised “automatic” set-off, but 
still required a declaration in court128 in order to bring it to the attention to the judge so 
that he could take it into account.129  They were of the opinion that compensatio is 
something on which a party must rely, after which it was effected by a judge,130 
although it not depend on the discretion of the judge.131  For them the declaration had 
no substantive effect but served merely as a notification that the debt had been 
extinguished automatically,132 therefore they held that the effect of the declaration was 
retrospective.133  According to their argument, the phrase “ipso iure” indicated that 
compensatio occurred by operation of law and did not depend on a decision by any 
party or the discretion of the judge.134  Nonetheless set-off took place judicially through 
intervention of a judge135 and because the judge would otherwise not be aware of the 
existence of the counterclaim, practical considerations supported the requirement of a 
declaration.136 
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2 4 2 The Roman-Dutch jurists 
Two divergent approaches regarding the operation of set-off also developed in Roman-
Dutch law.137  The majority of Roman-Dutch writers followed the approach that set-off 
takes place ipso iure,138 although they recognised that the defendant must raise the 
defence of compensatio139 in order to bring it to the attention of the court.140  Raising 
the defence of compensatio merely served as a notification that the debt had been 
extinguished141 and therefore, once raised, the operation of set-off would date back to 
the moment it first became possible.142  Accordingly, interest would no longer run on 
that part of the creditor’s claim which became susceptible to set-off.143  The debtor 
would also not be liable for a penalty or fine for late payment if he had the right to set-
off at the time that payment became due.144 
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Proponents of the abovementioned view held that where the defendant failed to raise 
his claim and paid the full amount, he could reclaim the amount paid as an 
indebitum.145  This is a logical consequence of the fact that the debts were extinguished 
automatically: because the debt no longer existed, there was no legal ground for the 
payment.  However, Voet146 also stated that a debtor could choose whether he wanted 
to rely on set-off; if he chose instead to pay his debt, he retained his right to collect the 
original debt.  This is clearly inconsistent with the automatic operation of set-off he 
supported.147 
Voet was further of the opinion that set-off depended on the utmost free will of the 
person raising it.148  Therefore, a person who did not claim set-off when he could have 
done so was not regarded as having released his adversary.149  However, according 
to Voet: 
“Clearly if a person who has the capacity of set-off and is not unaware of it has neglected 
somewhat often to employ set-off, when he has no reasonable cause for having wished 
rather that his credit should be preserved to him than that it should be destroyed by set-off, 
an inference that the debt has in that case been foregone is not unreasonable.”150 
It is once again difficult to reconcile these statements by Voet with the ipso iure 
operation of set-off advocated by him, since it seems to indicate that the defendant had 
a choice whether or not set-off should operate. 
There was also support for an opposing view, namely that a declaration by the parties 
was required for set-off to operate.151  However, such a declaration had a retrospective 
effect, which meant that the debts extinguished each other from the moment of their 
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mutual existence.152  Van Leeuwen required the declaration to take place by way of 
exception or defence,153 and therefore in the course of legal proceedings. 
It is clear that both these approaches required the intervention of a judge for set-off to 
become effective (although it did not depend on his discretion) – an informal out-of-
court declaration was not accepted by either group.  A possible reason for this is that 
acting without the intervention of a judge would amount to a form of “self-help”, which 
was forbidden.154  However despite this, set-off was no longer merely a procedural 
remedy (which could only operate as the equivalent of a modern counterclaim), but 
rather a substantive right.155  This meant that its “effects [were] produced 
independently from the rendering of a judgement”156 and set-off could have a 
substantive effect, for instance to stop the running of interest, even before it had been 
raised in judicial proceedings.  This also meant that if the debtor failed to raise 
compensatio as a defence, he was allowed to invoke it even after judgment.157 
In order to effect set-off, the debts must have subsisted between the same parties.158  
It was required that the counterclaim had to be of the same kind as the claim159 and 
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that it was both liquid160 and due,161 although the debts did not need to arise from the 
same cause.162  Huber attributed the first two aspects, namely that the counterclaim 
had to be of the same kind and liquid, to what he called the “immediacy characteristic 
of set-off”,163 since compensatio could not take place automatically by operation of law 
where a determination of values was required.  Nonetheless, the question whether the 
debt was liquid largely depended on the discretion of the judge.164 
2 4 3 The Pandectists 
It has been suggested that the German Pandectists gave new meaning to the 
declaration required to effect set-off,165 and that under their influence, a shift took place 
in the importance of the declaration:166 where it was first merely declaratory, the effect 
of the declaration then became constitutive, meaning that it was only possible to realise 
set-off by way of a declaration.167  According to Pichonnaz, the development of the 
notion of retroactivity can be ascribed to this shift in the importance of the declaration, 
but he indicates that it is unclear why the effect of the declaration should be 
retroactive.168 
It is argued that the reason why the Pandectists attributed a retrospective effect to the 
declaration of set-off, was possibly due to their attempt to reconcile their theory with 
the two texts of the Digest.169  The first text on which the Pandectists base their theory 
is D 16 2 10 1, which reads as follows: 
 
                                            
160  Huber HR 3 41 11 tr Gane The Jurisprudence of my Time 1 599; Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 
16 2 4, 16 2 17 tr Gane The Selective Voet 3 153, 168-169; De Groot Inl 3 40 8, 3 40 10 tr Maasdorp 
Introduction 334; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1 18 4 3 tr Juta Institutes of Holland 203; 
Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Gr 3 40 6, 3 40 8, 3 40 10 tr Van Warmelo et al Voorlesinge 427, 
429. 
161  Huber HR 3 41 13 tr Gane The Jurisprudence of my Time 1 599; Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 
16 2 4, 16 2 17 tr Gane The Selective Voet 3 153, 168-169; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1 
18 4 2 tr Juta Institutes of Holland 203. 
162  Huber 3 41 13 tr Gane The Jurisprudence of my Time 1 599-600. 
163 HR 3 41 9 tr Gane The Jurisprudence of my Time 1 598-599. 
164 Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 181, with reference to Van Leeuwen Cens For I IV 36 3 4. 
165  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 554. 
166 554.  
167 554.  
168  554. 
169  554. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   28 
 
  
“Accordingly, if someone who is able to make set-off pays, he can bring a condictio as if 
what was not owing has been paid.”170 
The second text which influenced the Pandectists is D 16 2 11: 
“When one party owes the other money without interest and the latter owes money with 
interest, it has been decided in a constitutio by the deified Severus that the interest on the 
respective sums of both parties is not to be paid.”171 
Both of these texts prima facie support either the ipso iure or retrospective operation 
of set-off.  The first text seems to indicate that the debts had been discharged 
automatically by set-off at the moment that the requirements for set-off were fulfilled.  
Therefore, any payment made can be reclaimed with an enrichment action as nothing 
was due after that moment.  The second text is along the same lines and seems to 
indicate that the running of interest is suspended from the moment that set-off could 
operate, because the debts are extinguished automatically.  Neither of these texts 
appears to require a declaration of set-off in order for set-off to occur. 
As discussed above, 172 a similar effect was already acknowledged by Van Leeuwen.  
He also considered the declaration a prerequisite for set-off to operate and therefore, 
unlike the majority of Roman-Dutch jurists, attributed a substantive effect to the 
declaration of set-off.  Presumably, his reasoning was based on the same texts which 
influenced the Pandectists. 
2 4 4 Modern jurists  
Thus far, this chapter has shown that the conflicting opinions on the operation of set-
off may be traced back to the use of the phrase “ipso iure” in Justinian’s decrees.  Just 
like the Glossators and Roman-Dutch jurists, modern writers have struggled to agree 
on a proper interpretation of Justinian’s decrees.173  The dispute regarding the meaning 
 
                                            
170 Tr Watson Digest 9. 
171  Tr Watson Digest 10.  Why the text refers to interest “on the respective sums” where the first part 
indicates that interest is only owing on one of the debts is not clear.  It does not seem to be a 
translation error, as Scott’s translation also states that “interest was not due on the sums owed to 
one another by the two parties respectively” (Scott Civil Law II 286). 
172  See 2 4 2 above. 
173  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 36. 
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of the phrase “ipso iure” and whether or not a declaration was required to effect set-off 
under Justinian’s rule remains unsettled even in modern law.174   
It must be kept in mind that Justinian did nothing innovative by introducing the concept 
of ipso iure compensatio – he merely confirmed a previous practice which had 
developed in the late classical period.175  Procedural requirements became less formal 
in post-classical times, and it was no longer necessary to invoke a special exception 
at the beginning of the proceedings, because the right to set-off was included in the 
action itself, ipso iure.176  The phrase “ipso iure” was also not new, but was used by 
classical jurists.177  Therefore by speaking of compensatio ipso iure, Justinian merely 
recognised this pre-existing principle and further stated that actions could be reduced 
if a counterclaim was raised.178  One should therefore “not be unduly let astray by the 
term ‘ipso iure’”.179 
Arguably, those who interpret the Digest as providing for automatic set-off without 
requiring any form of declaration by the parties, fail to take into account all the texts of 
the Digest.180  Van Niekerk states that viewed with some of the other texts of the Digest, 
“it is in fact difficult to comprehend how generations of later jurists could deduce from 
these texts an automatic extinction of a debt pro tanto by setting off without volition of 
the parties.”181  Such a view is for instance difficult to reconcile with D 16 2 2,182 which 
reads as follows: 
“Anyone bars the claim of his creditor, who at the same time is his debtor, if he is ready to 
make set-off.”183 
This text envisages a choice on the part of the debtor to decide whether he wishes to 
invoke set-off, although such a choice is completely inconsistent with the view that set-
off operates automatically.  
 
                                            
174  Zimmermann Obligations 761.  See Chapter 3 for a full discussion. 
175 Pichonnaz 2000 TR 546.  See also Zimmermann Obligations 766-767. 
176  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 546; Zimmermann Obligations 766-767. 
177  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 546 with reference to D 16 2 21, D 16 2 4 and D 16 10 23. 
178 Pichonnaz 2000 TR 546. 
179  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 31. 
180  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 32; Loots & Van Warmelo 1956 THRHR 178. 
181  1968 SALJ 32. 
182  Also mentioned at 2 3 above. 
183 Translation Watson Digest 9. 
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Some leading authors in the field (especially in Europe)184 have also raised doubts 
regarding the interpretation of Justinian’s decrees by the earlier writers, such as the 
Pandectists and Roman-Dutch authors.185  Two such authors are Pichonnaz and 
Zimmermann.  Whereas Pichonnaz186 places particular emphasis on the historical 
reasons why these views are “dogmatically inappropriate”,187 Zimmermann188 focuses 
on practical and policy reasons to indicate why reform is desirable.  These policy 
considerations will be discussed in a subsequent chapter,189 but it would be beneficial 
to take cognisance of Pichonnaz’s critique here. 
Pichonnaz focuses on the development by the German Pandectists, and in particular 
the two texts he argues their views were based on (as discussed above).190  He 
emphasises that is important to read both these texts in their proper context. 
According to the inscriptio, the first of the abovementioned texts191 forms part of 
Ulpian’s discussion regarding the selling of an insolvent estate.192  It therefore initially 
dealt with a very specific case, namely where a creditor of an insolvent estate who was 
simultaneously a debtor of the estate failed to invoke set-off.193  It thus reflects the type 
of set-off applied by the bonorum emptor, as discussed above.194  The reason behind 
the provision was to protect a creditor who was able to set the full amount of his claim 
off against the debt owing to the insolvent, but who, if he had to sue for payment, could 
only claim the percentage offered by the bonorum emptor.195  
This can be illustrated by using the same example as above.196  Where the bonorum 
emptor paid a dividend of 70% and A had a claim of 100 sestercii against the 
defraudator, he would only receive 70 sestercii.  However, if A also owed 300 sestercii 
to the insolvent estate, he could presumably deduct the entire 100 sestercii and 
therefore only had to repay 200 sestercii.  But what happened where A failed to invoke 
 
                                            
184  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 544. 
185 See for instance Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 31-33. 
186  2000 TR 541-546. 
187  541. 
188  See for instance European Law of Set-Off 22-60 
189  See ch 3 (specifically 3 6 to 3 8). 
190  See 2 4 3 above. 
191  D 16 2 10 1. 
192 Pichonnaz 2000 TR 555. 
193 555. 
194 See 2 2 2 2 above. 
195  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 555. 
196  See 2 2 2 2 above. 
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set-off and paid the full 300 sestercii?  Ordinarily A would be left with a claim of 70 
sestercii.  However, this statement by Ulpian meant that the part of the amount paid by 
A that was susceptible to set-off (i.e. 100 of the 300 sestercii) was seen as an undue 
payment.  He was therefore allowed to reclaim the full 100 sestercii as if an amount 
which was not due was paid by him to the insolvent estate.  In the absence of this 
decree, A would have had to rely on the insolvent’s original indebtedness (in other 
words, his original claim instead of a claim for restitution of an undue payment) and 
would merely have been able to claim the reduced amount (i.e. 70 sestercii).  
The second text,197 attributed to Paul, according to the inscriptio possibly dealt with the 
case of a partnership (societas).198  Pichonnaz argues that the only scenario to which 
it can apply is where one of the partners was guilty of abuse of the common funds in 
the partnership by not immediately returning profits obtained while acting on behalf of 
the societas.199  Such a partner had to return the money with interest in order to 
compensate for the loss of profit.  In the case of a societas with only two associates 
(such as contemplated in the text),200 the obligation to return the money to the 
partnership in effect amounted to giving the other partner half of the funds.201  
Therefore, if the other associate was equally indebted to the partnership, there was no 
longer an abuse of common funds.202  Consequently, interest should cease to run on 
that part of the amount in respect of which both partners were equally indebted.  For 
example, if partner A owed 100 sestercii to the partnership and partner B 150 sestercii, 
only the 50 sestercii by which B’s debt exceeded that of A should bear interest.  In 
such circumstances the reason for penalising the one partner and compensating the 
other fell away.  The rationale for the interruption in interest was thus not due to the 
operation of set-off, but rather due to fact that the reason for penalising the one partner 
had ceased to exist. 
In the light of the above, Pichonnaz argues that neither of these texts provides support 
for recognising a retroactive effect of set-off.203  He shows how two misunderstandings 
 
                                            
197  D 16 2 11. 
198 Pichonnaz 2000 TR 555. 
199 557. 
200  By use of the phrase “alter alteri” (Pichonnaz 2000 TR 557). 
201  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 557. 
202  557. 
203  556, 558. 
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led to the development of this doctrine by the Pandectists: (a) they incorrectly extended 
the ipso iure effect of set-off beyond the very specific situation of claims made against 
an insolvent estate and (b) they relied on a text which had nothing to with the operation 
of set-off in the first place.  Based on this argument, Pichonnaz states that “the two 
main grounds of justification used by the Pandectists to base a retroactive effect on 
the Roman sources failed”.204 
A third, more practical reason why the Pandectists ascribed a retrospective effect to 
the declaration of set-off, is the fact that it had to be pleaded in court.205  The 
Pandectists (like the Roman-Dutch writers) did not recognise an informal, out-of-court 
declaration.  Therefore, in the absence of a retroactive effect, the creditor who had a 
larger claim could delay instituting action and thereby earn more interest.206  Of course, 
this justification disappears if the declaration may be made out of court.207 
There is little doubt that the Roman-Dutch jurists (and in particular Van Leeuwen), 
formed their views based on the same misconceptions highlighted above.  His view 
with regards to the effect of the declaration correlated with that of the Pandectists.208  
This misconception was therefore invariably carried over to South African law and thus 
there may be scope to reconsider the manner in which set-off operates in modern 
South African law.  This will be considered in the next chapter. 
2 5 Conclusion 
Justinian attempted to standardise and generalise the fragmented approach to set-off 
followed in Roman law.  Instead, the uncertainty regarding his decrees led to divergent 
opinions with regard to the operation of set-off forming.  Different approaches have 
developed as early as the time of the Glossators, but have evolved somewhat over the 
centuries.  The Glossators were divided on whether set-off operated completely 
automatically, or automatically, but subject to a declaration in court.  The Roman-Dutch 
writers and Pandectists realised the impracticality of attributing a completely automatic 
effect to set-off and required a declaration, although they disagreed on the effect of the 
declaration, i.e. whether it served merely as a notification that the debt had 
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205  559. 
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207  559. 
208  See 2 4 2 and 2 4 3 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   33 
 
  
automatically been extinguished, or whether it had a substantive effect.  It is possible, 
however, that both these groups were misled by a combination of an unfortunate use 
of phrase “ipso iure” and the context of certain texts being lost over time. 
In the light of the above it is apparent that historical sources cannot provide a 
conclusive answer to the question of how set-off should operate.209  However, as 
Pichonnaz also admits,210 merely because current approaches to the operation of set-
off are based on an incorrect analysis of the Roman sources does not in itself provide 
a good enough justification for suggesting an amendment to the status quo.  A 
historical overview may tell us how we got to where we are, but it does not tell us which 
approach is preferable.  We still have to examine whether there are policy reasons 
which support a change in the current system.211  The next chapter will therefore 
discuss how the principles relating to the operation of set-off are applied in South 
African law.  It will especially consider whether any policy reasons exist which would 
justify a reform with regards to these principles. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
209  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470. 
210  2000 TR 559. 
211  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 559; Van der Merwe et al Contract 470.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AND OPERATION OF SET-
OFF  
3 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the historical development of set-off and explained 
how the dispute with regards to the manner in which set-off operates originated and 
evolved.  It became apparent that “[h]istorical sources contain no decisive answer to 
the question of how set-off operates … [and that] the issue must be decided by a 
judicial evaluation of the appropriate policy and principles.”1  In this chapter the nature 
of set-off in modern South African law will be analysed: does it operate automatically 
or must a party raise it before it is applicable?  The practical effect of these approaches 
and the policy considerations informing them will also be examined.  Furthermore, this 
chapter will investigate the approaches adopted in civilian jurisdictions in an attempt to 
determine whether these approaches suggest possible solutions to the current 
problems surrounding the operation of set-off in South African law. 
Before this analysis is undertaken, it is essential first to obtain a firm grasp of the 
general requirements for set-off which are applicable in South African law.  These 
requirements not only determine whether set-off can take place, but may also play a 
role when the different approaches to set-off are evaluated. 
A preliminary remark regarding terminology is also required.  For set-off to operate, 
each party must be both a debtor and a creditor of the other party, which makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the parties when referring to them.  To avoid confusion, 
this chapter will refer to the “creditor” or “plaintiff” as the person attempting to collect 
on the debt owed to him, and “debtor” or “defendant” as the person with a counterclaim 
who invokes or can invoke set-off, unless otherwise indicated.  Although the 
creditor/plaintiff can also rely on set-off, it will usually be the debtor/defendant who 
raises set-off as a defence against the other party’s claim. 
 
                                            
1  S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 4 
ed (2012) 470 n 230. 
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3 2 Requirements for set-off in South African law 
The requirements for set-off in South African law have remained relatively unchanged 
from those accepted in Roman-Dutch law,2 and are mostly settled and uncontentious.  
It is firstly required that the debts must exist between the same parties in the same 
capacities.3  Therefore, if the creditor brings a claim in a representative capacity, for 
instance as a trustee, the debtor cannot invoke set-off in respect of a claim the creditor 
owes him in his personal capacity.4  A debtor is also not entitled to set off a debt owed 
to his creditor against a debt his creditor owes to a third party,5 even where the third 
party consents to such set-off.6 
This apparently simple principle becomes somewhat more complex where multiple 
debtors or creditors are involved.  A debt which originates from a relationship of 
common or collective joint liability, i.e. where multiple debtors jointly owe the same 
debt, cannot be set off against an obligation which the creditor has towards only some 
of the debtors.7  If the debtors are jointly and severally liable, the view is mostly held 
that set-off can only operate if the creditor sues the party who also has a claim against 
him.8  The other debtors cannot invoke set-off, because there is no mutuality of debt 
 
                                            
2  See ch 2 (2 4 2). 
3 LTC Harms “Obligations” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 19 2 ed (2006) para 244; DJ 
Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 290; RH Christie & GB Bradfield Christie’s 
The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 498; D Hutchison & F Du Bois “Contracts in General” 
in F Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 733 824; CG Hall Maasdorp’s 
Institutes of South African Law 3: The Law of Contracts 9 ed (1978) 416; Capricorn Beach Home 
Owners Association v Potgieter t/a Nilands 2014 1 SA 46 (SCA) 49; Road Accident Fund v Myhill 
NO 2013 5 SA 426 (SCA). 
4  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; JC de Wet & AH van 
Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 274-275; Joubert Law of 
Contract 290; Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 498; Exley v Exley 1952 1 SA 644 (O); Strachan 
v The Master 1963 2 SA 620 (N); The Government v Regna-Adwel Business Machines Africa (Pty) 
Ltd 1970 2 SA 428 (T). 
5  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 2 
SA 693 (C). 
6  See Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244 and the authorities cited there; Hall Maasdorp’s 
Institutes 3 416. 
7  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; Strydom v Protea 
Eiendomsagente 1979 2 SA 206 (T). 
8  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 1 275; Bain v Barclays Bank (DC & O) Ltd 1937 SR 191.  Also see J R & M Moffett 
(Pty) Ltd v Kolbe Eiendoms Beleggings (Edms) (Bpk) 1974 2 SA 426 (O) 432; Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 2 SA 693 (C) 697-698; and the discussion at 3 4 2 1 n 115 
below. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   36 
 
  
between them and the creditor.9  Thus, where A, B and C are jointly and severally 
indebted to D, who is in turn indebted to A, only A will be entitled to raise set-off against 
D’s claim.  B and C will not be able to rely on set-off.  However, once set-off has 
operated between the creditor (D) and the debtor (A), the other debtors are released 
to the extent that the debt for which they are jointly and severally liable has been 
extinguished.10  The same is true of a relationship involving multiple creditors.11  Thus, 
where A is indebted to B, C and D, and A also has a claim against B, set-off can only 
operate where A is sued by B.  A will not be able to rely on set-off where either C or D 
claims from him. 
However, a surety may rely on set-off between the principal debtor and the creditor.12  
According to Van der Merwe and others,13 this flows from the accessory nature of the 
liability of the surety and is therefore not in conflict with the requirement of mutuality of 
debts.  In other words, the surety is not trying to reduce its own indebtedness, but is 
demanding that set-off takes place between the creditor and principal debtor before 
the creditor brings proceedings against him.14 
Another ostensible exception to the mutuality requirement is where a debt is ceded.  In 
such a case the cedent is no longer the creditor, because he is succeeded by the 
cessionary,15 and there is thus no longer a mutuality of debts between him and the 
debtor.  Despite this, the debtor can still rely on set-off against the cedent if set-off was 
 
                                            
9  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; Hall Maasdorp’s 
Institutes 3 416; Bain v Barclays Bank (DC & O) Ltd 1937 SR 191. 
10  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 264-265; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) 
Ltd 1984 2 SA 693 (C) 698. 
11  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 1 275; Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 416. 
12  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470-471; Joubert Law of Contract 290; Christie & Bradfield Law of 
Contract 499; Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 417-418; JJ Henning & KL Mould “Suretyship” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 26 2 ed (2015) para 291; J R & M Moffett (Pty) Ltd 
v Kolbe Eiendoms Beleggings (Edms) (Bpk) 1974 2 SA 426 (O) 432; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA 
Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 2 SA 693 (C) 698; Miller v Muller 1965 4 SA 458 (C).  However, see 
Dominick v Nedbank Limited (20463/14) 2015 ZASCA 160 (13 November 2015) and the discussion 
of that case in ch 4 (4 2 2 1). 
13  Contract 471. 
14  Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244 n 2. 
15  GF Lubbe & PM Nienaber “Cession” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 3 3 ed (2013) para 
178. 
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possible before the cession.16  However, this is not a real exception:17 the mutuality 
requirement did at one time exist, which means that set-off would have operated 
automatically before the cession took place (whereafter there was no claim that could 
be ceded)18 or its operation would be retrospective to the time the requirements for 
set-off were met.19 
The second requirement for set-off to operate is that the debts must be capable of set-
off.20  This requires that the debts must be of the same kind.21  Monetary debts are 
eiusdem generis and capable of set-off,22 but it is uncertain whether this will be the 
case where different currencies are involved.23  However, nothing prevents set-off from 
operating where non-monetary obligations are owed,24 as long as the obligations 
pertain to the same class and quality, for example the same type and grade of grain.25  
Where a specific item is identified within a class, set-off will not be able to apply, for 
instance where a horse is mentioned by name.26 
Set-off will also not be allowed where the debts are illegal.27  Set-off cannot operate if 
there is a common-law or statutory prohibition against set-off28 or if it is contrary to 
public policy.29  Therefore, set-off in respect of taxes or claims for maintenance 
 
                                            
16  Lubbe & Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 178; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 283-284; 
Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 499; Van der Merwe et al Contract 471, 475; Hutchison & Du 
Bois “Contracts in General” in Wille’s Principles 834; Van Aswegen v Pienaar 1967 3 SA 677 (O); 
Transkei Development Corporation Ltd v Oshkosh Africa (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 150 (C) 155D; Maharaj 
v Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd 2011 6 SA 17 (KZD) para 10. 
17  Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 2 SA 693 (C) 697-698; Hutchison & 
Du Bois “Contracts in General” in Wille’s Principles 834. 
18  Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 2 SA 693 (C) 698. 
19  See 3 4 2 2 below. 
20 Joubert Law of Contract 290. 
21 Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244, with reference to Van Leeuwen Censura Forensis 1 4 
36 15, Voet Commentarius 16 27 and various others; Van der Merwe et al Contract 471; De Wet & 
Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 277; Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts in General” in Wille’s Principles 833. 
22  Van der Merwe et al Contract 471; Joubert Law of Contract 290. 
23  Although not often considered in South Africa, it has been very relevant in Europe (it is termed “the 
most important practical question in this context in O Lando, H Beale, A Prüm & R Zimmermann 
(eds) The Principles of European Contract Law: Part III (2003) 140.  Also see R Zimmermann 
Comparative Foundations of the European Law of Set-Off and Prescription (2002) 48; P Pichonnaz 
& L Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration and Commercial Transactions (2014) 37). 
24  Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 414. 
25  Van der Merwe et al Contract 471; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 277; Joubert Law of Contract 
290. 
26  Van der Merwe et al Contract 471; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 277. 
27 Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 497. 
28 Joubert Law of Contract 290. 
29  Van der Merwe et al Contract 471. 
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currently due is not allowed, although claims in respect of arrear maintenance are 
susceptible to set-off.30 
A third requirement is that both debts must be due and payable,31 and therefore 
enforceable.  By relying on set-off, the debtor settles or reduces his debt and 
simultaneously compels the creditor to discharge or reduce his debt.  It thus constitutes 
a manner of enforcement of the debtor’s claim.32  Because the creditor cannot be 
required to perform before the debt is due, the debtor cannot invoke set-off before the 
debt owed to him is due and enforceable.33  If a debt is subject to either a suspensive 
condition or time-clause, it cannot be set off,34 unless the party in whose favour the 
clause operates waives the benefit of that clause.35  Where the claim is unenforceable 
(even only temporarily), set-off cannot operate in respect of that claim.36  The exception 
is natural obligations, where set-off is allowed even though such obligations are not 
enforceable.37  This exception probably does not pertain to a prescribed debt, where 
 
                                            
30  Van der Merwe et al Contract 471; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 243; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 1 281; Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286; Tregoning v 
Tregoning 1914 WLD 95; Luttig v Luttig 1994 1 SA 524 (O); Commissioner of Taxes v First Merchant 
Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd 1998 1 SA 27 (ZS). 
31 Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; Joubert Law of Contract 290; Christie & Bradfield Law 
of Contract 496; Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts in General” in 
Wille’s Principles 833; Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 419; Van Pareen v Pareen’s Properties (Pty) Ltd 
1948 1 SA 335 (T); Treasurer-General v Van Vuren 1905 TS 582 589-590; Roman Catholic Church 
(Klerksdorp Diocese) v Southern Life Association Ltd 1992 2 SA 807 (A) 814-815; Siltek Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) t/a Workgroup v Business Connexion 2009 1 All SA 571 (SCA). 
32  P Pichonnaz “Set-Off Compensatio: From Diversity to Unity – Comments on the Principles of 
European Contract Law Part Three” in A Vaquer (ed) The Principles of European Contract Law Part 
III (2005) 281 289. 
33  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 496. 
34  Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 1 278; Siltek Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) t/a Workgroup v Business Connexion 
2009 1 All SA 571 (SCA); Schnehage v Bezuidenhout 1977 1 SA 362 (O) 365; Asco Carbon Dioxide 
Ltd v Lahner 2005 3 SA 213 (N). 
35  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 278; Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Harms “Obligations” in 
LAWSA 19 para 244. 
36  Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; Schnehage v 
Bezuidenhout 1977 1 SA 362 (O) 366. 
37  Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 277-278; Joubert 
Law of Contract 291; Nichol v Burger 1990 1 SA 231 (C); Fensham v Jacobson 1951 2 SA 136 (T); 
Allison v Massel & Massel 1954 4 SA 569 (T); Rosen v Wasserman 1984 1 SA 808 (W).  For criticism 
of the judgment in Nichol v Burger 1990 1 SA 231 (C), see JR Midgley “Wagers, Natural Obligations 
and Set-Off” (1990) 107 SALJ 381.  For an opposing view regarding gambling transactions, see 
Gibson v Van der Walt 1952 1 SA 262 (A). 
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in terms of the common law set-off was not allowed if the necessary mutuality of debts 
did not exist before prescription set in.38 
According to De Wet and Van Wyk, only the claim sought to be raised in set-off by the 
debtor needs to be due and enforceable.39  They contend that the creditor’s claim does 
not need to be due and enforceable, but merely payable (i.e. capable of being 
fulfilled).40  Their argument is that it is sufficient that the debtor is entitled to perform: if 
he is entitled to satisfy the creditor’s claim by payment (even if the debt is not yet due 
and enforceable), there is no reason to prevent him from doing so by way of set-off.41  
By declaring set-off, the debtor enforces his claim (which must be due and enforceable) 
and also discharges the creditor’s claim. 
This argument is logical if the view is held that set-off operates when it is declared by 
one of the parties, since it is possible to distinguish between the debtor’s and creditor’s 
claim.  However, it is clearly irreconcilable with the view that set-off operates 
automatically.42  In terms of that view, neither party has to declare set-off and therefore 
neither specifically enforces his claim.  It is therefore impossible to distinguish between 
the two claims, which means one cannot determine which claim must be due and 
enforceable and which one merely needs to be payable.  The reason for holding that 
the claim of the creditor only needs to be payable, namely that the debtor is electing to 
discharge his debt earlier, also disappears if the debtor does not have the benefit of 
deciding whether to declare set-off.  Furthermore, if De Wet and Van Wyk’s view is 
accepted but set-off is held to operate ipso iure, determining when set-off operated will 
be problematic: if the one claim is due and enforceable, will set-off operate 
automatically the moment the other claim becomes payable or should both claims be 
 
                                            
38  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 277; Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 497.  Christie and 
Bradfield further argue that this position has not been changed by the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 
(Law of Contract 497). 
39  Kontraktereg 1 278.  Joubert seems to share their opinion (Law of Contract 290). 
40  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 278.  It also corresponds with the view generally prevailing in 
European legal systems, namely that only the debt sued upon by the person declaring set-off needs 
to be due, since set-off amounts to a form of enforcement of his claim.  However, French law (which 
attributes an ipso iure effect to set-off) require that both debts must be due and enforceable, since 
the automatic operation of set-off means that there is not one party declaring set-off (Zimmermann 
European Law of Set-Off 50-51). 
41  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 278. 
42  BvD van Niekerk “Some Thoughts on the Problem of Set-Off” (1968) 85 SALJ 31 34; E Kahn Contract 
and Mercantile Law through the Cases (1971) 280. 
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due and enforceable?  Depending on which approach to the operation of set-off is 
adopted, De Wet and Van Wyk’s opinion could either be, as they describe it, entirely 
consistent with “die voorskrifte van gesonde verstand en die algemene beginsels in 
verband met voldoening”43 or it could be nearly impossible to apply.   
Lastly, the debts must be liquidated,44 which means they must be capable of speedy 
and easy proof.45  The reason for this requirement is that where the plaintiff can easily 
prove (or has already proven) his claim, judgment should not be unnecessarily delayed 
due to complex counterclaims.46  Conversely, the plaintiff should not be able to defeat 
a defence of set-off merely by denying or querying a debt in respect of which set-off 
would otherwise be allowed.47  A debtor who has an illiquid counterclaim cannot 
immediately rely on set-off, but if he institutes a claim in reconvention and the judge 
gives judgement thereon, his claim will become liquidated and therefore capable of 
set-off.48   
Although most authors are of the view that both debts have to be liquidated in order 
for set-off to operate,49 De Wet and Van Wyk argue that only the debtor’s counterclaim 
needs to be liquid.50  They aver that there is no logical reason why an illiquid main 
claim should be immune from set-off.51  Again, this follows from their support of the 
 
                                            
43  Kontraktereg 1 279: “what is dictated by common sense and the general principles with regards to 
performance” (own translation). 
44 Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244 with reference to Grotius 3 40 8, Van Leeuwen Cens 
For 1 4 36 3 and others; Joubert Law of Contract 291; Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Christie & 
Bradfield Law of Contract 495; Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts in General” in Wille’s Principles 833; 
Lester Investments (Pty) Ltd v Narshi 1951 2 SA 464 (C) (see specifically 469E-F: “The debt must 
be liquid either in the sense that it is based on a liquid document or is admitted or its money value 
has been ascertained or in the sense that it is capable of prompt ascertainment”); Hardy NO v 
Harsant 1913 TDP 433; Blakes Maphanga Inc v Outsurance Insurance Co 2010 4 SA 232 (SCA); 
Treasurer-General v Van Vuren 1905 TS 582; Adjust Investments (Pty) Ltd v Wiid 1968 3 SA 29 (O); 
Tierfontein Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v Weber 1974 3 SA 445 (C); Janowskv v Payne 1989 2 SA 562 
(C); AAA Brick Co (Pty) Ltd v Coetzee 1996 3 SA 578 (BSC); Academy of Learning (Pty) Ltd v 
Hancock 2001 1 SA 941 (C); Muller v Botswana Development Corporation Ltd 2003 1 SA 651 (SCA). 
45  Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; Treasurer-General 
v Van Vuren 1905 TS 582 589. 
46  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 279; Trotman v Edwick 1950 1 SA 376 (C).   
47  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 495; Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 418. 
48  Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 2 
SA 693 (C); Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jongegezellen 2002 2 SA 580 (C). Also see Rule 
22(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court. 
49  Van der Merwe et al Contract 472; Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244; Hutchison & Du Bois 
“Contracts in General” in Wille’s Principles 833. 
50  Kontraktereg 1 280-282. 
51  280-281. 
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retrospective view: according to them the debtor should be able to invoke his (liquid) 
claim against whatever he may owe the creditor.52  For instance, where A owes B an 
unliquidated amount for damages, but A also has a claim against B for R1000, they 
argue that nothing prevents A from stating that any amount he may owe B must be 
reduced by up to R1000.  This will speak against the ipso iure operation of set-off for 
two reasons: (a) as discussed above, in terms of the ipso iure view no distinction can 
be drawn between the two claims because neither party has to declare set-off; and (b) 
if the amount of one or both the respective debts are uncertain, it cannot be calculated 
to what extent they automatically discharge each other.  Thus, the automatic approach 
will require that both debts are liquidated.53  De Wet and Van Wyk are further of the 
opinion that where the creditor’s claim is not easily proven, a claim by the debtor which 
is not easily ascertainable can be taken into account.54  For the same reasons as 
mentioned above, this reasoning is only consistent with the view that a declaration is 
required for set-off to operate. 
Joubert adds a last requirement, namely that set-off must not be contractually 
excluded.55  Rather than constitute a requirement, this can be classified as a manner 
in which set-off can be excluded and will therefore be discussed in the next chapter. 
Despite the fact that the requirements for set-off are relatively settled, it becomes 
apparent that the approach that is adopted in respect of the operation of set-off will 
have an impact on the manner in which these requirements are applied.  This can be 
seen with regard to more than one of the requirements, for instance the mutuality 
requirement in the case of multiple debtors (which will be discussed in more detail 
later),56 the requirement that the debts must be due and enforceable and the liquidity 
requirement.  This inevitable link between the requirements for and operation of set-
off also informs the evaluation of the different approaches undertaken below.57 
 
                                            
52  281. 
53  Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law 280. 
54  279. 
55 Joubert Law of Contract 292. 
56  See 3 4 2 1 below. 
57  See specifically 3 6 below. 
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3 3 Theoretical framework: possible approaches to the operation of set-
off 
As seen in the previous chapter, different approaches to the operation of set-off have 
evolved in response to what Zimmermann calls “the heritage of Justinian’s dark 
pronouncements”.58  Before embarking on a discussion of the approaches recognised 
in South African law and their practical effect, it may be beneficial first to provide a 
framework of the different models of set-off which can be distinguished and the 
characteristics of each of these models. 
Zimmermann59 provides a useful five-fold distinction of the different models of set-off 
which have developed.  At the one end of the spectrum is the view that set-off leads to 
an automatic discharge of the debts, ipso iure, as soon as they are in mutual existence.  
In terms of this view, which was developed by the Glossators and subsequently 
adopted by the French historical school,60 no action or declaration is required by either 
of the parties in order for set-off to operate.  At the moment the requirements for set-
off are fulfilled, the creditor’s claim is extinguished to the extent that set-off can operate, 
interest will cease to run and any surety and security will be released.61  There can be 
no breach of contract if the debtor fails to perform after set-off could operate, and any 
performance will be an indebitum and could therefore be reclaimed by the debtor as 
an undue amount.62  This view reinforces the payment function of set-off as a 
convenient mechanism to avoid duplication of performance and to promote the speedy 
settlement of debts,63 since the debts are extinguished at the earliest possible moment 
without requiring any action by the parties.64 
 
                                            
58  European Law of Set-Off 41. 
59  32-34. 
60  See ch 2 (2 4 1). 
61  Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
62  289. 
63  See ch 1 (1 2 nn 39 and 40). 
64  C Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: Position Paper” (2000) UNIDROIT 1 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2000/study50/s-50-062bis-e.pdf> (accessed 30-11-
2015).  For South African law see Van der Merwe et al Contract 469; for French law see CH de 
Pardieu & O Hubert “France” in W Johnston & T Werlen Set-Off Law and Practice: An International 
Handbook (2006) 161 168; for Belgian law see M Vermylen “Belgium” in W Johnston & T Werlen 
Set-Off Law and Practice: An International Handbook (2006) 49 49-50. 
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Article 1290 of the French Civil Code (Code Civil) sets out the rule above.65  In practice 
however, French courts require set-off to be pleaded in court and they therefore apply 
a second model: set-off operates ipso iure, but subject to it being pleaded in judicial 
proceedings.66  This corresponds with the view advanced by the majority of the 
Glossators.67  It is generally held that set-off must merely be pleaded to inform the 
court that the debts have been extinguished automatically.68  This construction shares 
all the characteristics of the ipso iure approach and the consequences will be similar, 
although it is subject to the condition that set-off must be raised in court.  But there is 
no notion that pleading set-off triggers its retrospective operation; set-off occurred, its 
operation was merely suspended until it was pleaded. 
A third model, followed in Scotland, is that set-off must be pleaded in court and only 
takes effect once it is sustained by judgment.69  Unlike the previous two models, set-
off does not operate automatically in terms of this approach.  However, once it is 
sustained by judgment, it works retrospectively.  This retrospective operation means 
that there ultimately is not really a practical difference between this approach and the 
ipso iure approaches highlighted above.70 
A fourth approach, which was followed by the German Pandectists71 and adopted in 
German law, requires that set-off be asserted by an “extrajudicial, informal and 
unilateral declaration to the other party, whereupon it works retrospectively.”72  
Generally, a retrospective effect is only attributed to the effect of set-off.73  Therefore, 
all the requirements for set-off must be met at the time a party seeks to rely on it, and 
set-off will not be allowed if one of the requirements has ceased to exist at the time of 
the declaration.74  However, in certain jurisdictions (including, possibly, South African 
 
                                            
65  See 3 5 1 below. 
66  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 32. 
67  See ch 2 (2 4 1). 
68  De Groot Inl 3 40 7 tr Maasdorp Introduction 334; J Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 16 2 2 tr P 
Gane The Selective Voet being the Commentary on the Pandects by Johannes Voet and the 
Supplement to that Work by Johannes van der Linden 3 (1956) 149-150; Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad Gr 3 40 7 tr Van Warmelo et al Voorlesinge 429. 
69  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 32; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 29, 147. 
70  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 33; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 29. 
71  See ch 2 (2 4 3). 
72  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 33. 
73  36. 
74  36. 
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law)75 a retrospective effect is attributed to the declaration itself.  If that is the case, 
set-off will be allowed if its requirements were met sometime in the past, even if it is no 
longer the case at the time set-off is declared. 
Because set-off does not operate automatically, the retrospective approach allows the 
debtor to elect instead to pay the creditor’s claim and thereby preserve his own claim.76  
However, the retroactive effect attributed to set-off would render its practical effect 
largely similar to that of the ipso iure approach: no interest would accrue after the debt 
became susceptible to set-off77 (or at least, any obligation to pay such interest would 
be nullified)78 and a breach of contract would be cured retrospectively.79  This notion 
of set-off supports its so-called security function,80 since a party can have his claim 
fulfilled or partially fulfilled whenever he elects to do so by declaring set-off.81  A creditor 
who is able to benefit from set-off is therefore in a more secure position than other 
creditors. 
A fifth possible approach to set-off, adopted in the PICC and the PECL, attributes an 
ex nunc effect to a declaration of set-off.82  This means that set-off has no effect until 
a unilateral declaration (which can be made informally and extrajudicially) is made by 
either one of the parties.  At the moment of the declaration, interest ceases to run, the 
debts are extinguished and any sureties or securities are released.83 
With these possible approaches in mind, the position in South African law can now be 
considered.  It must be determined which approaches are adopted here, whether one 
of these optimally supports the practical utility of set-off and, if not, which of the other 
models identified above offers a better solution. 
 
                                            
75  See 3 4 below. 
76  Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
77  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 37. 
78  Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
79  289. 
80  See ch 1 (1 2 n 41). 
81  Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: Position Paper” UNIDROIT 1; K Böhlhoff & 
J Budde “The Law of Set-Off in Germany” 1984 Int’l Fin L Rev 28 28. 
82  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 41. 
83  Pichonnaz “Compensatio” in Principles of European Contract Law 297; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off 
in Arbitration 184-185. 
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3 4 Operation of set-off in South Africa 
The uncertainty inherited from the Roman-Dutch law resulted in several questions 
surrounding the operation of set-off in South African law.  Most of these stem from the 
fact that South African law has failed to settle on one approach to set-off.  Instead, 
there is authority for two approaches to set-off: it is either said to operate ipso iure, i.e. 
automatically, but still has to be pleaded and proven as a defence or that it requires a 
declaration to operate, but then does so retrospectively.  These two approaches largely 
correspond with the second and the fourth theoretical approaches highlighted above, 
although both are subject to a range of exceptions.   
3 4 1 The debate on whether set-off operates ipso iure or retrospectively 
It is generally understood that the question of whether set-off operates ipso iure or 
retrospectively, was answered in favour of the ipso iure approach by the Appellate 
Division in Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice).84  It was held that: 
“When two parties are mutually indebted to each other, both debts being liquidated and fully 
due, then the doctrine of compensation comes into operation. The one debt extinguishes 
the other pro tanto as effectually as if payment had been made. Should one of the creditors 
seek thereafter to enforce his claim, the defendant would have to set up the defence of 
compensatio by bringing the facts to the notice of the Court - as indeed the defence of 
payment would also have to be pleaded and proved.  But, compensation once established, 
the claim would be regarded as extinguished from the moment the mutual debts were in 
existence together.”85 
The courts have since on numerous occasions confirmed that set-off operates 
automatically by operation of law86 and this view seems to be accepted in the majority 
of case law.87  In terms of this view, the debts are extinguished as soon as they are in 
 
                                            
84 1926 AD 286. 
85  289-290. 
86 Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286; Blakes Maphanga Inc v 
Outsurance Insurance Co 2010 4 SA 232 (SCA); Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo 
Petroleum CC 2012 5 SA 283 (SCA); Western Cape Housing Development Board v 2005 1 SA 462 
(C); Choice Holdings Ltd v Yabeng Investment Holding Co Ltd 2001 3 SA 1350 (W); Southern Cape 
Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C); Nichol v Burger 1990 1 SA 231 (C); 
Great North Farms (Edms) Bpk v Ras 1972 4 SA 7 (T); Van Aswegen v Pienaar 1967 3 SA 677 (O); 
SA Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ferreira 1962 4 SA 213 (O); Lester Investments (Pty) Ltd 
v Narshi 1951 2 SA 464 (C). 
87  Van der Merwe et al Contract 473.  Also see the cases listed in n 86 above. 
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mutual existence, although the defendant is required to plead and prove set-off as a 
defence.88  This approach is in line with the approach favoured by the majority of 
Roman-Dutch jurists.89   
Requiring a party to plead and prove set-off as a defence ostensibly contradicts the 
view that set-off operates automatically.  However, as in Roman-Dutch law,90 the 
reason for this requirement is merely to inform the court that set-off took place.91  This, 
it is argued, is purely a procedural requirement92 and places an evidentiary burden on 
the defendant to prove that set-off operated.  This is similar to a scenario where the 
defendant paid the debt before action was instituted, and subsequently has to prove 
that payment was made.  
The problem with ascribing automatic operation to set-off, but still requiring it to be 
pleaded and proved, was identified even earlier than the Schierhout case in our law by 
Mason J in Hardy NO v Harsant,93 where he asks: 
“[W]hat is meant by the saying that compensation operates ipso jure or automatically as the 
cases sometimes put it[?] ... Pothier (sec. 638) lays down very definitely that compensation 
operates as of right and extinguishes the respective debts of the parties even if neither party 
has alleged it and even if the Court has not adjudicated upon it.  And Voet (16, 2, 2) uses 
somewhat similar though perhaps less emphatic language.  But these two authors 
nevertheless use everywhere such phrases as pleading or opposing or offering a debt in 
compensation and similar words are used in the civil law to indicate that it is a right which 
parties must claim if they desire to have the benefit of it. (See Huber, Praelect, Juris Civilis, 
lib. 4, tit. 6, p. 450 n. 30.)  I am not aware of any passage or any case which requires a 
Court to apply the doctrine of set-off when neither party desires to raise it; as Pothier puts 
it in section 639 on this subject, it is a fiction of law introduced for the benefit of the parties 
between whom compensation applies and, therefore, differs widely from those cases in 
which the Court must decide a question arising in legal proceedings whatever be the wishes 
of the litigants, such as whether an Act is absolutely prohibited by law or whether as in 
 
                                            
88 Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 676F; Altech Data (Pty) 
Ltd v M B Technologies (Pty) Ltd 1998 3 SA 748 (W); Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus 
Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C); Bester v Boyd & Thorne Investments CC t/a Landlords 
(6947/2012) 2013 ZAWCHC 40 (26 February 2013); Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 420. 
89  See ch 2 (2 4 2). 
90  See ch 2 (2 4 2). 
91  Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 420; Van der Merwe et al Contract 474; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 
1 282; Van Aswegen v Pienaar 1967 3 SA 677 (O) 681. 
92  JH Loots & P Van Warmelo “Compensatio” (1956) 19 THRHR 267 269. 
93 1913 TDP 433. 
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matrimonial causes the Court has jurisdiction.  Indeed in sections 639 and 640 Pothier deals 
with cases in which a creditor who has failed to plead his claim as a set-off still retains his 
original right of action.  This certainly seems to be the effect of Dig., 16, 2, 7(1). Voet (16, 
2, 3) says very clearly that a man who does not wish to set-off his claim may discharge the 
demand of his adversary and preserve his own right of action.  Goudsmit, in his Pandects, 
goes even further than Voet and Pothier in requiring some definite act of the person who 
has the right to set-off as a condition precedent to compensation being applicable. 
To sum up the result of the authorities is, we may say, that whilst either party may claim as 
of right that his adversary's demand has been extinguished by a liquid debt due to him, 
there is nothing to prevent him, if the adversary denies the right of set-off, from refraining to 
press the set-off and reserving his right of future action.”94 
From the above it can be seen that there is a degree of uncertainty regarding the ipso 
iure operation of set-off.  A minority view, adopted by courts in some instances, is that 
set-off does not operate automatically, but only when a party elects to rely on it.95  
However, in such cases it is said that set-off operates ex tunc.96  This largely 
corresponds with the opinion of Van Leeuwen,97 except that the declaration in modern 
South African law does not necessarily have to be made in the course of judicial 
proceedings. 
It seems to be the accepted view in South African law that it is not only the effect of 
set-off which is held to operate retrospectively at the moment set-off first became 
possible, but the declaration is also deemed to have been made retrospectively.  
Therefore, the defendant is entitled to rely on set-off if it was possible sometime in the 
past, even if set-off is no longer possible at the time it is declared because one of the 
requirements is no longer satisfied (for example where the debt has been ceded and 
there is no longer a mutuality of debts).98  
 
                                            
94  447-448. 
95 Bain v Barclays Bank (DC & O) Ltd 1937 SR 191; Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA); Altech Data (Pty) Ltd v M B Technologies (Pty) Ltd 1998 3 SA 748 (W); 
Harris v Tancred NO 1960 1 SA 839 (C) 843; Mohamed v Nagdee 1952 1 SA 410 (A); Bester v Boyd 
& Thorne Investments CC t/a Landlords (6947/2012) 2013 ZAWCHC 40 (26 February 2013) para 6. 
96  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 273, 282.  Also see the case law mentioned in n 95 above. 
97  See ch 2 (2 4 2). 
98  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 283-284; Harms ‘Obligations’ in LAWSA 19 para 245. 
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This is contrary to the general construction of the retrospective operation of set-off as 
discussed above,99 as well as the approach in other civil law jurisdictions which also 
attribute a retrospective effect, such as Germany.100  In terms of this approach, it is 
required that all the requirements for set-off must be met at the time the declaration is 
made, and only the effect of set-off is retrospective.  Why South African law deviates 
from this view is not certain.  Possibly, it is an attempt to reconcile the retrospective 
approach with the majority view that set-off operates ipso iure, since it brings the 
practical effect of this approach more in line with the automatic operation of set-off.   
To illustrate why the effect of the retrospective approach as applied in South Africa 
shares a greater similarity with the ipso iure approach than the retrospective approach 
as applied in Germany, the example can be considered where a debt is ceded after it 
became susceptible to set-off, but before set-off is declared or relied upon.101  In such 
a case, the different approaches will bring about the following results: (a) in terms of 
the ipso iure approach, the debts would have been extinguished automatically before 
the cession occurred and the debtor’s indebtedness to the cessionary would have been 
reduced accordingly; (b) in terms of the retrospective approach as applied in Germany, 
set-off will no longer be possible since there is no longer a mutuality of debts;102 and 
(c) in terms of the retrospective approach as applied in South Africa, once the debtor 
relies on set-off it will be deemed to have taken place before the cession and the debtor 
will be entitled to the benefit thereof.  It is evident that for all practical purposes, (a) and 
(c) will yield the same result in these situations. 
However, this retrospective effect of the declaration only seems to be accepted to a 
certain extent: if one of the debts has been settled through payment and therefore 
ceased to exist, it is no longer possible to declare set-off.103  Whether this is also the 
case where a debt is extinguished due to prescription is unclear,104 since the few cases 
dealing with set-off in the context of prescription seem to follow the automatic approach 
 
                                            
99  See 3 3 above; P Pichonnaz “The Retroactive Effect of Set-Off (Compensatio): A Journey through 
Roman Law to the New Dutch Civil Code” 2000 TR 541 551. 
100  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 36. 
101  Also see 3 4 2 2 below. 
102  However, arts 404 and 406 of the German Civil Code specifically provides for set-off where a debt 
has been ceded – see 3 5 2 nn 218 and 219 below. 
103  See 3 4 2 4 below, specifically n 154.  Also see Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus 
Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C) 501A, quoted below at 3 4 2 4141. 
104  MM Loubser Extinctive Prescription (1996) 145. 
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to set-off and therefore accept that the debt was extinguished before it prescribed.105  
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the extinction of the debt due to prescription should 
be treated in the same manner as extinction due to payment, and therefore a 
declaration of set-off should no longer be possible after the debt has prescribed.106 
It is submitted by Harms that South African courts have not accepted all the 
implications of either of the ipso iure or retrospective approaches to set-off.107  To fully 
understand what is meant by this statement, it is necessary to consider the practical 
implications of both approaches.  Analysing the practical effect will also enable one to 
evaluate which approach, if indeed there is a practical difference between the two, is 
the most suitable, i.e. which approach best supports normal commercial practices. 
3 4 2 The practical implications of recognising either the ipso iure or retrospective 
approach 
3 4 2 1 Multiple parties 
The first situation where a different practical result will be reached, depending on which 
approach is followed, concerns the rules surrounding a debt owed by or to multiple 
parties, for instance a debt owed by multiple co-debtors who are jointly and severally 
liable to a single creditor.108  If it is accepted that set-off operates ipso iure, such a co-
debtor should be entitled to rely on the fact that the creditor’s claim was extinguished 
by way of set-off between the creditor and another co-debtor as soon as set-off became 
possible, and regardless of whether the creditor or the other co-debtor invoked set-
off.109  This is because the joint obligation is only due once110 – if one co-debtor 
performs, all the other co-debtors are absolved.111  In terms of the ipso iure approach, 
 
                                            
105  Binase v Maklutshana (1907) 24 SC 452 454; Swanepoel v Van der Westhuizen 1930 TPD 806 
809; Pentecost and Co v Cape Meat Supply Co 1933 CPD 472 476-477, 479; Trinity Engineering 
(Pvt) Ltd v Anglo-African Shipping Co (Pvt) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 700 (ZS) 702.  Also see Loubser 
Prescription 147. 
106  This will only be the case where the debt is extinguished by prescription (such as in the case of the 
s 10(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969), and not where it is merely rendered unenforceable due 
to prescription (such as in the case of s 3(1) of the old Prescription Act 19 of 1943) – see Duet and 
Magnum Financial Services CC (In Liquidation) v Koster 2010 4 SA 499 (SCA) para 21; Standard 
General Insurance Co Ltd v Verdun Estates (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 693 (A) 698-699. 
107 Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 243. 
108  The situation would be similar where a co-creditor can effect set-off against a debtor. 
109  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 275; AA Roberts Wessels’ The Law of Contract in South Africa 1 
2 ed (1951) 460. 
110  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 263. 
111  Van der Merwe et al Contract 216. 
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set-off operates automatically and therefore it is not required that the parties between 
whom set-off can operate should rely on it before the debt is extinguished.  For 
example: A, B and C are jointly and severally indebted to D, and A also has a claim 
against D.  If set-off operates ipso iure, the debt owed to D will be reduced or 
extinguished automatically if the requirements for set-off are fulfilled, without A having 
to rely on or declare set-off.112  If D now brings an action against B, B should be able 
to raise the defence that the debt or a part thereof has been discharged. 
As is evident from the earlier discussion,113 the consequences of the ipso iure approach 
to set-off are not always accepted where multiple parties are involved.  A co-debtor is 
often not allowed to rely on the automatic operation of set-off between another co-
debtor and the creditor (although once set-off has operated as between the latter two, 
the co-debtor could of course maintain that the liability has been reduced accordingly).  
Van der Merwe and others114 attribute this to a lack of mutuality of claims, which is one 
of the requirements for set-off to operate.  However, it is submitted that a mutuality of 
claims does exist between the creditor and one of the co-debtors (in the example, 
between A and D) – the fact that B is not a party thereto cannot negate that fact.  This 
argument by Van der Merwe and others thus conflates two different things, namely the 
requirements of set-off, and the consequences of set-off once those requirements are 
met, in an attempt to explain an anomalous outcome.115  Allowing only the co-debtor 
who has a claim against the creditor to invoke set-off “clearly speaks against the ipso 
iure operation of set-off”,116 rather than indicating the absence of a mutuality of claims.  
 
                                            
112  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 275. 
113  See 3 2 above. 
114  Contract 470. 
115 This conflation seems to also influence the conclusion in Van der Merwe Contract 470 n 235.  The 
authors point to the fact that the outcome of J R & M Moffett (Pty) Ltd v Kolbe Eiendoms Beleggings 
(Edms) (Bpk) 1974 2 SA 426 (O) and Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1984 
2 SA 693 (C) is inconsistent with the ipso iure operation attributed to set-off.  Arguably, these cases 
do not support this conclusion.  Although these cases confirm with the mutuality requirement, there 
are in fact passages in both cases which seem to support the automatic approach to set-off; in other 
words, once there is a mutuality of debts between a creditor and one of the co-debtors, it appears 
that another co-debtor can rely on the fact that set-off has occurred automatically and that at least a 
part of the debt has been extinguished (see J R & M Moffett (Pty) Ltd v Kolbe Eiendoms Beleggings 
(Edms) (Bpk) 1974 2 SA 426 (O) 432A-G, 433A-B; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment 
(Pty) Ltd 1984 2 SA 693 (C) 698C).  See also Roberts Law of Contract 1 460, who argues that co-
debtors should be allowed to rely on set-off having occurred ipso iure, although he acknowledges 
that the weight of old authority does not support this view. 
116  Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 244 n 9. 
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This inconsistency is probably due to policy reasons: it is preferable to leave the 
decision whether set-off should operate to the parties whose claims are immediately 
affected by it.  In the same manner that the law does not allow co-debtor B to compel 
co-debtor A to pay the creditor’s demand when the creditor claims the debt from B, the 
law should also not permit B to rely on the automatic operation of set-off when its effect 
would be to compel A to abandon his claim.  
Requiring the co-debtor who has a claim against the creditor to invoke set-off before it 
can be said to have extinguished the creditor’s claim corresponds with the minority 
view of set-off, namely that a declaration is required by one of the parties which 
operates retrospectively.  In this context, the view that set-off requires a declaration 
before it can operate produces the more desirable outcome.  Whether the effect of this 
declaration is retrospective is not relevant in this context, as long as only the parties 
involved are allowed to make the declaration.  It is generally recognised that set-off 
does not operate irrespective of the wishes of the parties and they should be allowed 
to preserve their autonomy by deciding whether their claims should be extinguished by 
set-off.117  Therefore, third parties should not be permitted to force two parties to effect 
set-off, as this would violate their autonomy.118   
3 4 2 2 Cession 
If a creditor cedes a debt after the requirements for set-off were satisfied, the debtor 
should, in terms of both approaches to the operation of set-off, still be able to rely on 
set-off against the new creditor, i.e. the cessionary.119  This is a natural consequence 
of the ipso iure approach, as the part of the debt which was susceptible to set-off would 
have ceased to exist from the moment that set-off could operate120 and the cedent will 
not be able to transfer a greater right than he possesses.121  Accordingly, it was 
recognised in Transkei Development Corporation Ltd v Oshkosh Africa (Pty) Ltd122 that 
 
                                            
117  See 3 4 1 above. 
118  As discussed at 3 2 above, different principles apply in the case of a surety. 
119  See the authority at n 16 above. 
120  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 499; Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 413. 
121  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 499; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd 
1984 2 SA 693 (C). 
122  1986 1 SA 150 (C). 
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“[i]n view of the ipso jure application of set off against any debts by defendant coming into 
existence, it follows that the claims that plaintiff acquired against defendant through cession 
were subject to set off to the extent to which set off had already taken place”.123 
In terms of the retrospective approach as applied in the South African context, a party 
can rely on set-off even where it was possible in the past, but one of the requirements 
is no longer satisfied.  As discussed above, this is due to the fact that it is not only the 
effect of set-off which is understood to be retrospective, but the declaration would date 
back to the time at which set-off first became possible.124  Thus, due to the retroactive 
operation of set-off, the debtor would be able to rely on set-off which was possible 
against the cedent, even if he declares set-off after the cession was effected.125 
Where the cedent relies on set-off, the same principles should theoretically apply.  In 
terms of the ipso iure view, no declaration of set-off is required for set-off to come into 
effect and it should therefore not make a difference which party later raises set-off as 
a defence.  In terms of the retrospective approach, the principle also remains the same 
regardless of which party invokes set-off: the effect of the declaration dates back to the 
moment set-off could first occur.  For example, A and B are mutually indebted and all 
the requirements of set-off are met.  A now cedes the debt owed by B to C.  If the ipso 
iure approach is followed, the debt would have been extinguished by set-off before 
cession occurred and A or B should be able to rely on that set-off. If A declares set-off 
after cession of the debt according to the retrospective approach, set-off would be 
deemed to have taken place before the cession.  
However, the courts have not been entirely consistent in this regard.  In Porterstraat 
69 Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v P A Venter Worcester (Pty) Ltd126 the court did not consider 
whether the requirements for set-off where fulfilled before the debt was ceded, but held 
that  
“only the [cessionary] is in a position to enforce the debt against the [debtor].  [The cedent] 
is in no such position and can therefore not claim set-off of a claim which it may be able to 
prove against the outstanding amount … which constitutes the debt owing by [the cedent] 
 
                                            
123  155D. 
124  See 3 4 1 above. 
125 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 283. 
126  2000 4 SA 598 (C). 
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to [the debtor].  There would appear to be no compliance with the requirement that both 
debts must be payable to the same persons in the same capacities.”127 
On a practical level, the conclusion reached by the court is probably a sound one, as 
it is not desirable to allow the cedent to claim set-off after the cession was effected.  
However, the problem is that the court attributes this conclusion to the lack of mutuality.  
If the prerequisites for set-off were met before the cession was effected, the fact that 
one of the requirements has since ceased to exist (i.e. that there is no longer a mutual 
debt) should not prevent set-off from operating retrospectively in terms of the minority 
view.  In terms of the ipso iure view, set-off would have already occurred, and the 
cedent should also not be prevented from raising it as a defence.  This is again an 
example where the requirements for and consequences of set-off are conflated, 
possibly because a strict application of either approach leads to an irregular outcome 
(i.e. allowing a cedent to invoke set-off in respect of a debt after it has been ceded to 
the cessionary). 
On the facts of the Porterstraat case, it is possible that one or both of the claims were 
not sufficiently liquid before the respondent effected cession, as both of the debts were 
disputed by the other party.  Unfortunately, if that was part of the court’s reasoning, the 
court failed to mention it as the reason why set-off could not operate. The impression 
that is gained from this judgment is that a cedent is prevented from relying on set-off 
even where it was possible before his claim was ceded.  This conclusion, although not 
necessarily unfair, contradicts the principles of both possible approaches to the 
operation of set-off.  
In theory, both approaches yield the same result (at least with regards to a debtor who 
relies on set-off), and generally both are applied consistently with their theoretical 
principles.  However, the operation of set-off in the case of cession is subject to certain 
qualifications.  The first qualification is that even where the debt was not susceptible 
to set-off at the date of the cession, but became capable of being set off thereafter, the 
debtor who is unaware of the cession and in good faith attempts to set off his debt 
against the cedent will be allowed to rely on set-off.128  According to Van der Merwe 
 
                                            
127  612. 
128  Van der Merwe et al Contract 416; Lubbe & Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 178; Agricultural 
& Industrial Mechanisation (Vereeniging) (Edms) Bpk v Lombard 1974 3 SA 485 (O); Stannic v Samib 
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and others, this is not regarded as real set-off; rather, the debtor is protected as if set-
off had taken place.129  The second qualification is where the cession is made mala 
fide in order to prevent the debtor from relying on set-off and the cessionary was aware 
of the cedent’s motive.130  Both of these qualifications originate from the law of cession, 
rather than being a consequence of or deviation from the rules surrounding the 
operation of set-off. 
3 4 2 3 Insolvency 
The operation of set-off in the context of insolvency is similar to its operation where a 
debt was ceded.  The creditor of an insolvent who is simultaneously indebted to the 
insolvent will be able to rely on set-off, as long as the requirements for set-off were met 
before concursus creditorum.131  This will be the case regardless of which approach is 
followed:132 in terms of the ipso iure approach the debts would have been extinguished 
automatically and therefore they no longer exist,133 and in terms of the retrospective 
approach the declaration has retrospective effect, so that the debts are extinguished 
prior to insolvency.134 
 
                                            
Underwriting Managers (Pty) Ltd 2003 3 All SA 257 (SCA); Clark v Van Rensburg 1964 4 SA 153 
(O).  According to Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 38, “[t]he basis for [this] view seems to reside in an 
analogy with the rule of equity that a debtor who is in the dark about the cession to a third party of 
the claim against him will nevertheless be released from his debt if he pays the cedent in good faith”. 
However, in Van Aswegen v Pienaar 1967 3 SA 677 (O) 679 the court qualified this by stating that it 
is only where “'n skuldenaar, handelende op sterkte van sy geregverdigde vermoede dat 'n sedent 
nog sy skuldeiser is, sy posisie ten opsigte van sodanige sedent tot sy nadeel verander, hy op grond 
van billikheidsoorwegings geregtig is om teenoor die sessionaris van die sedent sy eis teen hom as 
verweer op te werp dat by gebrek aan kennisgewing van die sessie aan hom, hy by magte is om 
hom te beroep op skuldvergelyking van sy eis teen die sedent en die gesedeerde eis.” (“a creditor, 
acting on the strength of his justified presumption that the cedent is still his creditor, alters his position 
in respect of such cedent to his prejudice, that he is entitled on equitable considerations to raise 
against the cessionary of the cedent his claim as defence that in the absence of notice of the cession 
to him, he is allowed to rely on set-off of his claim against the cedent and the ceded claim” – own 
translation). 
129  Van der Merwe et al Contract 416 n 254.  See also Van Zyl NO v Look Good Clothing CC 1996 3 SA 
523 (SE). 
130  Lubbe & Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 178; Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts in General” in 
Wille’s Principles 834; LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 1 SA 747 (A). 
131 Siltek Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) t/a Workgroup v Business Connexion 2009 1 All SA 571 
(SCA); Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 497. 
132  Van der Merwe et al Contract 475. 
133 Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 497. 
134  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 283. 
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This situation is regulated by section 46 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936,135 which 
seems to presuppose that set-off operates ipso iure or automatically.136  The effect of 
this provision is that the creditor of an insolvent will not have to compete in a concursus 
creditorum if all the requirements for set-off were satisfied before that time,137 although 
set-off may be disregarded if it was not in the ordinary course of business. 
As with cession, the two approaches will produce the same practical result.  There 
might be policy reasons for allowing a creditor of the insolvent estate to invoke set-off, 
since it might be seen as unfair to expect him to repay the whole of his debt towards 
the estate where he only receives a dividend on the debt owed to him.138  However, 
permitting set-off to operate in this context causes one creditor to be favoured above 
the others, which contradicts a fundamental principle of the law of insolvency, namely 
the pari passu principle.  It is submitted that these considerations should be evaluated 
and regulated within the context of insolvency law, as it is already done to a certain 
extent. 
3 4 2 4 Payments made after the debt is susceptible to set-off 
Arguably the biggest practical difference occasioned by the two different approaches 
to set-off is the status of payments made after the prerequisites for set-off have been 
met, but neither party has yet elected to rely on set-off.  On a strict interpretation of the 
majority view, namely that set-off operates ipso iure, the original indebtedness of the 
debtor would have been extinguished from the moment that the requirements for set-
 
                                            
135  “If two persons have entered into a transaction the result whereof is a set-off, wholly or in part, of 
debts which they owe one another and the estate of one of them is sequestrated within a period of 
six months after the taking place of the set-off, or if a person who had a claim against another person 
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the debtor) has ceded that claim to a third person against 
whom the debtor had a claim at the time of the cession, with the result that the one claim has been 
set-off, wholly or in part, against the other, and within a period of one year after the cession the estate 
of the debtor is sequestrated; then the trustee of the sequestrated estate may in either case abide 
by the set-off or he may, if the set-off was not effected in the ordinary course of business, with the 
approval of the Master disregard it and call upon the person concerned to pay to the estate the debt 
which he would owe it but for the set-off, and thereupon that person shall be obliged to pay that debt 
and may prove his claim against the estate as if no set-off had taken place: Provided that any set-off 
shall be effective and binding on the trustee of the insolvent estate if it takes place between an 
exchange or a market participant as defined in section 35A and any other party in accordance with 
the rules of such an exchange, or if it takes place under an agreement defined in section 35B.” 
136  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 37. 
137  37. 
138  See ch 2 (2 2 2 2) for the possibility that this policy consideration was already recognised in classical 
Roman law. 
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off were met, and therefore the creditor will not be entitled to claim or receive payment 
of the part of the debt discharged by set-off.139  If the debtor makes payment in respect 
of the extinguished claim, he would have to recover such a payment by way of the 
condictio indebiti and therefore be required to satisfy all the requirements for such a 
remedy.140  Despite this, where neither party raises set-off, the debt can still be 
extinguished by payment.141  This creates uncertainty, as the party who made the 
payment does not know whether the other party will rely on set-off and therefore cannot 
be sure which remedy to use. 
However, some authors who support the automatic operation of set-off are 
nevertheless of the opinion that where a debtor makes a payment to his creditor, either 
without realising that the requirements for set-off were met, or choosing to make the 
payment in order to preserve his original claim, he can thereafter rely on the original 
indebtedness of the creditor to enforce his counterclaim.142  This conclusion is 
sometimes justified by inferring a tacit agreement between the parties that set-off will 
not operate143 – a construction which seems highly artificial. 
This issue of reclaiming a payment made to the other party where such indebtedness 
was susceptible to set-off, is complicated further in the case of transactional bank 
accounts, where the debit and credit balances of respective accounts fluctuate 
continuously.  It is trite that “[t]he legal relationship between a banking institution and 
its customer whose account with it is in credit is that of debtor and creditor”.144  When 
 
                                            
139 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 273; Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
140 See for instance Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C) 501B, 
where the obiter statement was made that where a party settles a debt in another way, without 
realising that he could rely on set-off, he will be able to reclaim such payment as an undue amount 
by way of the condictio indebiti.  
141  Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C) 501A: “Indien [die 
skuldenaar] nie [van skuldvergelyking] gebruik wil maak nie, om welke rede ook al, staan dit hom vry 
om die betrokke skuld op 'n ander wyse te vereffen.” (“If the debtor decides not to rely on set-off, for 
whichever reason, he is free to settle the debt in another way” – own translation); S Scott 
“Skuldvergelyking – Toe (ex tunc) en Nou (ex nunc)” 2006 TSAR 595 598. 
142  According to De Wet & Van Wyk, it was accepted by Voet that a party could make payment and 
thereby retain his counterclaim (Kontraktereg 1 282, with reference to Voet Commentarius 16 2 3).  
See also Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 3 420, who acknowledge that there may be reasons why a person 
would prefer not to have his debt extinguished by set-off and is therefore of the opinion that failure 
to plead set-off does not prevent the person from recovering the original indebtedness. 
143  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 34.  
144 Ormerod v Deputy Sheriff, Durban 1965 4 All SA 330 (D) 334, with reference to White v Standard 
Bank 1883 4 N.L.R. 88 91-92.  Also see Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 
SA 669 (SWA) 674B-C; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum CC 2012 5 SA 283 
(SCA) 287-288; ABSA Bank Ltd v Intensive Air (Pty) Ltd 2011 2 SA 275 (SCA) 279. 
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amounts are deposited by or on behalf of a client in his bank account, the merely has 
a claim against the bank for repayment of such amounts.145  If the bank extends a loan 
to the same client, the bank’s claim arising from the loan can be set off against money 
in the transactional account of the client. 
Therefore, in the context of a bank account, the question regarding the status of 
payments made after set-off could operate will arise where a bank honours an 
instruction of its client to pay out funds from the client’s bank account, while a loan 
made by the bank to the client is due and payable.  Consider for instance a situation 
where on the day the requirements for set-off were first satisfied, the amount in a 
client’s transactional account was R100, but on the day the bank decides to enforce 
its right to apply set-off to recover the outstanding loan amounts, the balance has been 
reduced to R80 (after various deposits and withdrawals by the client).  If it is accepted 
that set-off operates ipso iure, it would mean that the bank should reclaim all amounts 
withdrawn by the client after the date set-off could first operate with an enrichment 
claim.  This leads to a further question: is it only in respect of the “missing” R20 that 
the bank needs to use the condictio indebiti, or in respect of the total of the amounts 
withdrawn by the client since set-off could first operate? 
The Supreme Court of Appeal recently had the opportunity of clarifying these problems 
in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum CC.146  In this case, a client 
had two accounts with the bank, one that had been overdrawn for some time and the 
other with a credit balance.  The accounts were operated in this manner with varying 
credit and debit balances for some time.  In June 2008, the bank issued demand for 
payment of the overdrawn account, thus rendering the full amount due and payable.  
After demand had been issued, the client continued to operate the accounts normally, 
with the credit balance in the second account frequently exceeding the debit balance 
in the first account.147  In October 2008, the balance of the credit account once again 
exceeded the debit balance of the overdraft account, and the bank decided to apply 
 
                                            
145  Alley Cat Clothing (Pty) Ltd v De Lisle Weare Racing 2002 1 All SA 123 (D).  See AJ Itzikowitz & SF 
du Toit “Banking and Currency” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 2(1) 2 ed (2006) para 
343 for a discussion of the relationship between banks and their customers. 
146  2012 5 SA 283 (SCA). 
147 Para 33. 
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set-off and to utilise the funds in the credit account to settle the debit balance of the 
other account. 
Unfortunately, the court failed to analyse the operation of set-off in this context properly 
and merely held that the bank had acted lawfully in appropriating the funds.  The 
following was said by Hefer JA with regard to the operation of set-off: 
“Counsel for [the defendant], somewhat desperately, submitted that no set-off was possible 
in the absence of demand by the Bank for repayment of the debit amount on the [overdrawn] 
account. This, he conceded, had been made in June 2008, but he pointed out that the 
[credit] account had, between the date of demand and the receipt of Echo's deposit at the 
beginning of October, stood in credit in varying amounts that frequently exceeded the debit 
balance on the [overdrawn] account. This, he submitted, served as making the funds 
available for payment in satisfaction of the Bank's demand. 
That the Bank chose not to appropriate the credits was of no significance; what was 
important was that a further demand became necessary in order to again render the 
[overdrawn] account due and payable. As no further demand was forthcoming the debit on 
that account could not be claimed by the bank and accordingly was not capable of set-off. 
This seems to be a wholly artificial argument. When demand was made for payment of the 
[overdrawn] account the debit balance became due and payable. The Bank did not then or 
later (until 2 October) consolidate the accounts or apply set-off. The debt arising on the 
[overdrawn] account was never discharged and the demand stood. Although set-off occurs 
automatically by operation of law, it only operates retrospectively if and when the debtor 
(the Bank) elects to rely on it. See Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings 
Bpk 1998 (4) SA 494 (C) at 499I – 501D and the authorities there cited. That election only 
took place on 2 October at a time when the [overdrawn] account remained unpaid and 
subject to the unsatisfied demand.”148 
As can be seen from the extract above, the court held that when demand was made, 
the debit balance became due and payable, and it is irrelevant that at times there were 
sufficient funds available to satisfy the bank’s demand through set-off.  This conclusion 
is irreconcilable with the view, seemingly acknowledged by Hefer JA, that set-off 
operates ipso iure.  If set-off operated automatically, it would have extinguished the 
bank’s claim in terms of the debit account the moment both debts became due and 
enforceable (provided the other requirements for set-off were met and there were no 
 
                                            
148  Paras 32-33. 
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contractual provisions to the contrary). In so far as set-off operated, the bank’s claim 
was satisfied and the defendant did not have a right to the money in the credit account 
(as the defendant’s claim had also been extinguished).  To the extent that the bank 
‘repaid’ a claim already discharged by set-off by allowing the defendant to withdraw 
money from the credit account, the bank was entitled to reclaim those amounts, 
possibly with the condictio indebiti.  Thus, holding that “the debt arising on the 
[overdrawn] account was never discharged”149 is completely at odds with the automatic 
operation of set-off. 
The rather confusing statement by Hefer JA in the quote above that “[a]lthough set-off 
occurs automatically by operation of law, it only operates retrospectively if and when 
the debtor ... elects to rely on it”, seems to conflate the second and fourth models to 
the operation of set-off.150  It is therefore possible that the court instead opted for the 
minority view, namely that set-off operates retrospectively when it is declared.  The 
decision in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum CC151 would be 
consistent with this approach.  Because set-off in terms of the retrospective approach 
only operates once it is relied on, the fact that the credit balance exceeded the debit 
balance before such reliance would not cause the debt to be extinguished.  Therefore, 
any payment made before the declaration would reduce the indebtedness of the 
defendant and thus the amount by which the debt can be reduced by set-off.152 
Theoretically, the retrospective operation of the declaration might also be problematic, 
because even though one of the requirements for set-off (i.e. a mutual debt) no longer 
exists, it existed sometime in the past and the defendant should still be allowed to rely 
on set-off, similar to where the debt was ceded.  However, as mentioned above, the 
declaration cannot have an effect if the debt has since ceased to exist due to 
payment.153  It is unanimously accepted by proponents of the retrospective view that 
only payments made after set-off was declared would constitute an undue payment.154  
The debtor (i.e. the bank) therefore has the option of paying the demand of the creditor 
 
                                            
149  Para 33. 
150  See the discussion in 3 3 above. 
151  2012 5 SA 283 (SCA). 
152  Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
153  See 3 4 1 above. 
154  See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 282; Joubert Law of Contract 289; Harms “Obligations” in 
LAWSA 19 para 245. 
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(i.e. the client) and preserving its own claim.  This means that the bank can allow the 
client to withdraw funds from the account with the positive balance, and thereby 
preserve its claim in terms of the overdrawn account. 
This scenario can be explained by the following example.  A and B are mutually 
indebted, each owing the other R100.  B repays his debt (after the debts were 
susceptible to set-off), but then becomes indebted to A again, this time for R80.  Can 
set-off now operate in respect of the R80 debt incurred by B?  If the ipso iure approach 
is adhered to it would appear not, since A’s debt was extinguished when set-off could 
operate the first time.  However, B still retains a claim against A for R100 (albeit now 
based on unjustified enrichment, since B paid an already extinguished debt) and this 
claim can be set off against B’s new debt of R80.  Should B wish to reclaim the R20 
balance, he will have to do so by means of an enrichment action.  However, if a 
declaration is required to effect set-off, the fluctuating indebtedness before such a 
declaration would have no effect.  If B therefore decides to invoke set-off after he 
becomes indebted for the second time, he will be entitled to apply set-off in respect of 
the R80 and reclaim the outstanding R20 based on A’s original indebtedness (which 
was never extinguished). 
The example above can be applied in the context of a bank-client relationship, with A 
being in the position of the client and B being in the position of the bank.  B’s repayment 
consists of allowing A to withdraw funds from the credit account, and B will become 
indebted again (or become more indebted) if A deposits funds in that account.  In other 
words, the client’s (A’s) claim against the bank (B) will decrease when funds are 
withdrawn by the client, and increase when money is deposited by him.  The answer 
to the question posed earlier in this section, namely what the extent of B’s enrichment 
claim would be, therefore depends on the approach which is followed.  In terms of the 
retrospective approach, no enrichment claim will arise.  In terms of the ipso iure 
approach however, the bank will be able to invoke set-off in respect of the available 
funds, but would have to rely on an enrichment claim to recover the balance. 
Generally, in this context, the retrospective approach is preferable and applied more 
consistently with its theoretical principles.  Clearly the ipso iure construction renders a 
result which is less desirable (because parties are not allowed the choice to keep their 
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claims alive)155 and which is difficult to apply in practice.  It is also probable that, in light 
of the conduct of the parties, such a result would be contrary to their intention.  This 
can be inferred from the manner in which bank accounts are normally operated – both 
the bank and the client treat it as two distinct accounts until the bank effects set-off by 
transferring funds from the one account to the other. 
Finally, it must also be added that the contractual arrangements between the parties 
may influence any reliance on set-off.  The possibility of excluding or varying the effects 
of set-off will be discussed in the next chapter.156 
3 4 2 5 Charging interest 
The status of payments made after the debts were susceptible to set-off highlights the 
practical difference between the two approaches to set-off.  Conversely, the effect that 
both constructions have on the charging of interest illustrates the underlying problems 
caused by the notion, supported by both the ipso iure and retrospective approaches, 
that set-off operates at the moment it first becomes possible. 
If set-off operates ipso iure, interest will cease to run from the moment the debts are in 
mutual existence,157 because the debts will automatically terminate.  If set-off operates 
retrospectively, any liability for interest on the debt after it became susceptible to set-
off would automatically be terminated when set-off is declared or relied upon.158 
The practical problems that arise from set-off operating in either of these manners can 
again be illustrated by the relationship between a bank and its client.159  Where set-off 
operates automatically, and in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, 
it would mean the bank would at all times only be allowed to charge interest on the 
overall balance of the amounts that are due and payable in respect of the two accounts.  
This is clearly contrary to the intention of both parties and the established modus 
operandi of the bank, who will continue to view the two accounts as separate and will 
 
                                            
155  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 282. 
156  See ch 4 (4 2 3). 
157  Van der Merwe et al Contract 475; Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
158  Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
159  This relationship is discussed in more detail in ch 5 (5 2 2), but in the context of the National Credit 
Act 24 of 2005. 
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charge or pay interest on each account based on the balance of that account.  As a 
result, the parties would presumably choose to regulate these matters contractually. 
The situation is no less problematic if the view is taken that set-off operates 
retrospectively.  In accordance with that view, once the bank decides to invoke its right 
to set-off, the amount of interest has to be adjusted retrospectively so that no interest 
is paid on that part of the loan which was susceptible to set-off.160  The practical 
difficulties caused by this approach are obvious, even more so if one or both of the 
accounts is a transactional account in respect of which the debit or credit balance 
fluctuate continuously.  Again the bank would probably elect to regulate this situation 
contractually. 
The practical impact of either of the approaches in this context would be disastrous, 
taking into account the negative effect both constructions will have on the bank’s 
revenue.  This discrepancy between legal theory and commercial reality compels 
banks to introduce contractual provisions to remedy the situation.  Possible drawbacks 
of relying on contractual provisions will be discussed in subsequent chapters.161 
3 4 2 6 Effect on default 
The effect set-off will have where a debtor defaults on his payment obligations (for 
example where loan payments are due but remain unpaid), whilst he has a claim 
against the creditor, also illustrates the inability of the current approaches to set-off to 
deal with modern relationships. 
The automatic approach to the operation of set-off will cause a debtor’s breach to be 
deemed never to have occurred,162 which will affect a creditor’s reliance on an 
acceleration or cancellation clause in a loan agreement.163  This was illustrated in 
Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK,164 where the lessee failed 
to pay his rent and the lessor cancelled the lease agreement based on this breach.  
 
                                            
160  Joubert Law of Contract 289; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration. 
161  See ch 4 (4 2 3) for the possibility of varying the consequences of set-off contractually, and ch 5 for 
the impact of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 on these types of contractual provisions. 
162  Joubert Law of Contract 289; Van der Merwe et al Contract 475. 
163 This seems to be the position accepted by the court in Great North Farms (Edms) Bpk v Ras 1972 4 
SA 7 (T). 
164 1998 4 SA 494 (C). 
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However, the lessee had a claim against the lessor arising from the purchase of liquor 
by the latter from the former.  After considering the principles surrounding the operation 
of set-off, the court held that the lessee’s defence, namely that set-off nullified the 
lessor’s claim and that the lessor was therefore not entitled to cancel the lease 
agreement, was good in law.165 
If the retrospective approach is followed, the debtor will be able to declare set-off and 
thereby cure his default retrospectively.166  This can create “immeasurable 
difficulties”167 for the creditor, who cannot be sure whether the debtor will rely on set-
off.  Any steps taken by the creditor pursuant to the breach, will then be made 
redundant, resulting in wasted costs and a possible cost order against the creditor.  
Although it can be argued that the creditor can also declare set-off and thereby avoid 
this uncertainty, there may be valid reasons why the creditor might prefer that set-off 
does not operate, for instance where a higher interest rate is charged on the debt owed 
to him. 
At first glance, the ipso iure approach to set-off manages to avoid this “state of 
pendency … before set-off has been declared”168 and thus it would seem to result in 
greater certainty.  However, it is commonly accepted that set-off will only operate when 
at least one of the parties desires and raises it.169  The creditor is therefore faced with 
a similar problem to the one he is confronted with in terms of the retrospective 
approach: either he treats the non-payment as a breach and risks the possibility that 
the debtor later relies on the fact that set-off occurred automatically, or he must accept 
that set-off operated, not treat the debtor’s default as a breach of the contract and thus 
lose the benefit of preserving his claim. 
As with the other consequences of set-off, the parties can counter the uncertainty 
created in these circumstances by providing for it contractually.170  However, it is 
evident that, should the parties fail to amend the situation by agreement, an uncertain 
 
                                            
165 502. See the criticism against this judgment levelled by Scott 2006 TSAR 599-600. 
166  Joubert Law of Contract 289; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 166. 
167  Joubert Law of Contract 289. 
168 Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 40. 
169 Hardy NO v Harsant 1913 TPD 433 at 447. 
170  See chapter 4. 
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and therefore less than optimal situation will ensue, regardless of which approach is 
adhered to. 
3 4 3 Assessment of the practical effects of the approaches to set-off  
There are limited situations where the two approaches to the operation set-off will 
render different results.  As seen above, the situations in which a different result would 
theoretically be achieved (keeping in mind that these approaches are often 
inconsistently applied in practice) depending on which approach is followed are: where 
there are multiple debtors or creditors; and where payments are made after the debts 
became susceptible to set-off.171  In both instances it has been shown that the view 
that a declaration is required for set-off to operate produces a more desirable outcome.  
It has further been seen that in both of these cases the consequences of the ipso iure 
approach are often deviated from, even by proponents of that view.   
It is also evident that both approaches can lead to practically undesirable results.  For 
example, we have seen that, with regard to interest charged after set-off could operate 
and the effect set-off has on default, neither approach corresponds with practical 
reality.  It must be considered whether, as Scott states, we remain “verstrengel in die 
historiese onsekerhede van die verlede”172 and whether, in this regard, South African 
courts have failed to take notice of legal developments in other jurisdictions or modern 
private law doctrine.173 
To evaluate opinions like those of Scott, as well as the provisional conclusions above 
on the relative merits of the competing approaches, it may be helpful to consider the 
operation of set-off in other jurisdictions.  The operation of set-off in civilian jurisdictions 
may provide particularly valuable insights into the problems faced in South African law, 
due to the shared legal background with regards to the development of set-off and the 
 
                                            
171  A third possibility where the outcome would depend on the approach to set-off which is adhered to 
is where the debt is prescribed.  However, the principles applicable in such an instance is unclear 
(see 3 4 1 above). 
172  “Entangled in the historical uncertainties of the past” (own translation) - Scott 2006 TSAR 601. 
173  601. 
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influence of Roman and Roman-Dutch sources on the application of set-off both in 
South Africa and Europe.174 
3 5 Operation of set-off in civil law jurisdictions 
Civilian jurisdictions can be divided into two broad groups with regards to their 
approach to set-off.175  The first group, which includes France176 and Belgium,177 
accepts the ipso iure operation of set-off, but requires it to be raised in court; the 
second, which includes Germany and the Netherlands,178 requires set-off to be raised, 
but then usually qualifies this requirement by accepting that once raised, set-off 
operates retrospectively.  Like the two approaches accepted in South African law, 
these correspond with the second and fourth theoretical approaches to set-off 
identified by Zimmermann.179 
3 5 1 Civil law jurisdictions that attribute an ipso iure effect to set-off 
The Romanistic legal systems, such as French and Belgian law, based their approach 
to set-off on the view of Pothier180 and thus provide that set-off operates 
automatically.181  French law unequivocally states that debts are extinguished ipso iure 
as soon as they are capable of set-off.182  Article 1290 of the French Civil Code (Code 
Civil) reads as follows: 
 
                                            
174 Scott 2006 TSAR 595, 599; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition (1990) 760-761. 
175  Zimmermann Obligations 760; R Zimmermann “Ius Commune and the Principles of European 
Contract Law - Contemporary Renewal of an Old Idea” in HL MacQueen & R Zimmermann (eds) 
European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 1 29; R Zimmermann “The 
Civil Law in European Codes” in H MacQueen, A Vaquer & SE Espiau (eds) Regional Private Laws 
and Codification in Europe (2003) 18 40. 
176 French law is especially important in the South African context (Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 35).  Also 
see Adjust Investments (Pty) Ltd v Wiid 1968 3 SA 29 (O) 31-32: “The development of our law of set-
off … [has] received its impetus not from the Romans but the Dutch and the French.” 
177 Lando et al European Contract Law 149; R Zimmermann “Legal History and Comparative Law” (25-
10-2007) Universitat de Lleida 5 <http://www.udl.es/export/sites/UdL/organs/secretaria/honoris/ 
zimmermann_discurs.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015); Scott 2006 TSAR 599. 
178 Lando et al European Contract Law 149; Zimmermann “Legal History and Comparative Law” 
Universitat de Lleida 5; Scott 2006 TSAR 599; Zimmermann “The Civil Law in European Codes” in 
Private Laws in Europe 41. 
179  See 3 3 above. 
180  See ch 2 (2 4 1). 
181  Art 1290 French Civil Code (Code civil); Art 1289 of the Belgian Civil Code. 
182  Zimmermann Obligations 760-761. 
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“Set-off is brought about as of right by the sole operation of the law, even without the 
knowledge of the debtors; the two debts are reciprocally extinguished, from the moment 
when they happen to exist at the same time, to the extent of their respective amounts.”183 
Theoretically, set-off thus operates irrespective of the will of the parties.184  However, 
French courts have found it impractical to implement this provision strictly185 due to the 
“doctrinal anomaly that an automatic discharge of an obligation may not automatically 
be taken into account in judicial proceedings involving this obligation.”186  Set-off is 
therefore held to be effective only if the defendant raises it in court187 and as a result 
the automatic operation of set-off is subject to the condition that set-off is pleaded in 
court as a defence.188  As mentioned above, this approach corresponds with the 
second model of set-off.189 
Inevitably, this condition has resulted in the will of one of the parties being decisive in 
order for set-off to operate,190 since a court cannot take set-off into account mero 
motu.191  It has further caused set-off in terms of this regime to closely resemble the 
approach in other civilian systems which require a declaration.  However, the solution 
causes French law to be more restrictive than the approach requiring a declaration, for 
it requires that the matter must serve before a court before set-off can be raised.192  
Zimmermann criticises this unnecessary restriction and argues that: 
 
                                            
183  Translation by G Rouhette “Civil Code” (04-04-2006) Legifrance <www.legifrance.gouv.fr 
/content/download/1950/13681/.../Code_22.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
184  Zimmermann Obligations 761; C Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences in International Commercial 
Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis (2011) 8. 
185  Zimmermann “Ius Commune” in European Contract Law 23-24; Zimmermann European Law of Set-
Off 25; Lando et al European Contract Law 149 n1. 
186  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 34-35. 
187  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 25; Lando et al European Contract Law 149 n 1; Pichonnaz 
& Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 28. 
188  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 25; Lando et al European Contract Law 149 n 1; Pichonnaz 
“Compensatio” in Principles of European Contract Law 287. 
189  See 3 3 above. 
190  Zimmermann “Ius Commune” in European Contract Law 24; R Zimmermann “Set-Off” in J Basedow, 
Hopt KJ, R Zimmermann & A Stier (eds) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law II 
(2012) 1554 1555. 
191  Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: Position Paper” UNIDROIT 3, 5. 
192  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 35. 
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“if set-off aims to avoid circuity of action and multiplicity of suits, a solution is arguably 
preferable which, at least occasionally, avoids a lawsuit altogether, rather than making the 
effect of set-off depend upon legal proceedings having been instituted.”193 
French courts have tried to rationalise the situation where the law regards set-off to 
have operated automatically, but the failure to invoke it meant that set-off could not 
operate in practice.  Their solution is to impute a waiver on the part of the defendant of 
his right to rely on set-off.194  This explanation is very unsatisfactory, especially where 
the defendant was unaware that set-off could operate, as it distorts the concept of 
waiver.195  It is, in other words, a fiction relied on to explain the discrepancy between 
the theory and the practical application. 
Another anomaly in French law is Article 1299 of the Code Civil, which only grants the 
condictio indebiti to a person who pays a debt which was susceptible to set-off if he 
had a valid reason for not being aware of the operation of set-off (i.e. if it was an 
excusable mistake).  In other cases, the original claim will remain enforceable, which 
is irreconcilable with the automatic operation of set-off.196  This is an indication that set-
off as a method of debt extinction depends upon the intention of the parties.  Where a 
party pays an amount knowing that set-off could operate, that party is deemed to have 
waived his right to set-off.197 
It is evident that, despite article 1290 of the Code Civil leaving no doubt that set-off 
operates without the consent or the knowledge of the parties, it is actually treated more 
like a right which a party has to invoke.  Therefore, a party is able to waive this right198 
– something which would not have been possible if set-off operated independently of 
the parties’ wills. 
Like South African law, French law further requires that both debts must be liquid.199  
This emanates from the ipso iure effect attributed to set-off in French law, since 
 
                                            
193  35. 
194  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 35; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 28. 
195  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 35. 
196  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 37; Scott 2006 TSAR 598. 
197  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 142; Scott 2006 TSAR 598. 
198  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 142. 
199  Art 1291 Code Civil; Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 52; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in 
Arbitration 143-144.  An exception is made in the case of connected or interrelated debts, see De 
Pardieu & Hubert “France” in Set-Off Law and Practice 162. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   68 
 
  
otherwise it would be impossible to calculate the extent to which the debts extinguished 
each other.200  It is also required that both debts are enforceable.201 
Set-off in the context of cession is specifically provided for in Article 1295 of the Code 
Civil.  Before notice of cession is given to the debtor, he is allowed to claim set-off 
against a cessionary in respect of claims he has against the cedent.  If the cession is 
accepted by the debtor, it is understood that he has waived his right to rely on set-off 
of any claims he has against the cedent.202  If the debtor does not accept the cession, 
he will be allowed to set off a debt owed by the cedent and which arose before the 
cession, but not claims which arose after notice of the cession was given.203   
Special rules also surround the operation of set-off upon the occurrence of insolvency 
in French law.  These are not relevant for present purposes, save to state that they are 
regulated in the context of bankruptcy law.204 
A similar position has been adopted by Belgian courts, where, despite the Belgian Civil 
Code providing for automatic set-off, the defendant is required to raise it as a 
defence.205  Waiver of the application of set-off is also allowed in Belgian law, although 
it is required that such a waiver be made expressly.206   
3 5 2 Civil law jurisdictions that require a declaration before set-off may operate 
German law provides a good example of a legal system falling into the second category 
(and thus the fourth approach identified by Zimmermann),207 namely that set-off 
requires a declaration to come into effect.208  This approach, which resulted from the 
 
                                            
200  Lando et al European Contract Law 145. 
201  C Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2001 Study L – Doc 72: Draft chapter” (2001) UNIDROIT 16 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2001/study50/s-50-071-e.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
202  Scott 2006 TSAR 598. 
203  Art 1295 Code Civil; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 143-144. 
204  De Pardieu & Hubert “France” in Set-Off Law and Practice 163. 
205  Vermylen “Belgium” in Set-Off Law and Practice 51. 
206  51. 
207  See 3 3 above. 
208  Zimmermann Obligations 760; Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 33.  This approach seems to 
be the one adopted by the majority of European legal systems - see Lando et al European Contract 
Law 149 n 1. 
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developments of the Pandectists,209 is embodied in Articles 387 to 389 of the German 
Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch).  These provisions read as follows: 
“If two persons owe each other performance that is substantially of the same nature, each 
party may set off his claim against the claim of the other party as soon as he can claim the 
performance owed to him and effect the performance owed by him. 
Set-off is effected by declaration to the other party. The declaration is ineffective if it is made 
subject to a condition or a stipulation as to time. 
The effect of set-off is that the claims, to the extent that they correspond, are deemed to 
expire at the time when they are set against each other as being appropriate for set-off.”210 
An informal declaration out of court is sufficient to effect set-off under German law.211  
A party is able to declare unilaterally that his debt is extinguished by set-off and no 
particular formality is prescribed for the notice.212  A party is also not obliged to invoke 
set-off – it is a voluntary act.213 
The effect of set-off in German law is retrospective.214  As in South African law, history 
provides the only explanation for this peculiarity215 namely that it developed in an 
attempt to reconcile the view that set-off must be effected by means of a declaration 
with the ipso iure approach.216 
Nevertheless, all the requirements for set-off must be met at the time a party seeks to 
rely on it; in other words, set-off will not operate if all the requirements were met at a 
time in the past but not at the time when a party elects to rely on it.217  Therefore, in 
terms of German law, if a debt is ceded before set-off is invoked, a party will 
theoretically be precluded from setting that debt off against a debt owed to him by the 
 
                                            
209  See ch 2 (2 4 3). 
210 Translated by Langenscheidt Translation Service “German Civil Code” (2014) Bundesminister der 
Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb. 
html#p1423> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
211  Zimmermann “Ius Commune” in European Contract Law 23. 
212  Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: Position Paper” UNIDROIT 3. 
213  5. 
214  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 33; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 138. 
215  Zimmermann “Set-Off” in The Max Planck Encyclopedia 1555; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in 
Arbitration 165. 
216  Zimmermann “Set-Off” in The Max Planck Encyclopedia 1555. 
217  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 36-37. 
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cedent.  Consequently, Articles 404218 and 406219 of the German Civil Code specifically 
provide protection for the debtor where the debt is ceded before set-off is effected, but 
after the debt became susceptible to set-off. 
A similar approach has been accepted in the new Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk 
Wetboek)220 and the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations (Code des Obligations).221  
Both the Netherlands and Swiss law require a declaration, upon which set-off has a 
retrospective effect to the date it first became possible.222  However, the Dutch Civil 
Code restricts the retrospective effect of set-off, in that interest which has already been 
paid in respect of the debts are not adjusted retrospectively.223 
In Swiss law, as in German law, no formalities are prescribed for the declaration.224  It 
is not even required that the declaration be made expressly; a tacit declaration will also 
suffice.225  Similar to the provision made for set-off under German law in the case of a 
cession, Articles 169 and 170 of the Code des Obligations provide that a debtor may 
still rely on set-off if it was possible before notice of the cession was received by the 
debtor.226 
Swiss law does not impose liquidity as a requirement for set-off and article 120(2) of 
the Code des Obligations specifically states that: 
“The debtor may assert his right of set-off even if the countervailing claim is contested.”227 
 
                                            
218  “The obligor may raise against the new obligee the objections that he was entitled to raise against 
the previous obligee at the time of assignment.”  (Translated by Langenscheidt Translation Service 
“German Civil Code” Bundesminister der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz). 
219  “The obligor may set off a claim against the previous obligee to which he is entitled against the new 
obligee as well, unless, when acquiring the claim, he was aware of the assignment or the claim only 
became due after he obtained knowledge of this and later than the assigned claim became due.” 
(Translated by Langenscheidt Translation Service “German Civil Code” Bundesminister der Justiz 
und für Verbraucherschutz). 
220  Arts 6:127(1) and 6:129. 
221  Art 124. 
222  Pichonnaz 2000 TR 541; Scott 2006 TSAR 598; R Bösch & C Amstutz “Switzerland” in Johnston W 
& Werlen T Set-Off Law and Practice: An International Handbook (2006) 433 437. 
223  Art 129:2 Dutch Civil Code; Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 41 n 110. 
224  Bösch & Amstutz “Switzerland” in Set-Off Law and Practice 437. 
225  437. 
226  436. 
227  Translated by Federal Council of Switzerland “Code of Obligations” (2015) Swiss Federation 
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19110009/201507010000/220.pdf> (accessed 
30-11-2015). 
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German law subscribes to a similar notion and the liquidity of the counterclaim is not 
prescribed for set-off to operate.228  In other words, a party may have his counterclaim 
discharged without knowing the precise amount of it.229  This leads to the peculiar 
situation in both German and Swiss law where a judge later adjudicates on the amount 
of the counterclaim, however 
“set-off will operate with these claims as though they have been ascertained as to their 
existence and to their amount from the first day of coexistence!”230 
German and Dutch law do not require that the main claim has to be enforceable, only 
the cross-claim (i.e. the debt owed to the person seeking to invoke set-off).231  Although 
Article 120(1) of the Code des Obligations implies that both debts should be due, in 
practice it is sufficient if only the claim due to the person declaring set-off is due and 
enforceable; the main claim is only required to be payable.232 
Al three legal systems have special provisions dealing with set-off in the context of 
insolvency.233  German and Swiss law further provides protection for a surety where 
the debt between the creditor and principal debtor is susceptible to set-off.  Although 
the surety cannot declare set-off, the debt cannot be claimed from him to the extent 
set-off can operate between the creditor and principal debtor.234 
3 5 3 Assessment of the operation of set-off in civil law jurisdictions 
Both the Romanistic and Germanistic legal systems have been unable to resolve the 
problematic notions of set-off inherited from Roman law and are therefore faced with 
 
                                            
228  Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2001 Study L – Doc 72: Draft chapter” (2001) UNIDROIT 14; Pichonnaz 
& Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 138. 
229  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 138. 
230  138. 
231  Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2001 Study L – Doc 72: Draft chapter” UNIDROIT 16; H Haag & K Birke 
“Germany” in W Johnston & T Werlen Set-Off Law and Practice: An International Handbook (2006) 
173 175; W Rank & L Silverentand “The Netherlands” in W Johnston & T Werlen Set-Off Law and 
Practice: An International Handbook (2006) 285 286; Böhlhoff & Budde 1984 Int’l Fin L Rev 30.  This 
is in line with the view advanced by De Wet and Van Wyk that the creditor’s claim does not need to 
be due and enforceable (see the discussion at 3 2 above). 
232  Bösch & Amstutz “Switzerland” in Set-Off Law and Practice 435. 
233  For Germany see Haag & Birke “Germany” in Set-Off Law and Practice 176-179; Böhlhoff & Budde 
1984 Int’l Fin L Rev 31-32.  For the Netherlands see Rank & Silverentand “The Netherlands” in Set-
Off Law and Practice 287-293.  For Switzerland see Bösch & Amstutz “Switzerland” in Set-Off   438-
441 
234  Art 770 of the German Civil Code; Art 121 of the Code des Obligations; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off 
in Arbitration 189-190. 
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the same problems experienced in South African law.  They also regard the obligations 
as extinguished at the moment that they are susceptible to set-off, either because they 
attribute an ipso iure operation to set-off or because, once it is declared, set-off is held 
to have retrospective effect.235  As a result, the consequences of set-off are largely the 
same as they would be in South African law.236 
Similar to the experience in South African law, neither of the two approaches to set-off 
followed in civil law jurisdictions provide a logical and sensible solution to the problems 
surrounding set-off.  It is further apparent that in terms of both approaches a whole 
range of exceptions exists in all legal systems.237  Two prime examples are French law 
which, despite accepting the automatic operation of set-off, still requires a 
declaration238 and Dutch law which, despite attributing a retrospective effect to the 
declaration of set-off, provides that interest already paid does not need to be repaid.239 
3 6 Evaluation of the approaches to set-off adopted in South African law 
Having considered the approaches adopted in some civil law jurisdictions, the two 
approaches to set-off followed in South African law can now be evaluated in the light 
of the policy considerations informing them and the practical impact they have on 
commercial relationships. 
There are policy considerations supporting both approaches to the operation of set-off.  
Van Niekerk contends that the ipso iure approach promotes certainty, because it 
determines more precisely the moment when set-off takes effect.240  He is further of 
the opinion that “it is in accordance with public policy that debts should be settled at 
the earliest date possible and that a multiplication of claims between the same parties 
should be avoided”.241  He also argues that in most cases it is in line with the intentions 
of the parties that the debts extinguish each other as soon as it is possible,242 i.e. 
automatic set-off is in accordance with their deemed intention.  Other policy reasons 
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advanced for the ipso iure approach include the notion that protection must be granted 
to parties who are in a position to invoke set-off.243 
However, Van der Merwe and others recognise that: 
“[r]equiring a reliance on set-off will not necessarily create uncertainty or result in a 
multiplicity of actions, nor is it immediately apparent that whatever public interest there may 
be in the earliest possible extinction of debts outweighs the need to recognise the autonomy 
of the parties in this regard.” 244 
The fundamental weakness of the ipso iure approach lies in its inconsistency with the 
autonomy contracting parties enjoy under our law.  The latter principle has led to the 
almost unanimous agreement, even by proponents of the ipso iure approach, that set-
off should not operate where neither of the parties wishes it.245  This dependency of 
set-off on the will of the parties was already recognised by Justinian.246  However, 
granting the parties an election on whether set-off operates undermines the core 
principle of the ipso iure approach and “reduce[s] it to an artificial theoretical 
construction”.247  This has also been the experience in other jurisdictions attributing an 
automatic effect to set-off where, despite provisions to the contrary, it is ultimately the 
will of the parties which is decisive.248  In order to preserve contractual autonomy, all 
legal systems that subscribe to this approach have adopted rules which are 
inconsistent with the ipso iure operation of set-off.  French law provides a good 
example of this.249  It is submitted that this conflict between autonomy and the ipso iure 
approach enhances uncertainty, rather than promoting certainty. 
Also problematic in terms of the view that set-off operates automatically is a situation 
where the defendant fails to raise the defence of set-off.  This gives rise to the 
paradoxical state of affairs that set-off took place automatically in theory, but is not 
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raised and therefore is not given effect to in practice.250  The result of this could be that 
a court gives judgment on a debt that the law regards as no longer in existence.  The 
solution found in other jurisdictions, such as France, which regard it as a waiver of the 
party’s right is unsatisfactory, because it disregards the principles of both the automatic 
operation of set-off and the notion of waiver.251 
Lastly, the ipso iure approach is inconsistent with commercial reality.  In most cases, 
until set-off is raised by either party, a creditor will continue to view his debtor as 
indebted to him and accept settlement of the debt by payment.  A creditor will also 
often still attempt to collect payment or even institute legal proceedings for recovery of 
the debt.  For example, a bank will treat two accounts of the same client (the one 
standing to his credit and the other having a debit balance) as separate accounts, until 
the bank decides to rely on set-off and appropriate money from the one account to 
decrease or settle the debit balance of the other account.  In practice therefore, set-off 
will only have an effect when at least one of the parties relies on it.  This also indicates 
that it is not necessarily the intention of the parties that set-off should operate as soon 
as the requirements for it are fulfilled.252  
Requiring a declaration to effect set-off manages to circumvent the biggest problems 
faced by the ipso iure construction.  This view is supported by various authors,253 on 
the basis that it ensures more legal certainty and acknowledges the autonomy of the 
parties.254  It allows a party to keep his claim alive by making payment and to enforce 
it by way of action.255 
Furthermore, if an approach is adopted in terms of which a declaration of set-off is a 
requirement for it to take effect, De Wet and Van Wyk’s argument that only the debt 
raised in set-off needs to be enforceable and liquid can be sustained.  As discussed 
above,256 where a declaration is required for set-off to operate, the debtor is enforcing 
his claim and discharging the creditor’s claim.  It can thus be argued that the creditor’s 
 
                                            
250  Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 495.  
251  Also see 3 5 1 above. 
252  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 39 n 102. 
253  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 282-283; Van der Merwe et al Contract 520-521; Zimmermann 
European Law of Set-Off 32-36; Scott 2006 TSAR 597. 
254  Scott 2006 TSAR 597; Van der Merwe et al Contract 474. 
255  Van der Merwe et al Contract 473; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 282. 
256  See 3 2 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   75 
 
  
claim does not need to be due and enforceable, merely payable.  Furthermore, it 
should be sufficient if only the debtor’s claim is liquid – he can choose to set it off 
against any amount he may owe the creditor.  However, the rationale behind these 
arguments disappears where set-off operates automatically, since set-off does not 
depend on the election of either party.  Relaxing the requirements for set-off in this 
manner will not only facilitate set-off and promote fairness, but will also be more in line 
with the general principles of performance.257 
An argument relating to the release of a surety can be made against requiring a 
declaration for set-off to operate.  If set-off operates ipso iure, he is freed from the 
earliest moment.  In such a case the parties will not be allowed exclude the operation 
of set-off, as it will place an impermissible burden on the surety.258  However, if a 
declaration by one of the parties is required to invoke set-off, a surety may be 
prevented from claiming release based on set-off.  Despite this, South African law 
allows a surety to rely on set-off between the principal debtor and the creditor.259  This 
is not in line with the minority view of set-off, but could be justified based on the 
accessory nature of the surety’s liability.260 
There are persuasive arguments for the view that requiring a declaration is preferable 
from both a theoretical and practical point of view.  However, the retroactive effect 
attributed to the declaration creates uncertainty and practical difficulties.  This is 
especially apparent when considering the effect of set-off on interest charged prior to 
the declaration, and its effect where one party was in default, but he failed to declare 
set-off timeously.  Joubert argues that the uncertainty created and the accompanying 
difficulties for the creditor due to the retrospective effect of the declaration (for example 
the fact that a breach of contract or a claim for interest can be nullified retrospectively) 
is of such severity that, despite the problems with the ipso iure approach, the balance 
of convenience still favours it.261 
 
                                            
257  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 278, 280-282. 
258  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 37. However, see the discussion of Dominick v Nedbank Limited (20463/14) 
2015 ZASCA 160 (13 November 2015) in ch 4 (4 2 2 1). 
259  See 3 2 above. 
260  Van der Merwe et al Contract 471. 
261  Law of Contract 289. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   76 
 
  
Historically, the notion of retroactivity developed in an attempt to reconcile the view 
that a declaration is required to effect set-off with the ipso iure approach.262  It was 
discussed previously why this historical basis may be regarded as flawed.263  Policy 
reasons advanced for attributing a retrospective effect to set-off are that the debtor 
usually does not declare set-off until he is sued by the creditor, and that it is necessary 
to protect any belief he may have had from the moment the requirements for set-off 
were met that he is no longer indebted.264  Pichonnaz mentions three reasons why this 
reasoning is not sound.   
First, both debts would only be discharged if the claims are for the same amount.265  
However, in practice, the respective debts are usually not for the same amount, which 
means that there may be an outstanding debt due by one of the parties.  In the latter 
case, there is no reason for a debtor to believe that the respective obligations have 
been (completely) extinguished by virtue of set-off.  Therefore, in most cases, the 
policy consideration underlying the retrospective effect attributed to a declaration of 
set-off (i.e. to protect the debtor’s belief that he does not owe anything) is largely 
irrelevant. 
Secondly, in a system where a declaration in the form of a notice of set-off is required, 
the claims are unaffected before such a declaration is made.  The view that the claims 
are already affected in some way, and that the debtor is therefore entitled to some 
protection even before set-off is declared (for example by accepting that he cannot be 
in default if set-off could have operated), stems from the automatic approach to set-off 
and does not fit in with a system where set-off is a voluntary act.266  There is no reason 
to protect the debtor before notice of set-off is given, since it is usually simple and 
convenient for him to declare set-off.267  It can further be argued that it is merely a 
fiction that most debtors would believe that set-off has operated automatically once the 
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requirements are met, and that there is no justification for protecting this fictional belief.  
As Zimmermann rightly states: 
“If it were true that whoever is in a position to give notice of set-off no longer regards himself 
as debtor and thus relies on not having to make payment, this argument would favour set-
off ipso iure rather than a retroactive one”.268 
Lastly, it is preferable for the debtor to declare set-off as soon as possible rather than 
to wait until action is instituted before he does so.269  If an informal declaration is 
required, such a declaration will be easily achieved and there is thus no reason for the 
debtor to delay.270  Denying retrospective effect to set-off would encourage a debtor to 
declare set-off as soon as possible.  This would enhance certainty and avoid 
unnecessary legal actions.  Practical problems could arise where the debtor is unaware 
that set-off has to be declared, but since an informal declaration will suffice, it is not 
unreasonable to expect him to inform the creditor that he no longer regards himself as 
indebted.271 
Evidently, both the ipso iure and retrospective approaches fall short of ensuring legal 
certainty and preventing unnecessary costs.  In terms of both the approaches, it is 
necessary to determine when set-off first became possible.  This can cause an 
unnecessarily protraction of a case before the court: instead of merely looking at the 
debts as they stand, the court now has to take note of evidence proving at what time 
the debts met the requirements for set-off, including at what stage they became due 
and liquid.  This could conceivably be a difficult task and could delay the speedy 
resolution of the matter, thereby bringing about the exact mischief the liquidity 
requirement aims to avoid.272 
The legal principles on which both approaches are founded and which originated in 
much simpler times, are clearly incapable of dealing with complex modern 
relationships.  To counter this uncertainty, we may have to consider the proposal, inter 
alia favoured by Zimmermann, that we should “adopt a rule according to which the 
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notice of set-off leads to a discharge pro tanto of the obligations confronting each 
other”.273  This proposal, which is in line with the approach recommended by the PICC 
and PECL, will now be considered. 
3 7 Attempts at unification: PICC and PECL 
With the formation of the European Union and the increase in trade between the 
member states, greater support for a unified European private law has recently started 
emerging274 (albeit that the recent attempts at creating a common European Sales Law 
have not come to fruition).275  Several initiatives have been undertaken to facilitate this 
process.276  Most notably are the PECL, which were drafted by the Commission of the 
European Contract Law,277 and the PICC, which are a set of principles with a more 
global scope and were prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT).278 
There is a great degree of similarity between the principles regarding set-off in the 
PICC and the PECL, which may be explained by the fact that the two instruments were 
drafted more or less at the same time279 and the close personal ties between the 
respective commissions responsible for the drafting.280  Essentially, the respective 
provisions on set-off follow the German model of set-off by notice, but attribute a 
prospective effect to such notice.281  Both sets of principles therefore adopt the fifth 
theoretical construction of the operation of set-off identified above.282  This is in spite 
of the fact that most civil law jurisdictions regard the debts to be discharged from the 
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moment they first become susceptible to set-off,283 because they opt for either the ipso 
iure or retrospective approach. 
The approach requiring a notice of set-off was supported for various reasons.  
Requiring a voluntary declaration of set-off recognises the idea that obligations are 
discharged because of the will of the parties.284  The declaration serves to inform the 
one party of the other’s intent285 and therefore enhances certainty.  It is thus considered 
to be preferable to the business community.286  There also seems to be a convergence 
of all systems towards set-off by notice:287 notice is a requirement in a large number of 
jurisdictions such as German, Swiss and Dutch law, and even jurisdictions such as 
France ultimately require set-off to be raised, albeit during the course of judicial 
proceedings.288  A benefit of requiring an extrajudicial notice is the fact that the notion 
that set-off needs to be declared before a judge is dismissed.289  This prevents a 
declaration of set-off from being postponed until action is instituted, and further avoids 
unnecessary legal costs.  As stated by Pichonnaz and Gullifer: 
“Set-off triggered by extrajudicial notice is economically more efficient than an automatic 
set-off regime and, doctrinally, more coherent with the idea that the obligations are 
discharged because of the will of one party.” 290 
After deciding that a notice of set-off will be required for set-off to be effected, the 
retroactive effect attributed to set-off in terms of systems such as German law had to 
be considered.  The arguments against the notion that it is necessary to attribute a 
retrospective effect to a declaration of set-off in order to protect the debtor’s reasonable 
belief that his debt has been extinguished by set-off have been discussed above.291  It 
was further found to be illogical to separate the date of “conception” of set-off (i.e. the 
day a declaration to that effect is made) from the date it takes effect.292  If set-off 
operates automatically, and a declaration is therefore not required, a natural 
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consequence would be that set-off is given effect from the date it first became possible.  
However, where a declaration is required before set-off can occur, the more logical 
construction would be that set-off becomes effective from the date of such a 
declaration.  The date of declaration of the set-off is also easier to establish than the 
date on which set-off first became possible.293 
At first glance, the notion of effecting set-off by way of a declaration with prospective 
effect seems foreign to legal systems which base their approach to set-off on Roman 
law, as it is contrary to the approaches which developed subsequent to Justinian’s 
decrees.  However, it has been shown in the previous chapter that this is not 
necessarily the case.  These opinions developed in response to the use by Justinian 
of the phrase “ipso iure”, but read in context the decrees relied on in support of an 
automatic extinction of debt by set-off were not necessarily intended to introduce such 
a system.294  The possibility that requiring a declaration without a retrospective effect 
corresponds with the approach envisioned by the Corpus Iuris Civilis and that deviating 
views developed due to misconceptions, can therefore not be discarded. 
There are at least three reasons which justify attributing an ex nunc effect to the notice 
of set-off.295  First, requiring an extra-judicial notice to effect set-off enables the debtor 
to decide when he wants to discharge his obligations.296  Performance also operates 
in this manner, and it is preferable that set-off should, despite the differences between 
the two, have the same effects as performance.297   
This justification also informs the second reason for the ex nunc effect of the notice.  If 
set-off operates ipso iure or with retrospective effect, it provides security where the 
other party becomes insolvent, as the creditor of the insolvent will still be able to 
“recover” his debt to the extent that set-off is possible.  However, the PICC and the 
PECL emphasise the performance function of set-off:298 by requiring a notice with an 
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ex nunc effect, the performance function is strengthened, while dispensing with the 
notion that set-off must fulfil this security function.299  Insolvency laws can however still 
provide for automatic set-off upon insolvency and thereby restore the security function 
of set-off.   
Thirdly, interest will continue to accrue until set-off is declared.  This will induce parties 
(or at least the party paying the higher interest rate)300 to set their debts off as soon as 
possible, which will enhance certainty.  There is also no reason to give a debtor the 
benefit of preventing the accrual of interest where he is free to declare set-off at any 
time.301  Similarly, there is no reason to protect a debtor from the consequences of 
breach, where the debtor was able to declare set-off, but failed to do so.  The 
subsequent declaration does not condone the debtor’s earlier breach, and there is no 
justification for curing the breach retrospectively.302 
The consequence of the prospective approach is that at the date the declaration is 
given, the debts are discharged, provided all the requirements for set-off are met.  
Therefore interest will accrue until notice of set-off is given.303  If breach occurred 
before the declaration, such a breach will not be cured by the declaration, similar to 
where payment is made after the due date.304  Any payments made after the date set-
off is declared will constitute an undue amount and can be reclaimed under the laws 
of unjustified enrichment.305  Payments made before that date will merely serve to 
discharge the indebtedness and set-off will not be able to operate in respect of the 
extinguished portion of the debt, since there is no longer a mutuality of claims.306 
3 8 Suggestions for reform in South Africa 
When analysing the South African approach to set-off, the impression is gained that 
judges select the consequences of whichever approach they prefer to apply or regard 
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as the most appropriate in a given situation. For instance, those judges who recognise 
that set-off operates ipso iure, are somehow still of the opinion that the defendant can 
chose to pay his debt rather than to invoke set-off.  The rules relating to multiple 
debtors or creditors are also wholly inconsistent with the ipso iure approach.  
Even if these inconsistencies are overlooked, the biggest shortcoming of the current 
system is the inability of either of the approaches to set-off to regulate modern business 
and banking relationships in a manner which corresponds with normal commercial 
practices.  For instance, we have seen that the effect set-off has both on the charging 
of interest and a party’s default is so problematic in practice that banks are compelled 
to regulate the operation of set-off contractually.  Jurisdictions which share our 
historical foundation of set-off do not offer solutions, as the same problems are 
experienced there.   
The reasoning which influenced the drafters of both the PICC and the PECL to require 
a notice in order to effect set-off and to discard the notion of retrospective operation 
may be instructive when considering the South African position.  There can be no 
denying that requiring a notice which operates ex nunc “constitutes the commercially 
most efficient and equitable solution”307 and that: 
“to deny a retroactive effect to the declaration of set-off has the advantage of creating a 
legal situation which is simple and clear, and which is harmonious with the fact that the 
claims remain unaffected until the declaration of set-off.”308 
If set-off operates ex nunc upon it being declared by one party, the consequences will 
be similar to payment being made at that moment.309  Therefore, interest will run until 
set-off is declared, and will cease the moment the debtor gives notice of set-off.  
Payments made after notice has been given of set-off constitutes undue payments, but 
payments made before that time will merely be performance, as there is no possibility 
of set-off discharging the obligation prior to that time.  These consequences are logical 
and lead to a more natural and “entirely satisfactory result”.310 
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Attributing a prospective effect to a declaration of set-off will mean that set-off will not 
be possible where one of the requirements has ceased to exist before set-off has been 
declared.  This consequence of attributing an ex nunc effect to set-off will be especially 
relevant where the debt has been ceded or if one of the parties becomes insolvent 
before notice of set-off is given. These two situations must therefore be considered in 
more detail. 
It can be argued that a person should not be allowed to use cession as a means to 
escape the operation of set-off.311  The possibility of cession being utilised by a cedent 
to avoid set-off is much greater where set-off does not operate automatically or if a 
declaration of set-off does not have a retrospective effect. This is because attributing 
a prospective effect to a declaration of set-off would preclude a debtor from relying on 
set-off if he failed to declare it before the cession occurred.  If set-off operates ipso iure 
or retrospectively, the debtor is able to rely on set-off in respect of a debt owed by the 
cedent even if the debt is subsequently ceded, provided the requirements for set-off 
were met before the cession.   
For example, A and B are mutually indebted and B cedes his debt to C after the 
requirements for set-off were fulfilled, but before A declared set-off.  In terms of the two 
approaches to set-off currently followed in South African law, A will either be able to 
rely on the fact that set-off occurred automatically before the cession or his declaration 
will operate retrospectively to before the debt was ceded.  Therefore, once the debts 
are susceptible to set-off, B cannot escape the operation of set-off by ceding the debt.  
However, if the declaration does not have a retrospective effect, it will mean that A can 
no longer rely on set-off against the cedent and B is therefore allowed to avoid the 
operation of cession. 
This difference in practical outcome where a declaration is made after cession was 
effected, which will be the result of denying the retroactive operation of set-off, can be 
regulated within the law of cession.  Some protection is already granted to the debtor 
where he performs in good faith before receiving notice of the cession or where the 
cession is mala fide.312  Thus, if A in the example above declares set-off before he 
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becomes aware of the cession, or if B ceded the debt for the purpose of evading the 
operation of set-off, A will still be entitled to rely on set-off even if the prospective 
approach is adhered to.  This protection can perhaps be extended, based on the 
common law rule that that a creditor cannot render the position of his debtor more 
burdensome through cession.313  But arguably, the existing provisions provide 
sufficient protection, as it is difficult to imagine a situation where a debtor should be 
allowed to rely on set-off against a cedent in spite of the fact that the debtor was aware 
of the cession (or did not perform in good faith), and the cedent was not mala fide. 
Requiring a declaration with ex nunc effect would also have an important effect on the 
so-called security function of set-off in the case of insolvency.  The proposed system 
of set-off would only provide protection to a creditor of an insolvent who has declared 
set-off before concursus creditorum.  However, in South Africa set-off upon insolvency 
is already partially regulated by statute,314 and most legal systems have specific rules 
that deal with set-off in the context of insolvency.315  The suggestion would therefore 
be that if policy considerations require that a creditor of an insolvent who is able to 
declare set-off upon insolvency must receive protection, it should be provided for by 
insolvency law.  One suggestion of how this can be effected is by stating that set-off is 
deemed to be declared upon insolvency.  Although this may be contrary to the notion 
that set-off should be the result of an exercise of will, it may be justified if policy 
considerations in the law of insolvency require that a creditor of an insolvent who has 
a claim against the insolvent estate should be awarded his full claim, rather than merely 
a dividend.  This security function of set-off was possibly already recognised in 
classical Roman law, where the estate of an insolvent was purchased by the bonorum 
emptor and he was then only allowed to claim from debtors the balance of claims owed 
to the estate.316  Nonetheless, it must be decided whether there is justification for this 
type of protection in modern insolvency law. 
It is desirable that the approach to set-off which is selected should be applied as 
consistently as possible with the theoretical principles underlying it.  Both the current 
approaches followed in South Africa have failed to achieve this ideal.  A system where 
 
                                            
313  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 45-46, with reference to Voet 18 4 13. 
314  See 3 4 2 3 above.  
315  Lando et al European Contract Law 143 n7; Zimmermann “Set-Off” in The Max Planck Encyclopedia 
1557. 
316  See ch 2 (2 2 2 2). 
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set-off operates ex nunc upon notice offers a much more coherent approach.  The 
possible problems which arise from abolishing the ipso iure or retrospective effect of 
set-off would occur in situations where it overlaps with other areas of the law and where 
it is to a certain extent already regulated by the rules applicable in those contexts.  
Where policy considerations therefore require a deviation from the rules surrounding 
set-off in the context of cession or insolvency, they can be easily be provided for by 
the rules applicable in those areas. 
Legal reality should resemble practical reality as closely as possible. It is not clear why 
a legal situation should be sustained if it is based on questionable historical foundations 
and, more importantly, is so out of touch with commercial reality that the business and 
banking community it is supposed to serve is forced to regulate the situation 
contractually.  In the absence of a proper historical foundation or other policy 
considerations, legal certainty should not be sacrificed to maintain a status quo which 
is clearly unsatisfactory. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: EXCLUSION OF THE RIGHT TO RELY ON SET-OFF: 
AGREEMENT, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL 
4 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the two approaches to the operation of set-off followed 
in South African law, namely that it either operates ipso iure the moment the 
requirements for its operation are met, or retrospectively upon it being declared by 
either party.  Despite the conclusion that neither approach produces an optimal 
outcome, these approaches still reflect the prevailing legal situation.  Therefore, in the 
absence of legal development in this regard by the courts or the legislature, the 
principles surrounding the current approaches are still relevant. 
It will now be examined when a party will be precluded from relying on set-off, and to 
what extent the parties can vary the requirements1 for, or the operation of, set-off.  This 
chapter will attempt to clarify the following: (i) the applicable principles where the 
parties have agreed not to rely on set-off or have varied the way in which it will operate 
in their specific situation; (ii) the acts or omissions which will constitute a waiver of a 
party’s right to invoke set-off; and (iii) the circumstances in which a party can be 
estopped from invoking his right to set-off. 
Unavoidably, the view that is followed with regards to the operation of set-off also has 
an impact on the theoretical (if not practical) application of these principles.  This aspect 
will therefore also be analysed. 
4 2 Agreement to exclude or vary the operation of set-off 
4 2 1 Introduction 
The first question which will be considered is whether parties can agree to exclude the 
operation of set-off.  In this regard, it is important to distinguish between two different 
scenarios, namely whether the parties agreed to exclude the operation of set-off before 
the debts were susceptible to set-off, or whether they reached agreement after the 
requirements for set-off were met. 
 
                                            
1  See ch 3 (3 2) for a discussion of the requirements for set-off. 
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This section will also examine the extent to which the parties may vary the operation 
of set-off by either removing or adding certain requirements for its operation.  As shown 
in the previous chapter, the practical difficulties resulting from both accepted views 
regarding the operation of set-off compels credit providers, especially banks, to 
regulate the operation of set-off contractually.2  It is therefore important to determine 
to what extent parties will be allowed to do so. 
4 2 2 Agreement to exclude the operation of set-off 
4 2 2 1 Agreement concluded before set-off could operate 
It is generally accepted that the parties can, by prior agreement, exclude the operation 
of set-off.3  This does not have to be an express agreement;4 the operation of set-off 
can also be excluded by way of a tacit agreement5 or a tacit term in the agreement6 
between the parties. 
 
                                            
2  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4, 3 4 2 5 and 3 4 2 6). 
3 Blakes Mphanga Inc v Outsurance Insurance Co Ltd 2010 4 SA (SCA); Herrigel NO v Bon Roads 
Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA); Altech Data (Pty) Ltd v M B Technologies (Pty) Ltd 
1998 3 SA 748 (W); LTC Harms “Obligations” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 19 2 ed 
(2006) para 245; BvD van Niekerk “Some Thoughts on the Problem of Set-Off” (1968) 85 SALJ 31 
34.   
4  See Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 676, where it was 
held that an agreement to exclude the operation of set-off can be inferred from the manner in which 
the parties conduct their business. 
5  There are two tests which the courts apply to infer a tacit agreement (see Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 292A-B, where it was said that it is necessary 
to show “by a preponderance of probabilities, unequivocal conduct which is capable of no other 
reasonable interpretation than that the parties intended to, and did in fact, contract on the terms 
alleged”; and Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v Cleveland Estate (Pty) Ltd; Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v 
Vorner Investments (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 155 (A) 165B, where it was said that “a court may hold that 
a tacit contract has been established where, by a process of inference, it concludes that the most 
plausible probable conclusion from all the relevant proved facts and circumstances is that a contract 
came into existence”).  For an attempt at reconciliation of these two tests, see RH Christie & GB 
Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 84-93.  However, a discussion 
of this debate falls outside of the scope of this thesis. 
6  The court normally employs the official bystander test to infer a tacit term (in terms whereof the court 
will acknowledge a tacit term if it is satisfied that the parties, being asked at the time the contract was 
negotiated what will happen in a certain case, would have replied “of course so and so will happen”), 
and further requires that the term must be objectively necessary to give business efficiency to the 
agreement.  In this regard, see MFB Reinecke, JP van Niekerk & PM Nienaber “Insurance” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 12(1) 2 ed (2012) para 245, with reference to 
Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) 1919 1 KB 592; C Maxwell “Obligations and 
Terms” in in D Hutchison & C-J Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 
233 247; Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jongegezellen 2005 6 SA 1 (SCA) para 50-51; Alfred 
McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 533; Seven Eleven 
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Cancun Trading No 150 CC 2005 5 SA 186 (SCA) para 34; Alfred 
McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 533;.  Joel 
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Van der Merwe and others state that: 
“[t]he possibility that parties may by agreement exclude the operation of set-off in respect 
of debts that may arise between them is a further indication that the theoretical and practical 
significance of the two supposedly opposing views [to the operation of set-off] should not 
be overemphasised.”7 
They do not elaborate on the meaning of this statement, but presumably it refers to the 
fact that by allowing the parties to exclude the operation of set-off, they can prevent 
set-off from operating even if it is held to operate automatically.  Thus, set-off will be 
subject to the wishes of the parties even in terms of the ipso iure approach.  However, 
they fail to consider how the fact that the parties may agree to exclude the operation 
of set-off can be reconciled with the two opposing views of the operation of set-off, and 
in fact it is something that is rarely considered. 
If the view is followed that set-off depends on a declaration by one party, the situation 
is uncomplicated.  In terms of that approach, the operation of set-off is clearly linked to 
the will of the parties8 – if neither of the parties wishes to declare set-off (i.e. in the 
absence of a declaration), it will not operate.  The autonomy of the parties is clearly 
recognised and they are allowed to elect whether set-off operates or not.9  There is 
thus no difficulty with the parties agreeing to exclude the operation of set-off between 
them – in effect, they are each undertaking to each other than neither may declare set-
off, and therefore set-off cannot be effected. 
On the other hand, the view that set-off operates automatically is inevitably linked to 
the notion that it operates irrespective of the wishes of the parties.10  If set-off operates 
automatically, the question whether the parties should be allowed to exclude the 
operation of set-off by agreement depends on the whether or not “legal policy 
 
                                            
Melamed and Hurwitz v Cleveland Estate (Pty) Ltd; Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v Vorner Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 155 (A) 165D.  A discussion of this test falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
7  S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 4 
ed (2012) 474. 
8  JC de Wet & AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 282. 
9  S Scott “Skuldvergelyking – Toe (ex tunc) en Nou (ex nunc)” 2006 TSAR 595 597; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 474. 
10  See for instance Van Aswegen v Pienaar 1967 3 SA 677 (O) 681D-E, where it is said that the 
difference between payment and set-off is that the former bears a close connection to the will of the 
payee, whereas the latter takes place ipso iure; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 282; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 470 n 230, where they admit that there is an inclination towards the view that 
set-off operates irrespective of the parties’ wills.  See further the discussion in ch 3 (3 4 1).   
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outweighs the principle of individual autonomy sufficiently to permit the operation of 
set-off irrespective of the will of either of the parties involved.”11  
The law generally favours the autonomy of parties and all civil law jurisdictions 
(including those which attribute an ipso iure operation to set-off) accept that the parties 
can exclude the operation of set-off contractually.12  This follows from the principle of 
freedom of contract.  Based on the same principle, the PECL recognises that set-off 
cannot be effected if it is excluded by agreement,13 and exclusion of set-off by 
agreement will also be possible under the PICC.14  South African law also recognises 
the autonomy of parties, and therefore, if two parties agree  
“expressly, or at least by necessary implication, in their dealing with each other … not to set 
off their reciprocal debts but to pay them to each other in full … it does not [lie] in the mouth 
of [a party] to contend that set-off operates automatically in respect of their mutual 
indebtedness, nor can [the party] now insist upon or claim set-off when it specifically chose 
not to do so at the time that set-off would have operated had it at that time chosen to rely 
thereon.”15 
The ostensible conflict between allowing parties to contract out of the operation of set-
off and the fundamental principle of the ipso iure approach to the operation of set-off, 
namely that set-off operates irrespective of the will of the parties,16 has not been 
resolved.  Two possible solutions can be offered to address this inconsistency. 
The first potential solution can be found in Joubert’s construction of the requirements 
of set-off.  He states that set-off must not be contractually excluded as a fifth 
requirement for set-off to take place.17  Although is generally not recognised as a 
requirement for set-off and recognising it as such does not make a practical difference, 
Joubert’s construction has a theoretical advantage.  If set-off is excluded, one of the 
 
                                            
11  Van der Merwe et al Contract 470. 
12  R Zimmermann Comparative Foundations of the European Law of Set-Off and Prescription (2002) 
57; P Pichonnaz & L Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration and Commercial Transactions (2014) 16, 168; 
O Lando, H Beale, A Prüm & R Zimmermann (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law: Part 
III (2003) 155 n 1. 
13  Art 13:107(a). 
14  P Pichonnaz “Set-Off” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (2005) 1033 1039. 
15 Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 676-677. 
16  See n 10 above. 
17  DJ Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 292. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   90 
 
  
requirements for its operation is not met and therefore (despite its automatic operation) 
set-off cannot operate between the two parties. 
Another possible solution is to treat the right to set-off as an implied term in the contract 
between parties,18 and therefore imposed by “a rule of law which the Court will apply 
unless validly excluded by the contract itself”19 and which “can be varied or made 
inapplicable by agreement.”20  Set-off operates by virtue of a common law rule,21 and 
is incorporated in the legal relationship of the parties without depending on their 
intention.  Although the right to invoke set-off is never explicitly recognised as an 
implied term, it can be argued that this is effectively what is done by allowing parties 
to contract “out of the otherwise automatic applicability of set-off”.22  In this manner, 
set-off does not lose its character as a manner in which agreements are terminated by 
operation of law, but operates by way of an implied term in the agreement between the 
parties. 
Regardless of the theoretical explanation underlying the parties’ right to exclude set-
off by means of agreement, our law clearly accepts that contracting parties are free to 
preclude it from operating between them.23  However, even where an agreement to 
exclude set-off is concluded before set-off could operate, it does not necessarily mean 
that the agreement must be concluded before the debts arose.  The parties could for 
instance conclude such an agreement while one of the debts is not yet due and payable 
or not sufficiently liquid. 
Where the parties agree not to invoke set-off in respect of a debt which is secured by 
a suretyship (and before set-off could operate in respect of that debt), such an 
agreement could prejudice a surety.  The exclusion of set-off would prevent the surety 
from being released by way of set-off between the debtor and the creditor.  Therefore, 
 
                                            
18  On the definition of an implied term, see Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial 
Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 526. 
19  Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 532G. 
20  Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 6. 
21  Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286 289; Joubert Law of Contract 286. 
22  Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 677. 
23  Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 677; Blakes Mphanga Inc 
v Outsurance Insurance Co Ltd 2010 4 SA (SCA) para 15: “Although set-off operates ipso iure its 
operation may be excluded by agreement”.  It must be noted that an agreement to exclude the 
operation of set-off will not prevent a defendant from raising a claim in reconvention (Consol Ltd t/a 
Consol Glass v Twee Jongegezellen 2002 2 SA 580 (C); Van der Merwe et al Contract 473). 
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if such an agreement is concluded after the debt is secured, Van Niekerk argues that 
the surety must consent to such an agreement.24  He is of the view that, in the absence 
of such consent, the surety will not be bound to the agreement and will thus be able to 
raise set-off as a defence despite the debtor and creditor being barred from doing so.  
Effectively, the surety will therefore be released to the extent that set-off could have 
taken place in the absence of the agreement.25  This is in line with the general principle 
that the accessory obligation of a surety may be extinguished 
“wholly or in part, if the creditor in his or her dealings with the principal debtor and other 
sureties acts in such a way as to prejudice the surety or increase his or her burden. Thus, 
if the creditor, without the surety’s consent, agrees with the principal debtor upon a material 
alteration or variation of the principal obligation which will prejudice the surety, the latter is 
released.”26 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal recently expressed the opinion that where a 
creditor is entitled to rely upon set-off, but not obliged to do so, the failure to apply set-
off will not amount to a breach of the terms of a suretyship.27  It was further stated that 
a surety will only be released “if the prejudice is the result of a breach of some other 
legal duty or obligation.”28 Although this judgement seems to nullify the argument made 
previously with regards to the release of a surety where set-off can operate, the court’s 
reasoning was based on a term of the principal agreement (of which the sureties were 
aware)29 which entitled the creditor, in its sole discretion, to rely on set-off.30  It can 
thus be argued that the case can be distinguished from Van Niekerk’s reasoning, and 
it is not clear whether a similar conclusion will be reached where the right to set-off 
does not flow from an agreement, but is based on the common law.   
4 2 2 2 Agreement concluded after set-off could operate 
Whether the parties can reach an agreement not to invoke set-off after the 
requirements for set-off were satisfied is more contentious, especially where the ipso 
 
                                            
24  1968 SALJ 37. 
25  37. 
26  JJ Henning & KL Mould “Suretyship” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 26 2 
ed (2015) para 307. 
27  Dominick v Nedbank Limited (20463/14) 2015 ZASCA 160 (13 November 2015) para 18. 
28  Para 15, with reference to ABSA Bank Ltd v Davidson 2000 1 SA 1117 (SCA) para 19. 
29  Para 5. 
30  Para 19. 
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iure operation of set-off is accepted.31  This problem will rarely, if ever, arise if a 
declaration is required for set-off to operate.  Because the requirements for set-off in 
terms of that construction are only satisfied once the declaration is made, any 
agreement to exclude the operation of set-off concluded before either party has 
declared set-off will fall in the category mentioned above, i.e. an agreement concluded 
before set-off could operate.32  In other words, set-off cannot operate before a 
declaration is made, therefore it is only where the parties agree to exclude the 
operation of set-off after one of them has already declared set-off that the problematic 
situation discussed below will arise.  It is improbable that the parties would reach such 
an agreement where one of them already gave notice of set-off to the other. 
In terms of the ipso iure construction, set-off is held to extinguish the debts 
automatically as soon as the requirements for set-off are met, without requiring a 
declaration by either party.  Technically the debts no longer exist after set-off could 
operate.  Therefore, after the debts became susceptible to set-off, it should be 
impossible to exclude the operation of set-off – it is no use closing the stable door after 
the horse has bolted.  Nonetheless, the possibility has been mooted that some scope 
still exists for parties to exclude the operation of set-off after the debts were 
extinguished due to the automatic operation of set-off.   
One possibility is that the subsequent agreement is regarded as a kind of novation: the 
extinguished or partially extinguished obligations are substituted with new obligations 
identical to those which would have existed if set-off did not take place.33  However, 
there are two problems with accepting that the parties novated their obligations by 
agreeing to exclude the operation of set-off. 
First, for novation to occur it must be proved that the parties intended to substitute the 
old obligation for the new one.34  It is doubtful whether either of the parties had the 
intention of replacing their obligations with a new obligation when all they meant to do 
was to exclude the operation of set-off.  Inferring an intention to novate where the 
 
                                            
31  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 37. 
32  See 4 2 2 1 above. 
33  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 37. 
34  Harms “Obligations” in LAWSA 19 para 239. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   93 
 
  
parties’ only aim was to ensure that the debts would not be susceptible to set-off 
misconstrues the concept of novation. 
A second problem with accepting novation of the debts is that an intended novation 
can only be effective if the obligation meant to be novated is still in existence.35  As 
mentioned above, where set-off operates ipso iure, the debts would have been 
extinguished the moment that the requirements for set-off were met and there is 
therefore no obligation left to novate. 
An alternative solution would be to infer a new agreement between the parties in terms 
of which they incur new debts, on the exact same terms and conditions as the old 
debts, except for the condition that set-off would not operate.  This might avoid the 
second problem identified with regards to accepting a novation of the debts, but offers 
no solution to the first problem.  Again, it is quite a stretch to imagine that the parties 
had the intention to conclude an entirely new agreement where they only expressed 
(or by their conduct indicated) the desire for set-off not to operate – and where one of 
the parties claims amounts outstanding, he will undoubtedly base his claim on the 
original agreement. 
A further question which arises is whether such a novation or new agreement will be 
allowed where it affects the rights of third parties, for instance a surety?36  Similar to 
the situation where set-off is excluded after the debts were secured,37 a surety who 
does not consent to the agreement to exclude the operation of set-off cannot be bound 
to it.  He will therefore be released pro tanto to the extent that set-off could have 
operated between the debtor and creditor, subject to the terms of the suretyship 
agreement.38 
From the above it can be seen that reconciling the fact that parties are allowed to 
exclude the operation of set-off by agreement with the minority view of set-off is not 
problematic.  However, if it is accepted that set-off operates ipso iure, the situation 
becomes a lot more complicated, especially where the agreement to exclude set-off is 
 
                                            
35  Para 239. 
36  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 37. 
37  See 4 2 2 1 above. 
38  Van Niekerk 1968 SALJ 37.  However, also see Dominick v Nedbank Limited (20463/14) 2015 
ZASCA 160 (13 November 2015), as well as the discussion in 4 2 2 1 above. 
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concluded after the debts were susceptible to set-off.  These problems are aggravated 
where the debts are secured by way of surety. 
4 2 3 Agreement to vary requirements or operation of set-off 
Instead of entirely excluding set-off, the parties may prefer to contractually vary either 
the requirements for set-off to operate (such as prescribing a notice) or the timing 
thereof, for instance by excluding the automatic operation of set-off without preventing 
either of the parties from relying on set-off.  This would ensure certainty with regards 
to the operation of set-off in practice.  Arguably, if it is possible for parties to exclude 
set-off by agreement, it should also be possible for parties to stipulate the way it 
operates in their specific circumstances. 
South African literature on the ability of parties to vary the operation of set-off 
contractually is scarce.  However, internationally this is an important commercial 
concept known as “contractual set-off” or “set-off by agreement”.39  Set-off by 
agreement is accepted by most legal systems based on the recognition of the 
autonomy of contracting parties,40 although in most instances the freedom of the 
parties to provide for contractual set-off are subject to certain statutory limitations, for 
instance those imposed by insolvency laws.41  It is further recognised in terms of the 
both the PICC42 and the PECL43 that the parties may effect set-off by agreement even 
if the prescribed requirements are not met. 
There are numerous examples of the possible variations which the parties can provide 
for.  For instance, the parties could agree that set-off will operate before the debts are 
due and payable.  This offers a bank an opportunity to set off amounts owed to the 
client against a loan made to the client, but in respect of which the date of payment 
has not yet arrived.44  Parties can also agree to relax the mutuality requirement, which 
 
                                            
39  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 14. 
40  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 15; Lando et al European Contract Law 149 n 2.  Also see 
C Fountoulakis Set-Off Defences in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis 
(2011) 56, 97-98.  For the importance of contractual set-off in English law, see PR Wood English and 
International Set-Off (1989) 147-232. 
41  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 15. 
42  Official Comment 8 to Art 8.1. 
43  Lando et al European Contract Law 148-149. 
44  Wood Set-Off 162-163. 
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can enable a bank to set off a loan owed by one company in a group of companies 
against money deposited on behalf of another company in that group45 (subject to the 
provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008).46 
Although the parties are able to vary the manner in which set-off will operate by 
agreement, it does not mean that the party invoking set-off is entitled to stipulate 
unilaterally how set-off should take place.  Even if the party declaring set-off should 
wish for set-off to take effect only on the date it is declared or pleaded by him, he 
cannot (for instance by stipulating this in his declaration) avoid the fact that set-off 
operates when the requirements for it are first satisfied.47  In other words, the operation 
of set-off can only be varied by prior agreement between the parties. 
4 3 Waiver of right to rely on set-off 
4 3 1 Introduction 
The next issue for consideration is whether a party can waive his right to rely on set-
off.  This was answered in Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings 
BK,48 where the Cape Division confirmed Van Leeuwen’s opinion49 that  
“’n skuldenaar afstand kan doen van sy reg om op skuldvergelyking staat te maak … [waar] 
dit op ‘n oorwig van waarskynlikhede bewys word dat die skuldenaar, met volle kennis van 
sy reg, besluit het om daarvan afstand te doen, hetsy uitdruklik hetsy deur gedrag wat 
onversoenbaar is met die bedoeling om die reg te behou en uit te oefen.”50   
Accepting that a party may waive his right to invoke set-off is not problematic in terms 
of the minority view of set-off.  In terms of that view, a declaration by one of the parties 
is required to effect set-off.  A party is entitled to waive his right to make such a 
declaration and, in the absence of a declaration by either party, set-off cannot be 
effected.   
 
                                            
45  169. 
46  See s 45, which sets certain requirements for lending money or securing a debt of a related or inter-
related company. 
47  South African Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ferreira 1962 4 SA 213 (O) 215. 
48 1998 4 SA 494 (C). 
49  Van Leeuwen Cens For 1 4 36 1. 
50  500: “A debtor can waive his right to rely on set-off where it is proven on a balance of probabilities 
that the debtor, with full knowledge of his right, decided to waive it, whether expressly or through 
conduct which is irreconcilable with the intention to retain and exercise the right” (own translation). 
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However, the notion of waiver of a party’s right to rely on set-off becomes more 
problematic if the view is adopted (as in the majority of cases) that set-off operates 
ipso iure on the date that the debts become susceptible to set-off.  The questions that 
arise are similar to those where the parties contract out of the operation of set-off,51 
namely: (i) if set-off operates irrespective of the will of the parties, and therefore 
discharges the debts even where neither party desires it,52 what right exists to be 
waived by a party prior to set-off occurring; and (ii) even if it is accepted that a party 
can waive his right to rely on set-off, how can that be done after the debts were already 
extinguished automatically at the moment that set-off could operate? 
The first question was partially discussed above,53 when the exclusion of set-off by 
way of agreement was considered.  Presumably, the reason for allowing a party to 
waive his right to rely on set-off is also based on the autonomy of contracting parties.  
However, the concept of waiver is even more problematic, as it presupposes that the 
party effecting the waiver possesses a right.  In Hardy NO v Harsant,54 Mason J 
recognised the inconsistency between holding that set-off operates ipso iure or 
automatically, and yet treating it as a right which a party can decide whether to assert.55  
However, this did not deter the Appellate Division in Schierhout v Union Government 
(Minister of Justice)56 from regarding set-off as a right which a party may elect to 
exercise,57 despite an apparent recognition of the automatic nature of set-off.58  In that 
case, the appellant was a former employee of the Government and was receiving 
monthly pension payments from it.  The Government also obtained a taxed cost order 
against the appellant.59  Instead of relying on set-off to discontinue the payment of 
monthly pension instalments until the cost order was settled, the Government opted to 
reduce every subsequent pension payment to the appellant by a certain amount.60  
However, when the appellant obtained a claim against the Government for arrear 
 
                                            
51  See 4 2 above. 
52  See n 10 above. 
53  See 4 2 2 1 above. 
54 1913 TDP 433. 
55  447-448. 
56 1926 AD 286. 
57  293. 
58  289-290. 
59  289. 
60  293. 
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salary payments,61 the amount of which was slightly less than the outstanding balance 
of the cost order,62 the Government set this claim off against the cost order.63  The 
appellant averred that failure by the Government to invoke set-off in respect of the full 
amount of the monthly pension payments amounted to waiver of this right in respect 
of the cost order, but the court found that partially exercising the right to set-off from 
time to time (by reducing every pension payment) is not inconsistent with the intention 
to retain the right to invoke set-off in future.64  Recognising set-off as a right which a 
party can chose to invoke is clearly problematic if the automatic approach to set-off is 
followed, since it undermines the foundation of the ipso iure approach, namely that the 
debts are extinguished by operation of law without requiring any action by the parties. 
Even if it is accepted that set-off “is a right which parties must claim if they desire to 
have the benefit of it”65 (a construction very similar to the notion that set-off must be 
declared), it does not alter the core principle of the ipso iure view that the debts are 
extinguished automatically at the moment set-off becomes possible.66  Subsequent 
waiver of the right to rely on set-off cannot change the fact that the debt is no longer in 
existence, and allowing such a waiver will mean that the debt is revived.  This is 
analogous to the scenario where the parties contract out of the operation of set-off after 
the debt became susceptible to set-off67 and can only be explained by way of a 
novation of the debt or a new agreement between the parties.  However, this will mean 
that the party relying on the waiver has to prove that both parties had the prior intention 
to novate the agreement or to conclude a new agreement, before the right to rely on 
set-off was waived. 
Despite the theoretical uncertainty, it is accepted that the right to invoke set-off may be 
waived by either party both before and after the requirements for set-off were met,68 
although waiver by one party of his right to invoke set-off does not preclude the other 
 
                                            
61  289. 
62  289. 
63  289. 
64  293: “the arrangement was in effect the partial exercise of [the right to set-off] from time to time; nor 
was it inconsistent with an intention to retain that right in future.” 
65  Hardy NO v Harsant 1913 TDP 433 447. 
66  See ch 3 (3 4 1). 
67  See 4 2 2 2 above. 
68 Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C); Hardy NO v Harsant 
1913 TPD 433. 
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party from relying on set-off.  Waiver of a right causes that right to perish69 and is 
irrevocable.70  It is thus important for a party to be aware when he will legally have 
waived his right to set-off, as this will preclude any future reliance by him on set-off in 
respect of that debt.  This requires us to consider the general principles that determine 
the nature and requirements of waiver 
4 3 2 Nature and requirements of waiver 
Unanimity on the precise nature of waiver has not been reached in South African law.71  
One view is that waiver is based on an agreement, in terms of which one party offers 
to waive its right and the other party accepts such a waiver.72  This view is supported 
by Christie and Bradfield in so far as the waiver relates to a contractually conferred 
right.73  The requirements for waiver in terms of this view are that (i) the person who 
waives his right must be fully aware of the right he is waiving;74 (ii) he must 
communicate his intention to waive to the other party; and (iii) the person to whom the 
waiver is communicated must also be aware of the right at the time of such 
communication.75 
Another school of thought describes waiver as “a unilateral decision not to avail oneself 
of a right or a remedy, a privilege or power, an interest or benefit.”76  All that is required 
for a party to waive a right is that: (i) he must be fully aware of the right that is waived;77 
and (ii) he must communicate the waiver to the other party78 or there must be “some 
unequivocal act indicating a waiver.”79  Proponents of the first mentioned school of 
 
                                            
69  Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Ingle 1910 TS 540 550; Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit 
(Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A) 792. 
70 Glaser v Millward 1950 4 SA 587 (W); Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 456. 
71  MFB Reinecke, JP van Niekerk & PM Nienaber “Insurance: Part 2” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
The Law of South Africa 12(2) 2 ed (2012) para 160.  
72  Regent Insurance Co Ltd v Maseko 2000 3 SA 983 (W) 995; Napier NO v Van Schalkwyk 2004 3 SA 
425 (W) 437-438; Union Free State Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd v Union Free State Gold 
and Diamond Corporation Ltd 1960 4 SA 547 (W) 549-550.  Also see GF Lubbe & CM Murray Farlam 
and Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 728-729 n 1. 
73  Law of Contract 456. 
74  Reinecke et al “Insurance: Part 2” in LAWSA 12(2) para 160.   
75  Reinecke et al “Insurance: Part 2” in LAWSA 12(2) para 160; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 
453. 
76 AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 464. 
77 Reinecke et al “Insurance: Part 2” in LAWSA 12(2) para 160; Borstlap v Spangenberg 1974 3 SA 
695 (A); Feinstein v Niggli 1981 2 SA 684 (A) 698. 
78  Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Ingle 1910 TS 540 550. 
79 Joubert Law of Contract 245.  Also see Kerr Law of Contract 465. 
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thought also accept the unilateral form of waiver where it involves an election or where 
a contractual provision which operates exclusively for the benefit of a particular 
contracting party is waived by that party.80 
It has been suggested that where waiver takes the form of election, for purposes of the 
first requirement it is merely required that the party who is alleged to have waived his 
right had knowledge of the material facts which give rise to the right he is waiving.81  
Election by a party generally involves a waiver, in the sense that by choosing to 
exercise one right which is inconsistent with another right, the party is waiving the 
latter.82  Although the example used to illustrate this principle usually relates to an 
election regarding the possible cancellation of the agreement, it can also apply in the 
case of set-off: where a party elects not to invoke set-off, he waives his right to 
extinguish his debt by way of set-off.  The argument can then be made that the fact 
that he was aware that mutual debts existed is sufficient, even if he was not aware that 
he had a right to invoke set-off.  However, this seems to be contrary to the dictum in 
Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK83 quoted above, which 
clearly requires full knowledge of the right that is waived. 
Whether waiver is seen as a unilateral act or an agreement, it is accepted that 
“[w]aiver is first and foremost a matter of intention.  Whether it is the waiver of a right or a 
remedy, a privilege or power, an interest or benefit, and whether in unilateral or bilateral 
form, the starting point invariably is the will of the party said to have waived it.”84 
Despite the fact that waiver depends primarily on the intention of the party said to 
waive, it is required that the intention must be communicated to the other party, either 
expressly or through conduct.  This has been endorsed by the Appellate Division in 
 
                                            
80  De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 453; Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract 731 n 5.  Also 
see Thomas v Henry 1985 3 SA 889 (A) 895. 
81  Reinecke et al “Insurance: Part 2” in LAWSA 12(2) para 160; Feinstein v Niggli 1981 2 SA 684 (A) 
699.  
82  Feinstein v Niggli 1981 2 SA 684 (A) 698; Thomas v Henry 1985 3 SA 889 (A) 896.  Also see Lubbe 
& Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract 731 n 5. 
83 1998 4 SA 494 (C) 500. 
84  Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (SCA) para 15. 
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Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd,85 where it reaffirmed the opinion by 
Innes CJ in Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Ingle86 that: 
“[W]aiver is the renunciation of a right. When the intention to renounce is expressly 
communicated to the person affected he is entitled to act upon it, and the right is gone. 
When the renunciation, though not communicated, is evidenced by conduct inconsistent 
with the enforcement of the right, or clearly showing an intention to surrender it, then also 
the intention may be acted upon, and the right perishes. But a mere mental resolve, not so 
evidenced, and not communicated to the other party, but discovered by him afterwards, 
seems to me... to have no effect upon the legal position of the person making the resolve”.87 
It was further confirmed in Road Accident Fund v Mothupi88 that an objective test is 
applied to determine whether the party had the intention to waive.89  This test is 
threefold: (i) the intention to waive is adjudged by its outward manifestation;90 (ii) 
mental reservations which are not communicated have no legal consequence;91 and 
(iii) the outward manifestation of intention is evaluated from the perspective of the 
reasonable person in the shoes of the person relying on the waiver.92  The outward 
manifestation of a party’s intention can consist of words or other conduct from which 
the intention to waive can be inferred.93  This can also include inaction or silence in 
certain circumstances.94  Although the court in Road Accident Fund v Mothupi95 limits 
these circumstances to instances where a duty to act or speak exists, Kerr argues that 
there are clearly circumstances where waiver can be inferred based on inaction or 
silence even in the absence of a duty to speak or act.96  
 
                                            
85  1989 3 SA 773 (A) 792. 
86  1910 TS 540. 
87  550. 
88  2000 4 SA 38 (SCA). 
89  Para 16, with reference to Palmer v Poulter 1983 4 SA 11 (T) 20C - 21A; Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund v Meyerowitz 1995 1 SA 23 (C) 26H - 27G; Bekazaku Properties (Pty) Ltd v Pam 
Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd 1996 2 SA 537 (C) 543A - 544D. 
90  Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (SCA) para 16, with reference to Traub v Barclays 
National Bank Ltd; Kalk v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1983 3 SA 619 (A) 634H - 635D; Botha (now 
Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A) 792B – E. 
91  Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (SCA) para 16, with reference to Mutual Life Insurance 
Co of New York v Ingle 1910 TS 540 550. 
92  Para 16. 
93  Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (SCA) para 16; Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York 
v Ingle 1910 TS 540 550. 
94  Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (SCA) para 18. 
95  Para 16. 
96  Kerr Law of Contract 475.  
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It is commonly accepted in our law that the onus is on the party who alleges waiver97 
to show that the other party “with full knowledge of [his] right, decided to abandon it, 
whether expressly or by conduct plainly inconsistent with an intention to enforce it.”98  
A court will not easily infer waiver, the conduct must be unequivocal.99 
4 3 3 Tacit waiver in the context of set-off 
As discussed above, it is accepted that a party can waive his right to rely on set-off.100  
However, an important practical question is when he will be deemed to have tacitly 
waived his right based on his conduct.  In other words, in the absence of an express 
or intentional waiver, when will a party run the risk of being deemed to have waived his 
right to rely on set-off?  It is impossible to provide a complete list of the types of conduct 
which could indicate an intention not to invoke set-off, but it is submitted that two 
specific scenarios pose this risk: first, where the party delays invoking set-off; and 
secondly, if he either accepts partial settlement of a debt or partially settles a debt 
which is susceptible to set-off. 
These considerations are especially relevant in the context of banking relationships.  
Due to different practical considerations, banks will often decide not to apply set-off at 
the moment that the requirements have been met, but rather to postpone its operation 
to a later stage.  In the previous chapter, the facts of Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Echo Petroleum CC101 were discussed, where a client operated two accounts at 
the bank, the one having a credit balance and the other being overdrawn.102  By 
allowing the client to operate the bank accounts in this manner while the balance of 
both accounts are due and payable (and the other requirements for set-off are met) 
instead of applying the credit balance to discharge the debit balance, the bank 
postponed the operation of set-off.  In such a case, the question must be asked 
whether the bank, through allowing the effluxion of time, waived its right to rely on set-
 
                                            
97  Kerr Law of Contract 475-476; Regent Insurance Co Ltd v Maseko 2000 3 SA 983 (W) 997. 
98  Law v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 263. 
99  Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286 293; Road Accident Fund v 
Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (SCA) para 19.  Also see 4 3 3 1 below. 
100  Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C). 
101  2012 5 SA 283 (SCA). 
102  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4). 
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off.  If so, what period of time must have lapsed before the bank could be said to have 
waived its right?   
In the scenario above, the bank will presumably also allow the client to withdraw funds 
from the credit account.  This is also what happened in Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Echo Petroleum CC.103  In legal terms, the bank is repaying money owed to the 
client, despite the fact that these funds are susceptible to set-off.  Thus the second 
question arises, namely whether the bank by allowing the client to withdraw funds in 
respect of which set-off could operate, waived its right to invoke set-off?  Furthermore, 
was such a waiver only in respect of the amount withdrawn by the client or in respect 
of the total amount susceptible to set-off? 
4 3 3 1 Delay in invoking set-off 
A mere delay in enforcing a right does not necessarily constitute waiver, but is merely 
a factor to take into consideration in determining whether there was an intention to 
waive.104  In Mahabeer v Sharma NO105 Hefer JA confirmed that: 
“Apart from the law relating to prescription, there is no principle in South African law … that 
justifies a conclusion that a right may be lost through mere delay to enforce it”.106   
This seems to correspond with the court’s view in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Echo Petroleum CC107 where, despite the lapse of several months, it was held that the 
right to rely on set-off had not been waived.  Innes CJ further confirmed in Schierhout 
v Union Government (Minister of Justice)108 that: 
“[W]aiver is never presumed: it must be clearly proved.  Voet (16.2, par.3) remarks that 
even if a debtor has not set off when entitled to do so, he is not on that account to be taken 
to have remitted the debt, since there might be other reasons for his conduct.  He adds that 
frequent omissions to take advantage of set-off without any probable reason might be proof 
of an intention to remit”.109 
 
                                            
103  2012 5 SA 283 (SCA). 
104 Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 4 SA 310 (T) 325; 
Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 460. 
105 1985 3 SA 729 (A). 
106 736D. 
107 2012 5 SA 283 (SCA). 
108 1926 AD 286. 
109  293. 
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What the circumstances are that will justify an inference of waiver, will depend on the 
facts of each case.  However, in the light of the principle laid down in Mahabeer v 
Sharma NO,110 it can be argued that in the absence of any other steps taken by the 
party said to waive his right (such as accepting payment of a debt), the other party will 
find it very difficult to prove that the former has waived his right to invoke set-off merely 
based on a lapse of time, even if it covers a substantial period. 
In the banking scenario described above, the bank will in all likelihood continue to 
charge interest separately on the two accounts.  In the absence of contractual 
provisions, it can be argued that this is an indication of the bank’s intention not to invoke 
set-off, but to rather view the two accounts as separate and distinct.  However, it has 
been said that: 
“As it is by operation of law that set-off comes into effect and not by the act of parties, it can 
make no differen[c]e what entries the Bank made in its books on[c]e it had intimated to the 
plaintiff that it intended to set-off.”111 
There is some scope for the argument that charging interest amounts to no more than 
an accounting entry in the books of the bank, and it does not constitute an unequivocal 
act which indicates waiver.  However, once such interest is communicated to the client 
in a statement, this could be taken as an indication that the bank regards the accounts 
(and therefore the two debts) as separate.112  Whether the bank will be held to have 
waived its right to invoke set-off due to the charging of interest separately on the two 
accounts has yet to be tested in the courts. 
4 3 3 2 Accepting partial settlement of debt or partially settling a debt 
A second question is whether a party is deemed to waive his right to rely on set-off 
where he partially pays a debt which is susceptible to set-off, or partially accepts a 
payment of such a debt.  Although this question is less important with regards to that 
portion of the debt which is settled through payment, it can have an impact on the 
 
                                            
110 1985 3 SA 729 (A). 
111  Bain v Barclays Bank (DC & O) Ltd 1937 SR 191 204. 
112  Derham argues that charging interest separately is not inconsistent with the right of banks to apply 
set-off, and ascribes this to an agreement between the bank and the client that, “while an account 
retains a separate identity in the bank’s book, interest is to be calculated by reference to the balance 
on that account” (R Derham The Law of Set-Off 3 ed (2003) 656). 
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party’s right to invoke set-off in respect of the balance of the debt which has yet to be 
settled. 
This issue was briefly considered in Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus 
Beleggings BK.113  The court stated that if a person mistakenly pays a debt in respect 
of which set-off could operate, the payment may be reclaimed with the condictio 
indebiti.114  This indicates that the fact that payment was made does not automatically 
exclude the possibility of set-off operating – it is because the debt was discharged by 
set-off (despite payment of the debt) that the debtor has an enrichment claim for the 
payment made instead of having to rely on the original indebtedness. 
Although the court did not exclude the possibility that paying a debt could amount to 
waiver of the right to invoke set-off, Van Zyl J stated that: 
“Die hof a quo het voorts gefouteer deur te bevind dat die betaling deur die verweerder nie 
versoenbaar was met enige bedoeling om hom op skuldvergelyking te beroep nie. Dit 
beteken dat die hof tevrede was dat die verweerder afstand gedoen het van sy reg om op 
skuldvergelyking staat te maak. Soos reeds vermeld moet daar aan streng vereistes 
voldoen word alvorens so 'n afleiding gemaak kan word… Daar is geen aanduiding dat hy 
in daardie stadium enigsins gedink het aan die reg wat hy het om hom op skuldvergelyking 
te beroep nie. Nog minder is daar enige aanduiding dat hy kennis gedra het van die inhoud 
van sodanige reg, om nie te praat van 'volle kennis' nie. Die blote feit van betaling beteken 
nie dat hy van sodanige reg afstand gedoen het nie.”115 
From the above it can be deduced that making payment of a debt in ignorance of the 
right to invoke set-off will not in itself amount to waiver of that right;116 at the very least 
the person alleging waiver will have to prove that the other party had knowledge of the 
right to invoke set-off.  Furthermore, the dictum confirms the fact that waiver is not 
easily inferred. 
 
                                            
113 1998 4 SA 494 (C) 500-501. 
114  501B-C. Also see Bain v Barclays Bank (DC & O) Ltd 1937 SR 191 204. 
115  501G-I: “The court a quo further erred in finding that payment by the defendant was irreconcilable 
with any intention to rely on set-off.  This means that the court was satisfied that the defendant waived 
his right to rely on set-off.  As already mentioned strict requirements must be met before such an 
inference can be drawn… There is no indication that he at that stage thought at all about the right 
that he has to rely on set-off.  There is even less of an indication that he had knowledge of the content 
of such a right, not to mention ‘full knowledge’.  The mere fact of payment does not mean that he 
waived such a right” (own translation). 
116  This is also confirmed in Christie & Bradfield Law of Contract 495. 
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The possibility of claiming ignorance might not be of much use to a bank, since a 
financial institution will find it difficult to argue that it had no knowledge of its right to 
apply set-off.  Unfortunately, in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum 
CC,117 the facts of which were discussed previously,118 the question of waiver of the 
right to invoke set-off did not arise, despite the bank allowing the client to operate the 
bank account as usual after the requirements for set-off were met.  This could perhaps 
be attributed to a failure by the defendant to allege waiver, and does not exclude the 
possibility that allowing withdrawals might be sufficient grounds to prove waiver of the 
right to invoke set-off. 
Presumably, accepting partial payment of a debt which is susceptible to set-off will 
constitute less grounds for inferring waiver.  This is because in most cases no or very 
little positive action is required by the payee, and accepting payment can thus be 
argued to be less of an indication of his intention.  However, as in the case of a bank 
allowing a withdrawal of funds, it remains to be seen whether a court will find it sufficient 
grounds for finding that a party has waived his right to rely on set-off.   
4 3 4 Prejudice to third parties where reliance on set-off is waived 
A last relevant consideration in the context of waiver is whether a party will be allowed 
to waive any reliance on set-off where such a waiver will negatively affect the rights of 
third parties, such as a surety or where the debtor is jointly and severally liable with 
other co-debtors.  This is again similar to the principles applied where the operation of 
set-off is excluded by agreement119 – the debtor and creditor cannot prejudice a surety 
in such a manner without his consent, and he will therefore still enjoy the benefit of set-
off.120 
The same problem will not arise where there are jointly and severally liable co-debtors.  
As discussed previously,121 the predominant view is that such co-debtors are not able 
to rely on set-off in respect of a debt between the creditor and another co-debtor.  Set-
 
                                            
117  2012 5 SA 283 (SCA). 
118  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4). 
119  See 4 2 above. 
120  However, see Dominick v Nedbank Limited (20463/14) 2015 ZASCA 160 (13 November 2015), 
where it was found that not exercising a contractual right to set-off does not amount to prejudice 
towards the surety.  Also see the discussion in 4 2 2 1 above. 
121  See ch 3 (3 2 and 3 4 2 1). 
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off can only operate where it is relied on by either the creditor or the relevant co-debtor.  
Because there is no obligation on the debtor who is able to invoke set-off to do so, he 
cannot by waiving his right to set-off be said to prejudice the other co-debtors. 
To conclude: although it is accepted that a party can waive his right to rely on set-off, 
the principles surrounding such a waiver are not very clear.  Once again the ipso iure 
approach to set-off creates complications, especially where the right to set-off is 
waived after the debts were susceptible to set-off.  A further difficulty in stipulating 
when a party will be deemed to have tacitly waived his right to invoke set-off is that the 
answer will depend on the facts of each case, and to date few possible scenarios have 
been tested in court.  
4 4 Estoppel 
4 4 1 Introduction 
Where a person successfully relies on estoppel, he is precluded “from denying the truth 
of a representation previously made by him or her to another person if the latter, 
believing in the truth of the representation, acted thereon to his or her prejudice.”122  In 
the context of set-off, the party against whom estoppel is raised successfully would not 
be allowed to aver that the debt had been extinguished by set-off.   
The elements which the party relying on the estoppel must prove are: (i) that he was 
misled by a representation made by the other party; (ii) that the belief was reasonable; 
and (iii) that he acted on the misrepresentation to his detriment.123  Fault may also be 
required,124 but the law is not clear on whether this is indeed a requirement.125 
4 4 2 The requirements of estoppel within the context of set-off 
The first requirement of estoppel is that a representation must be made.  It is possible 
that silence or inaction can constitute a representation, but only where there is a duty 
to speak or act.126  In the context of set-off, it is difficult to imagine a duty to make the 
 
                                            
122 PJ Rabie & H Daniels “Estoppel” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 9 2 ed (2006) para 
652. 
123  JC Sonnekus Rabie and Sonnekus The Law of Estoppel in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 48; Rabie & 
Daniels “Estoppel” LAWSA 9 paras 656-671; Joubert Contract 82. 
124  Joubert Contract 82; Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 241-281 
125  Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 242. 
126  Martin v De Kock 1948 2 SA 719 (A); Rabie & Daniels “Estoppel” LAWSA 9 para 656. 
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other party aware of the intention to invoke set-off so that, in the absence of such 
communication, a party can be estopped from relying on set-off.  Therefore, the 
representation will have to take the form of words or conduct, and merely allowing a 
lapse of time cannot be said to constitute a representation.  Actions that will possibly 
meet the requirement of a representation includes steps taken to collect a debt which 
is susceptible to set-off, accepting partial payment or allowing the partial withdrawal of 
funds (in the case of a bank) or a bank sending a statement which indicates that 
interest was charged separately on two accounts which could be set off against each 
other (inasmuch as it does not in any event amount to waiver of the right to set-off).127 
The requirement that the person pleading estoppel must establish that he acted on the 
representation and thereby altered his position to his detriment might be problematic 
in the context of set-off.128  Where the one party believed, based on a reasonable 
impression created by the other party, that the latter would not invoke set-off, he has 
two possible courses of action.  Either he can decide to claim set-off, in which case the 
other party’s decision not to rely on set-off will have no effect.  Alternatively, he can 
decide to ignore the operation of set-off by paying his debt or by taking steps based on 
the other party’s default, such as attempting to collect the debt owed to him. 
The possibility of prejudice only arises if the second action is taken.  The question is 
therefore whether A be prejudiced where he was under the impression that B will not 
rely on set-off and, based on that belief, either (i) paid the debt and now has to rely on 
the condictio indebiti to recover his claim; or (ii) took steps pursuant to the breach (e.g. 
by instituting action to collect the debt or taking steps to evict B where B was in default 
with lease payments), only to have B’s default retrospectively cured due to the 
operation of set-off.  In order to answer this, it is first necessary to ascertain what will 
constitute sufficient prejudice to support a defence of estoppel – a question which has 
been a point of some debate in our law. 
In Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Breet NO129 it was held that 
 
                                            
127  See 4 3 above. 
128  Rabie & Daniels “Estoppel” LAWSA 9 para 661. 
129  1958 3 SA 783 (W). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   108 
 
  
“the very act of the one contracting party in entering into the contract in reliance on the 
other’s conduct will be regarded in most bilateral contracts as a sufficient alteration of his 
position to his detriment to meet the requirement of prejudice…  That, however, does not 
alter the fact that the party relying on the principle must show some kind of prejudice, even 
of the minimum kind just mentioned”130 
Joubert argues that the first sentence quoted above reduces the requirement of 
prejudice so much that it will always be present and can therefore be ignored for all 
practical purposes.131  However, Sonnekus does not agree and is of the view that it 
merely indicates that prejudice is not limited to direct or instantaneous loss, but that 
showing a prospect of pecuniary loss, which does not need to be easily calculable, will 
suffice.132  He further argues that a bilateral contract will as a matter of course entail 
an obligation which will be of patrimonial nature.133  He states that: 
“although academic writers on the law have suggested in law journals that the law does not, 
or ought not to, require that prejudice must be of a patrimonial nature in order to be capable 
of founding an estoppel, there is no case in which it has been held that prejudice need not 
be of a patrimonial nature.”134 
Where a party paid a debt which was susceptible to set-off, such a payment will either 
discharge the debt or possibly (where set-off is held to operate automatically) give rise 
to a claim of unjustified enrichment.135  The party who made payment will therefore still 
be entitled either to enforce the original debt owed to him or to claim back the amount 
he paid with the condictio indebiti if he can prove the requirements for the condictio 
indebiti.  If either of these possibilities is available, it is difficult to imagine any prejudice 
suffered on that account. 
However, the scenario must also be considered here that the party who made the 
payment cannot prove that the requirements for the condictio indebiti have been 
satisfied, for instance where he cannot prove that his mistake in making the undue 
payment is excusable.136  For example, A pays a debt to B based on his misconception 
 
                                            
130  790. 
131  Joubert Contract 82. 
132  Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 199. 
133  203. 
134  199. 
135  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4). 
136  See Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 4 SA 202 (A) 223-224, where it 
was confirmed that an amount paid indebite in mistake of fact or mistake of law can be recovered 
with the condictio indebiti, except where the payer was found to have been “inexcusably slack”. 
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that B will not invoke set-off.  B then alleges that set-off occurred automatically before 
the payment was made by A.  If the court adheres to the ipso iure construction of set-
off, A has to reclaim the payment made with an enrichment claim.  If he cannot prove 
that the requirements for this claim is satisfied, this claim will fail.  Not being allowed 
either to claim the debt owed by B (because it has been discharged by set-off) or to 
reclaim the amount paid to B (because the requirements for the condictio indebiti 
cannot be proved) should constitute sufficient prejudice for purposes of estoppel.  
Provided the other requirements for estoppel are satisfied, A should be able to claim 
in the alternative that B is estopped from invoking set-off, thus allowing A to claim B’s 
original indebtedness. 
In respect of the steps taken to collect the debt, and the costs incurred to do so, there 
is perhaps a stronger case to be made that the party acted to his detriment, believing 
the other will not invoke set-off.  It is also conceivable that a lessor can take steps to 
evict a lessee, and cancellation of the lease agreement is later disputed due to the 
possibility of set-off operating.  See for instance the facts of Southern Cape Liquors 
(Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK.137  There, the lessor did not raise the defence of 
estoppel, and it is difficult to say whether he would have succeeded with such a 
defence.   
A further obstacle in the way of the party alleging estoppel might be the requirement 
of fault.  Although it is settled that fraud is not required to found estoppel, the law is not 
settled with regards to whether negligence must be proved.138  It has been indicated 
that fault (in the form of negligence) is not always required, although it usually must be 
shown in order to succeed with a defence of estoppel.139  According to Sonnekus, “[i]f 
no blameworthiness can be attributed to the estoppel denier, no estoppel can be 
founded.”140  As there is no duty to invoke set-off, and both parties are entitled to rely 
on set-off, it might be difficult to establish fault. 
 
                                            
137  1998 4 SA 494 (C).  These facts are also discussed in ch 3 (3 4 2 6). 
138  Rabie & Daniels “Estoppel” LAWSA 9 para 665; Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 241-242. 
139  Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 1 SA 394 (A); Joubert Contract 82 n 89; Rabie & 
Daniels “Estoppel” LAWSA 9 para 665. 
140  Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 242. 
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It is evident that a party will find it difficult to estop another from invoking set-off.  Even 
though prejudice in this context has a wide connotation and is not limited to immediate 
monetary loss,141 this might still be difficult to show in the context of set-off.  If fault on 
the part of the estoppel denier is required, it will further hinder successfully estopping 
the other.  The onus will also be on the party relying on estoppel to plead and prove 
estoppel.142 
Lastly, it must be mentioned that once again the ipso iure view of set-off does not fit in 
well with the notion of estoppel.  If a party successfully relies on estoppel, the other 
party “may be bound by a representation constituted by conduct”143 and therefore be 
precluded from invoking its right to set-off.  However, in terms of the aforementioned 
view, set-off operates automatically without requiring any action on the part of either of 
the parties.144  It is thus uncertain whether estoppel can have any effect, as set-off 
operates by law and the party is not required to do anything to bring it about.  A similar 
problem does not arise if the approach is followed that a declaration is required for set-
off to operate, since in those circumstances it is required that a party declares set-off 
before it can become effective.  Therefore, if the person created the impression that 
he would not declare set-off, he will be estopped from doing so. 
4 5 Conclusion 
It is clear that the law favours the autonomy of parties and that it therefore will not allow 
set-off to operate where the parties do not wish it to.145  Parties are allowed to contract 
out of the operation of set-off, and the right to invoke set-off can also be waived.  If it 
is accepted that a party can waive his right to invoke set-off, the other party should also 
be able to estop the former from relying on set-off where he created the reasonable 
belief that he will not invoke set-off.  The application of the general principles relating 
to waiver and estoppel will largely depend on the facts of each case.  It is still uncertain 
 
                                            
141  Rabie & Daniels “Estoppel” LAWSA 9 para 663. 
142  Para 672. 
143 Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Technicrete v Potgieter 2004 6 SA 491 (SCA). 
144  CG Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law 3: The Law of Contracts 9 ed (1978) 412; De 
Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 273, 282; Van der Merwe et al Contract 473-474. 
145  Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 16 2 2, 16 2 6 tr P Gane The Selective Voet being the 
Commentary on the Pandects by Johannes Voet and the Supplement to that Work by Johannes van 
der Linden 3 (1956) 149-150, 155-156; Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 
1998 4 SA 494 (C); Hardy NO v Harsant 1913 TDP 433; Van der Merwe et al Contract 470; Christie 
& Bradfield Law of Contract 495. 
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how willing the courts will be to accept these defences in the context of set-off and 
what conduct will be regarded as sufficient grounds for the conclusion either that a 
party has waived his right to invoke set-of or that he should be estopped from doing 
so. 
Even though the possibility of excluding the operation of set-off is universally accepted, 
analysing the ways in which this may happen once again highlights the problems with 
according it automatic operation.  Despite the basic principle of the ipso iure approach 
to set-off being that the debts are extinguished by law, without depending on any action 
by or wish of the parties, this is irreconcilable with the principle of freedom of contract 
and is therefore not consistently adhered to.   
It is thus evident that the theoretical principles underlying the exclusions of the 
operation of set-off favour the view that a declaration is required for set-off to operate.  
This approach makes it clear on what basis exceptions to the operation of set-off are 
allowed – the parties either agree not to declare set-off, or one party waives his right 
to do so, or is estopped from declaring set-off.  Requiring a declaration further avoids 
a situation where the law regards a debt as already extinguished (due to the automatic 
operation of set-off), but a party is then still allowed to exclude or waive the operation 
of set-off.  Attempts to rationalise this situation lead to agreements being inferred on 
grounds which are insufficient at best – based on convenience rather than the 
satisfaction of the requirements for a valid contract – and therefore cause a distortion 
of the concept of a tacit agreement. 
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5 CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT ON SET-
OFF 
5 1 Introduction 
The previous chapters focused on the historical origin of set-off, and provided an 
analysis of the current principles governing this form of debt extinction.  We have also 
seen that the operation of set-off can be excluded or varied in certain circumstances, 
whether by agreement, waiver and possibly estoppel. 
In many legal systems the general principles governing the operation of set-off have 
been regarded as inadequate when applied to credit agreements.1  South African law 
is no exception.  According to sections 90 and 124 of the National Credit Act 24 of 
2005 (NCA), if a credit provider wants to insert a clause into a credit agreement which 
authorises the appropriation of money from an account of a debtor to satisfy an 
obligation in terms of a credit agreement, such an authorisation must comply with 
certain requirements.  Prescribing conditions for utilising money in one account of a 
client to settle or reduce the indebtedness of that client in terms of another account, 
will affect the right of a credit provider to rely on set-off. 
However, uncertainty exists regarding the ambit of the abovementioned provisions, 
and specifically their impact on a credit provider’s common law right to set-off.  This 
chapter will analyse whether these provisions of the NCA exclude a credit provider’s 
common law right to set-off, by considering (i) the reports and policy documents 
prepared during the drafting of the NCA; (ii) provisions in consumer legislation of other 
jurisdictions; and (iii) the objectives of the NCA.  Other provisions of the NCA will also 
be considered to ascertain whether a specific interpretation of sections 90(2)(n) and 
124 will contravene these provisions, and the impact of the provisions contained in the 
Code of Banking Practice will be assessed.  It will also be evaluated whether and to 
what extent a limitation to a credit provider’s right to invoke set-off is desirable. 
Although these principles will apply to any credit provider who is able to invoke set-off, 
they will be of particular relevance for a bank, operating as a credit provider.  This is 
because a bank, as both a lender and a deposit-taking institution, is generally in a 
 
                                            
1  P Pichonnaz & L Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration and Commercial Transactions (2014) 283; R 
Zimmermann Comparative Foundations of the European Law of Set-Off and Prescription (2002) 56. 
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position where it can invoke set-off.  Other credit providers (for instance micro lenders) 
who only grant loans, will seldom be in the position where set-off becomes possible.  
Therefore, the focus in this chapter will be mainly on banks, although (with the 
exception of the Code of Banking Practice) the same principles will apply in the case 
of other credit providers. 
5 2 The relevant provisions of the NCA 
5 2 1 Overview of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA  
In the case of credit agreements which are subject to the NCA,2 credit providers must 
adhere to sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA.  These sections read as follows: 
“90(2) A provision of a credit agreement is unlawful if- 
(n) it purports to authorise or permit the credit provider to satisfy an obligation of 
the consumer by making a charge against an asset, account, or amount 
deposited by or for the benefit of the consumer and held by the credit provider 
or a third party, except by way of a standing debt arrangement, or to the extent 
permitted by section 124; 
124 Charges to other accounts 
(1) It is lawful for a consumer to provide, a credit provider to request or a credit 
agreement to include an authorisation to the credit provider to make a charge 
or series of charges contemplated in section 90(2)(n), if such authorisation 
meets all the following conditions- 
(a) the charge or series of charges may be made only against an asset, 
account, or amount that has been- 
(i) deposited by or for the benefit of the consumer and held by that credit 
provider or that third party; and 
(ii) specifically named by the consumer in the authorisation; 
(b) the charge or series of charges may be made only to satisfy- 
(i) a single obligation under the credit agreement; or 
(ii) a series of recurring obligations under the credit agreement, 
 
                                            
2 For purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary to discuss which credit agreements are subject to 
the NCA.  Where reference is made to a “credit agreement”, it will be assumed that such an 
agreement is subject to the NCA. 
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specifically set out in the authorisation; 
(c) the charge or series of charges may be made only for an amount that is- 
(i) calculated by reference to the obligation it is intended to satisfy under 
the credit agreement, and 
(ii) specifically set out in the authorisation; 
(d) the charge or series of charges may be made only on or after a specified 
date, or series of specified dates- 
(i) corresponding to the date on which an obligation arises, or the dates 
on which a series of recurring obligations arise, under the credit 
agreement; and 
(ii) specifically set out in the authorisation; and 
(e) any authorisation not given in writing, must be recorded 
electromagnetically and subsequently reduced to writing. 
(2) Before making a single charge, or the initial charge of a series of charges, to 
be made under a particular authorisation, the credit provider must give the 
consumer notice in the prescribed manner and form, setting out the particulars 
as required by this subsection, of the charge or charges to be made under that 
authorisation.” 
A bank will often choose to insert a so-called cross-default clause in a loan agreement 
with the client.  This clause allows the bank, in the event of default by the client, to 
utilise funds held by the bank in another account of the client, in order to satisfy the 
outstanding loan payment or payments.  However, in terms of section 90(2)(n) of the 
NCA, a credit provider is not allowed to insert a blanket provision authorising the bank 
to appropriate any funds held on behalf of the client in the event of default.  If a credit 
provider wants to insert a provision authorising the collection of funds, it must comply 
with specific conditions prescribed in section 124 of the NCA.  The authorisation must 
therefore be specific as to the account from which the funds can be withdrawn,3 the 
obligation which may be satisfied,4 the amount which may be appropriated5 and the 
 
                                            
3  S124(1)(a). 
4  S 124(1)(b).  Form 27 of the Regulations to the NCA sets out the prescribed form for the notice.  
5  S 124(1)(c).  
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date on which the funds may be utilised.6  This authorisation can be given upon the 
consumer’s own initiative, in response to a request by the credit provider or it can be 
included in a credit agreement.7  This means the credit provider can, after conclusion 
of the credit agreement, still obtain the necessary authorisation from the client.  The 
credit provider is only allowed to collect money from an account of the client in 
accordance with this authorisation, and it further has to give notice to the consumer 
before doing so.8 
An example of such an authorisation will be where the client authorises the bank to 
collect R100 from account X on the 25th of every month.  The bank, after giving the 
required notice, is allowed to collect funds in accordance with the authorisation.  
However, the problem arises if the bank attempts to collect on 25 May, but finds that 
there is only R40 in account X.  The bank will not be allowed to collect the shortfall of 
R60 from account Y also held by the client.  Neither may the bank collect the shortfall 
on 26 May, nor collect R160 on 26 June, as none of these measures are in accordance 
with the authorisation.  A clause in the credit agreement which allows the bank to 
deviate from the authorisation in the event of default will contravene section 124. 
To understand how the abovementioned sections of the NCA limit the application of 
set-off by a bank (who qualifies as a credit provider in terms of the NCA9) in respect of 
a debt owed in terms of a credit agreement, two aspects need to be considered.  First, 
the nature of the relationship between a bank and its client must be analysed.  
Secondly, it must be determined what will constitute a charge for purposes of the NCA.  
Once that is settled, the ambit of the provision and the effect thereof on a credit 
provider’s common-law right to set-off can be investigated. 
5 2 2 The relationship between a bank and its client 
It has been mentioned previously that ownership of money deposited in a client’s bank 
account vests in the bank, and the client retains a claim or personal right against the 
 
                                            
6  S 124(1)(d).  
7  S 124(1). 
8  S 124(2). 
9  See the definition of “credit provider” in s 1 of the NCA. 
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bank.10  The bank is therefore the client’s debtor in respect of those funds.11  Where 
the bank grants a loan to the same client, or allows an overdraft in respect of another 
account operated by that client, the bank is also a creditor of the client.  Where both 
accounts are due and payable and in the absence of contractual provisions preventing 
set-off, the possibility exists that the bank can rely on set-off to appropriate money from 
the client’s transactional account to settle or reduce the debit balance of the loan 
account.12 
This right of a bank to invoke set-off in effect means that the bank utilises funds in one 
account of the client to “satisfy an obligation of the consumer”.13  The question is 
whether this appropriation of funds will constitute a charge made against an account 
of the client, as contemplated in the NCA. 
5 2 3 The meaning of a “charge” in terms of the NCA 
The term “charge” is not defined in the NCA, but is mainly used as an equivalent to 
costs or fees.14  In that context it has been said that the word “charge” should be 
interpreted widely.15   
However, it is generally accepted that “charge” in the context of sections 90(2)(n) and 
124 refers to the appropriation or withdrawal of any funds from an account, for instance 
by way of a debit order.16  According to Otto and Otto 
 
                                            
10  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4). Also see Ormerod v Deputy Sheriff, Durban 1965 4 All SA 330 (D) 334, with 
reference to White v Standard Bank 1883 4 N.L.R. 88 91-92; Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction 
Co (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 669 (SWA) 674B-C; Dantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v National 
Explosives (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) 1990 1 SA 736 (A) 478F-G; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
v Echo Petroleum CC 2012 5 SA 283 (SCA) 287-288; ABSA Bank Ltd v Intensive Air (Pty) Ltd 2011 
2 SA 275 (SCA) 279.  The fact that the client is not the owner of money standing to his credit in his 
bank account is also confirmed in J du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 
(2012) 34-35; Gainsford NNO v Gulliver’s Travel (Bruma) (Pty) Ltd (07/ 5121) [2009] ZAGPJHC 20 
(7 April 2009) paras 99–100. 
11  Gainsford NNO v Gulliver’s Travel (Bruma) (Pty) Ltd (07/ 5121) [2009] ZAGPJHC 20 (7 April 2009) 
para 100. 
12  J Pretorius “Combining Bank Accounts” (2008) 16 JBL 51 53. 
13  See the wording of s 90(2)(n) above. 
14  See for instance Part C in Chapter 5 of the NCA. 
15  JM Otto & R-L Otto The National Credit Act Explained 3 ed (2013) 89 n 2.  Also see Evans v Smith 
2011 4 SA 472 (WCC) para 16, where Binns-Ward J stated that: “The terms ‘charge’, ‘fee’ and 
‘interest’ are not defined in the NCA.  They therefore fall to be construed in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the words as they would be understood in the context in which they have been 
employed in the statute.” 
16  JW Scholtz, JM Otto, E van Zyl, CM van Heerden & N Campbell Guide to the National Credit Act 
(2008) 9-13 n 55. 
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““[w]hat is clearly prohibited is a clause in a contract which generally authorises the credit 
provider to satisfy a debt out of any account that the consumer has with it”.17 
As described above, when a bank exercises its right to set-off, funds in one account of 
a client are used to reduce or settle a debt in another account, without the client 
instructing the bank to do so.  There is little doubt that this action – appropriating funds 
from one account of a client to pay a debt incurred in terms of another account – falls 
within the ambit of the conduct regulated by sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA.  
This view also corresponds with the interpretation of these provisions by the National 
Credit Regulator (NCR).18 
This is not the end of the analysis, however.  The first sentence of section 90(2) does 
not prohibit this conduct, but rather states that a provision in a credit agreement 
authorising such conduct is unlawful.  The question thus arises whether section 
90(2)(n) of the NCA only relates to a provision in a credit agreement that authorises a 
charge against an account (and therefore set-off), or whether it also (by implication) 
prohibits a creditor from relying on its common-law right of set-off. 
5 2 4 The debate surrounding the impact of the NCA on the common-law right to 
invoke set-off 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the impact of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA 
on the common-law right of credit providers to invoke set-off, several South African 
banks obtained legal opinions in this regard.  The opinion expressed by their legal 
advisors was that the NCA does not prohibit a credit provider from relying on its 
common-law right to set-off.19  According to them, the provisions of the NCA quoted 
above will only apply if the credit agreement contains provisions authorising the credit 
provider to satisfy an obligation against an account of the client.  Therefore, where no 
 
                                            
17  The National Credit Act 57 n 51. 
18  National Credit Regulator “NCR Consumer Booklet” (2007) NCR 20 
<http://www.ncr.org.za/brochures /NCR%20Consumer%20Booklet/ENGLISH.pdf> (accessed 30-
11-2015), where the NCR interprets the clause as preventing “[p]rovisions/clauses that authorise the 
credit provider to set-off a consumer’s debt against an asset or account of the consumer held by the 
credit provider, except where the consumer has given the credit provider specific instructions 
specifying which assets may be set-off against which credit agreement.”  
19 Ombudsman for Banking Services “Consumer Information Note 5: Set-Off” (21-07-2009) 
Ombudsman for Banking Services 3 <http://www.obssa.co.za/images/documents/ 
cin_005_setoff.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
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such clause is contained in the credit agreement, section 90(2)(n) of the NCA will not 
apply and a credit provider can enforce its common-law right to set-off. 
If the abovementioned interpretation is correct, the provisions of the NCA will apply 
even if the clause contained in a credit agreement does not add to the bank’s common-
law right to set-off in any way but merely confirms it.  This gives rise to the rather 
strange, if not downright bizarre, situation that in order to retain its right, a credit 
provider must refrain from stipulating such a right in the credit agreement.  
The NCR disagreed with the opinion expressed by the banks.20  Although the grounds 
for the disagreement are not clear, it is possible that they considered such an 
interpretation to be inconsistent with the spirit and purposes of the NCA.  However, in 
the absence of a definitive finding by the courts, banks continue to rely on set-off.21  
Unfortunately, the Department of Trade and Industry failed to identify the uncertainty 
surrounding the application of the common-law right to set-off as one of the challenges 
which emerged from the NCA,22 with the result that the legislature has missed the 
opportunity to clarify these provisions in the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 
2014. 
The Ombudsman for Banking Services was of the view that this dispute should be 
settled by a legislative amendment or a court judgment.23  As neither has occurred, it 
is still uncertain whether the NCA will only prohibit a clause in an agreement authorising 
set-off, or whether a credit provider’s common law right to set-off will also be affected. 
At first glance it may seem as if this debate is not very significant, as a bank can acquire 
the authorisation contemplated in section 124 of the NCA and proceed to appropriate 
 
                                            
20 Ombudsman for Banking Services “Consumer Information Note 5: Set-Off” Ombudsman for Banking 
Services 3; W Knowler “Credit Providers’ Contentious Set-Off Habit Will Soon Be Illegal” (15-09-
2014) IOL Blogs <http://www.iol.co.za/blogs/wendy-knowler-s-consumer-watch-1.1608/credit-
providers-contentious-set-off-habit-will-soon-be-illegal-1.1751365#.VidjoNKUd8F> (accessed 30-
11-2015); W Knowler “Bank Helps Itself to Client’s Money Illegally” (01-09-2015) Times Live 
<http://www.timeslive.co.za/lifestyle/inyourcorner/2015/09/01/Bank-helps-itself-to-
client%E2%80%99s-money-illegally> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
21  Ombudsman for Banking Services “Consumer Information Note 5: Set-Off” Ombudsman for Banking 
Services 3. 
22  Department of Trade and Industry “Document In Respect of Project Re Policy Review of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005” GN 559 in GG 36504 of 2013-05-29. 
23  Ombudsman for Banking Services “Consumer Information Note 5: Set-Off” Ombudsman for Banking 
Services 3. 
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amounts from the account of the client in accordance with that authorisation.  However, 
if this is done the bank will be limited in the exercise of its right to what is contained in 
that authorisation.  As mentioned above,24 this limitation pertains to the amount which 
may be collected25, the date of collection26 and the account from which is collected27.  
It is undoubtedly preferable for a bank to rely on its more flexible common-law right to 
set-off, in terms of which the bank requires no authorisation and is not restricted in 
respect of the date, the specific account or the amount it may appropriate (although 
only amounts which are due and payable are susceptible to set-off).  This also avoids 
the risk for instance of the client nominating one account in terms of section 124, but 
later instructing his employer to deposit his salary in another account held by him.  If 
this happens, the bank will have to obtain another section 124 authorisation in respect 
of the second account.28 
In order to determine which interpretation of the relevant provisions contained in the 
NCA is correct, various factors must be considered.  First, and in accordance with 
section 2 of the NCA, it is necessary to consider the spirit and purpose of the NCA.  
Secondly, the origin of the relevant sections must be determined to ascertain what the 
intention was with their inclusion in the NCA.  It must also be examined whether similar 
provisions were included in the consumer protection legislation of the jurisdictions 
which influenced the drafting of the NCA.  
The purpose of the abovementioned investigation is not only to ascertain how the 
relevant sections of the NCA should be interpreted, but also to determine whether a 
limitation on the right of banks to invoke set-off is desirable.  Even if it is found that the 
common-law right of banks to rely on set-off is not restricted by the NCA, it should be 
considered whether any conditions should be imposed on the exercise of a bank’s right 
to invoke set-off and, if so, what these conditions should be. 
 
                                            
24  See 5 2 1 above.  
25  S 124(1)(c) of the NCA. 
26  S 124(1)(d) of the NCA. 
27  S 124(1)(a) of the NCA. 
28  See 5 2 1 above. 
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5 3 Interpretation of sections 90 and 124 of the NCA 
5 3 1 General rules regarding the interpretation of statutory provisions 
As mentioned above, various factors must be considered in the interpretation of 
sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA.  This includes attempting to ascertain what the 
origin and purpose of these provisions are.  Two principles of interpretation must be 
borne in mind during this process. 
The first rule relates to the proper boundaries of interpretation.  Its purpose is to 
determine the meaning of the wording of a statutory provision.  It may not be driven by 
what is deemed to be desirable in a specific case.29  Doing so will disregard the 
separate roles of the judiciary and the legislature.30  In other words, sight must not be 
lost of the ordinary meaning of the wording of a section; interpretation should be 
“concerned with the meaning of words without imposing a view of what the policy or 
object of the legislation is or should be.”31 
Focusing on the purpose of legislation rather than its wording has been described as 
an exercise in determining the intention of the legislature.  According to Wallis JA this 
description of the object of interpretation is incorrect.32  Instead, he contends that 
interpretation is an objective exercise.33  He further states that: 
“[i]nterpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be 
it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context 
provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a 
whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence.  Whatever the 
nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the 
apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its 
production.”34 
 
                                            
29  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) para 22, with 
reference to JJ Spigelman “The Intolerable Wrestle: Developments in Statutory Interpretation” (2010) 
84 ALJ 822 826. 
30  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) para 22. 
31  Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2010 5 SA 137 (SCA) para 25. 
32  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 20, 23. 
33  Paras 18, 23. 
34  Para 18. 
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The plain meaning of a provision in combination with the context and purpose of the 
provisions should therefore be considered, as well as the relevant material leading to 
its production.  With regards to the plain meaning of the provision, it must be noted that 
the section 90(2)(n) of the NCA clearly refers to a “provision of a credit agreement 
[which] purports to authorise or permit a credit provider”35 to take certain actions, 
without making any reference to a common-law right which could render the same 
result.  The heading to section 90, which reads “Unlawful provisions of credit 
agreement” also does not indicate an application which extends beyond declaring that 
certain types of provisions are unlawful.  It can be argued that interpreting the provision 
in a way which extends its scope beyond what may be contained in a credit agreement, 
would cross the line between interpretation and legislation. 
However, in terms of section 2(1) of the NCA, a court is required to interpret the 
provisions of the NCA in a manner that gives effect to the purposes of the NCA as set 
out in section 3.36  This obligation to follow a purposive interpretation may grant the 
court more scope to deviate from the linguistic interpretation of a specific section of the 
NCA in order to promote the objectives of the NCA.  These purposes are to: 
“promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, 
transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit 
market and industry, and to protect consumers”.37 
A list of measures is provided to facilitate these objectives, which includes: 
“promoting responsibility in the credit market by discouraging … contractual default by 
consumers; addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between 
consumers and credit providers by … providing consumers with adequate disclosure of 
standardised information in order to make informed choices; … [and] providing for a 
consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, enforcement and judgment, which 
places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligations under 
credit agreements.”38 
 
                                            
35  Own emphasis. 
36  See Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 2. 
37  S 3 of the NCA. 
38  Ss 3(c)(ii) and 3(e)(ii) of the NCA. 
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To determine which interpretation of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 would be most 
conducive to these purposes, it is necessary to consider the consequences of 
restricting the common-law right of banks to invoke set-off.  
Before commencing this analysis, a second relevant rule of interpretation must be 
mentioned, namely that the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the state of 
the law, and that includes the common law.39  The common law can be amended by 
statutory provisions, but these provisions should not be interpreted to alter the common 
law more than necessary.40  For the common law to be varied, the intention of the 
legislature must be plainly aimed at modifying the common law, and even in such a 
case the modification will only be to the extent provided for by the relevant statutory 
provisions (whether expressly or by necessary implication).41 
Sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA make no reference to and contain no express 
variation of the common-law right to set-off.  These sections may, if interpreted in the 
manner advanced by the NCR, modify the common law regarding set-off by necessary 
implication.  However, in light of the abovementioned rules regarding interpretation, it 
seems as if the interpretation of the banks, namely that the relevant sections of the 
NCA will not affect their common-law right to set-off, will be favoured.  However, in the 
absence of a definitive finding by the courts, this is mere speculation.  It is therefore 
necessary to consider other factors which might influence the interpretation of these 
sections. 
5 3 2 Considerations regarding the spirit and purposes of the NCA 
The first, and probably most important, factor which must be considered is whether a 
limitation of a credit provider’s common-law right to invoke set-off is in accordance with 
the spirit and purposes of the NCA.  As mentioned above,42 this can only be done by 
analysing the consequences of such a limitation. 
 
                                            
39  Terblanche v South African Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 1983 2 SA 501 (N) 504F. 
40  Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 38. 
41  Para 38. 
42  See 5 3 1 above. 
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5 3 2 1 Reasons for limiting the right of banks to invoke set-off 
As a point of departure it is necessary to consider why a bank’s right to invoke set-off 
can have an adverse impact on a consumer.  In other words, it must be speculated 
why the legislature would have considered it necessary to restrict this right of a bank.  
It is evident that set-off is a powerful mechanism in the hands of a creditor, and this is 
especially true in the case of a bank.  Often a bank will require that its client maintains 
a transactional account with it when granting a loan to the client, which enables the 
bank to use set-off to collect arrear payments due on another account from the client’s 
transactional account.  Studies have shown that set-off between accounts (which is 
known informally as “money grabbing”) occurs regularly.43 
Failure by the bank to exercise proper discretion when applying set-off can lead to 
gross unfairness towards the client and cause financial harm.  Consider for instance a 
client who falls in arrears with one or two loan payments due to unforeseen 
circumstances.  The bank, enforcing its right to set-off, appropriates amounts due from 
the transactional account of the client, leaving an amount insufficient for subsistence 
of the client and rendering the client unable to service his other debts.  This can, in 
turn, result either in the client’s other creditors accelerating the repayment of his loans 
or in the client having to incur additional debt (at a less favourable interest rate) to stay 
afloat.  If the client is unaware of the reduction in the balance of his account (since 
notice is not required for set-off), he may also unknowingly incur the additional costs 
of a returned cheque or a declined debit order. 
A further problem which might arise is that the client is not given the opportunity to 
raise any defences against the bank’s claim, such as prescription.44  In the context of 
prescription, this problem is prevented by section 126B(1)(b) of the NCA, which 
provides that a debt which has been extinguished by prescription may not be collected.  
However, it is conceivable that the client might also have other defences against the 
bank’s claim (for instance if the signature on the loan document was forged).  Even if 
 
                                            
43  See University of Pretoria Law Clinic “The Debt Counselling Process: Challenges to Consumers and 
the Credit Industry” (April 2009) NCR 293 <http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/apr09/ncr.zip> (accessed 30-11-2015), where it is indicated that 62% of consumers 
interviewed during the study indicated that they have experienced set-off between their bank 
accounts. 
44  Knowler “Credit Providers’ Contentious Set-Off Habit Will Soon Be Illegal” IOL Blogs; Knowler “Bank 
Helps Itself to Client’s Money Illegally” Times Live. 
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the client manages to have the money appropriated by set-off refunded, it does not 
compensate for injuries caused by the unavailability of funds, such as those mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. 
5 3 2 2 Adverse consequences of limiting the right to invoke set-off 
While it is clear that there is sufficient cause for introducing measures to protect a 
consumer from the negative effects of a bank exercising its right to set-off, it is also 
important to bear in mind the adverse consequences of limiting the right of credit 
providers to apply set-off. 
Both access to credit and the cost of credit – two factors which are of crucial importance 
in consumer credit legislation – are closely linked to the perceived risk of granting 
credit.  The lower the risk attached to a loan, the lower the interest rate charged by a 
bank.  Prohibiting banks from relying on set-off to recover outstanding amounts will 
remove the security provided by this mechanism.  This will increase the bank’s risk and 
will thus be detrimental to the overall cost of credit. 45   
An effective collection method will decrease the risk attached to a loan.46  Set-off 
provides a method of collection which is not only effective, but also carries a very low 
cost of implementation and thus leads to a lower cost of credit.  It is acknowledged in 
policy documents and research compiled in the course of drafting the NCA that: 
“Effective debt recovery procedures would assist credit providers by reducing bad debt 
write-offs, and assist consumers by ensuring that high bad debts of a minority of consumers 
do not feed through into higher interest rates for the rest.”47 
Section 3(a) of the NCA further highlights the necessity to improve access to credit, 
while preventing the exploitation of consumers.  The willingness of a credit provider to 
grant credit increases if more security is provided in respect of a loan.  Thus, the 
 
                                            
45  See Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review August 2003: Summary of Findings of 
the Technical Committee” (August 2003) National Credit Regulator 31 
<http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/background_documents/Summary%20of%20Findings.pd
f> (accessed 30-11-2015), where it is acknowledged that “problems in the area of debt recovery and 
contract enforcement increase the cost of finance substantially.” 
46  See P Hawkins The Cost, Volume and Allocation of Consumer Credit in South Africa (2003) 55-58 
for the mechanisms used to reduce the risk associated with collections. 
47  Department of Trade and Industry “Making Credit Markets Work: A Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit” (November 2010) National Credit Regulator 7 <http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/ 
background_documents/Credit%20Law%20Review.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
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security function of set-off will cause a broader group of people to have access to credit 
through the formal banking sector. 
Although conditions can be set for the exercise of a bank’s right to set-off, the 
consequence of these conditions should be considered.  For instance, requiring 
notification before exercising the right of set-off will enable a client to withdraw the 
funds susceptible to set-off after receiving the notice, but before the credit provider has 
exercised his right.  This will result in set-off 
“ceas[ing] to be the swift remedy that it is today [and banks] lacking this power … may be 
less reticent to call in a depositor’s loan, thereby accelerating a different kind of injury to the 
depositor.”48 
If the bank is allowed to invoke set-off, it will mean that the client cannot be in default 
while there are sufficient funds in another of his accounts with the bank to settle the 
outstanding payments.49  If there are no contractual provisions to the contrary, the 
client would therefore be protected from the consequences of breach.  For instance, 
the bank would not be able to invoke an acceleration clause which, if set-off could not 
operate, it would be able to do. 
It can therefore not be said that allowing set-off by credit providers “goes against the 
spirit and intent of the [NCA] in all respects.”50  Although, as mentioned above, this 
right can be abused, abolishing it completely would also have adverse effects.  An 
interpretation which excludes the common-law right of banks to invoke set-off is thus 
not necessarily one that gives effect to the spirit and purposes of the NCA, as argued 
by the NCR.51 
5 3 3 The origin of sections 90 and 124 of the NCA 
The next factor to consider when interpreting sections 90 and 124 of the NCA is the 
origin of these provisions.  In order to determine what the origin of the provisions is, it 
 
                                            
48 SL Sepinuck “The Problems with Setoff: A Proposed Legislative Solution” (1988) 30 Wm. & Mary 
Law Review 51 65. 
49  This will be the case regardless of whether set-off operates automatically or retrospectively, see ch 
3 (3 4 2 6). 
50  University of Pretoria Law Clinic “The Debt Counselling Process: Challenges to Consumers and the 
Credit Industry” NCR 294. 
51  See n 20 above. 
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is necessary to study the policy documents and reports prepared in the process of 
drafting the NCA and to consider the provisions in other jurisdictions which might have 
influenced the drafters of the NCA. 
5 3 3 1 The policy documents informing the NCA 
As mentioned above, the legislature is assumed to be circumspect when amending the 
common law.52  Where it decides to restrict an important common-law right, it would 
be expected that the problems which caused the legislature to consider such a 
restriction would be highlighted in the reports and policy documents prepared during 
the drafting of the legislation.  However, despite the practical significance of the right 
of banks to rely on set-off,53 the policy documents providing background to the NCA 
do not deal with or even mention the topic of set-off by banks.54 
There are, however, two observations by the Technical Committee (which was tasked 
with making recommendations regarding the NCA) which could possibly be interpreted 
to refer to the right to invoke set-off.  The first instance is where the Technical 
Committee states that the credit legislation should “[i]ntroduce regulation on collection 
practices such as payroll deduction and banks’ treatment of debit orders … in order to 
ensure that neither competition nor consumer protection are undermined”.55  They do 
not elaborate upon this statement, or whether the term ”collection practices” is wide 
enough to include collection by means of set-off.56  How these practices undermine 
either competition or consumer protection is also not explained.  It is thus difficult to 
 
                                            
52  See 5 3 1 above. 
53  See n 43 above. 
54  These include the following documents: R Willemse & N Mxunyelwa Report Prepared by Hofmeyr 
Herbstein & Gihwala for Purposes of the Credit Law Review (2002); Reality Research Africa Credit 
Contract Disclosure and Associated Factors: Executive Summary of Research to Determine Public 
Awareness of Legal Provisions in Relation to Credit and Satisfaction with Provisions for their Benefit 
(2002); P Meagher Regulation of Payday Lenders in the United States (2003); G A Dymski Interest 
Rates, Credit Structures and Usury in Emerging Markets (2003); P Hawkins The Cost, Volume and 
Allocation of Consumer Credit in South Africa (2003); Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law 
Review August 2003: Summary of Findings of the Technical Committee” National Credit Regulator; 
Rudo Research and Training & AfriData Research A Market Research Report: Credit Law Review 
(2004). 
55  Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review August 2003: Summary of Findings of the 
Technical Committee” National Credit Regulator 25. 
56  See ss 90(2)(j) and 90(2)(m) of the NCA, which seems to have been included pursuant to these 
concerns.  
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draw any conclusions from this statement about the operation of the common-law right 
of set-off. 
The second observation which may relate to set-off is where the Technical Committee 
identifies as one of the weaknesses in the credit legislation preceding the National 
Credit Act the fact that: 
“Certain aspects of the Banks Act and National Payment System rules undermine 
competition in the consumer credit markets (while creating inequitable preferences for 
certain credit providers)”.57 
The specific provisions of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 which lead to these inequalities 
are not specified.58  The Banks Act contains no provisions authorising banks to invoke 
set-off, although regulation 1559 allows banks to report only the net balance of a client’s 
liability, i.e. the balance after set-off has been effected.  This is only allowed if the bank 
has a legal right to set the balance of the client’s accounts off against each other and 
thus does not authorise set-off, but merely regulates one of the consequences where 
the common-law right exists.   
None of the studies or reports considered by the Technical Committee60 indicate that 
reliance on a bank’s common law right to set-off sufficiently prejudices the consumer 
 
                                            
57  Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review August 2003: Summary of Findings of the 
Technical Committee” National Credit Regulator 7; Kelly-Louw M “Introduction to the National Credit 
Act” (2007) 15 JBL 147 148.   
58  Although it seems as if the objection raised by the Technical Committee relates to barriers of entry 
caused by the conditions imposed by the Banks Act 94 of 1990 for requiring a banking licence 
(Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review August 2003: Summary of Findings of the 
Technical Committee” National Credit Regulator 21). 
59  Regulation 15 of the Regulations relating to Banks (GNR 628 in GG 17115 of 1996-04-26) reads as 
follows:  
“(1) Where a client maintains both debit and credit balances with a bank, it may be permissible in 
certain circumstances to set such balances off against one another for the purposes of 
completing the prescribed forms, thus reporting net balances only. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in these Regulations, set-off shall be allowed only if all of the 
following circumstances apply, namely— 
(a) a legal right of set-off must exist and the reporting bank should have obtained a legal 
opinion to the effect that its right to apply set-off is legally well-founded and would be 
enforceable in the liquidation or bankruptcy of the client(s) or of the bank; 
(b) the debit and credit balances must relate to the same person; 
(c) both the debit and the credit balances must be denominated in the same currency; and 
(d) the debit and credit balances must have identical maturities.” 
60  For a list of the publications and reports considered, see Department of Trade and Industry “Credit 
Law Review: Setting the Scene” (November 2010) National Credit Regulator 3 
<http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/background_documents/Introduction-RevNo1.pdf> 
(accessed 30-11-2015).  Also see n 54 above. 
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to warrant legislative intervention.  To the contrary, the only explicit reference to set-
off that can be found is the suggestion that limiting the consumer’s right to invoke set-
off might constitute an unfair term.61  This provision did not find its way into the NCA, 
but was partially included in the regulations to the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008.62 
It is evident that, if the South African legislature meant to regulate a credit provider’s 
common-law right to invoke set-off, such a consideration was not contained in the 
policy documents.  Given that the drafters were at times inspired by foreign law in 
incorporating certain provisions in the Act, it may be of interest to determine whether 
similar provisions to those found in sections 90(2)(n) or 124 of the NCA are contained 
in the legislation of other jurisdictions, which might have influenced the drafters of the 
NCA to adopt those provisions in South African law. 
5 3 3 2 Provisions in other jurisdictions regarding set-off by banks  
In accordance with section 2(2) of the NCA, appropriate foreign and international law 
may be considered to assist in the interpretation of the provisions of the NCA.63  The 
NCA does not define “international law” or “foreign law”, which causes some 
uncertainty with regards to which jurisdictions are appropriate to consider.64  
Presumably it should include those jurisdictions which were considered during the 
 
                                            
61  See Willemse & Mxunyelwa Report Prepared by Hofmeyr Herbstein & Gihwala for Purposes of the 
Credit Law Review 12, who refer to the proposed legislation contained in SA Law Reform 
Commission Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts Project 47 
(1998), of which clause 2(v) states that “[i]n determining whether a contract or a term thereof is 
unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive … the court may, where applicable, take into account 
the following factors, namely … (v) [w]hether the term directly or indirectly amounts to a waiver or 
limitation of the competence of the party against whom the term is proffered to apply set-off”. 
62  Regulation 44(3)(b) of the regulations in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (GNR 293 
in GG 34180 of 2011-04-01) states that: 
“(3) A term of a consumer agreement subject to the provisions of subregulation (1) is presumed to 
be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of— 
(b) excluding or restricting the legal rights or remedies of the consumer against the supplier or 
another party in the event of total or partial breach by the supplier of any of the obligations 
provided for in the agreement, including the right of the consumer to set off a debt owed to 
the supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against the supplier”. 
63  See Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 2. 
64  M Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 24. 
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drafting of the NCA,65 such as the United Kingdom, the European Commission and 
New Zealand.66 
Investigating foreign jurisdictions serves a dual purpose: (i) it aims to identify the origin 
of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA; and (ii) even if there are no similar provisions 
in the legislation of other jurisdictions, it will show to what extent it was found necessary 
in the consumer legislation of other jurisdictions to prohibit the right to set-off.  The 
latter consideration can assist in an evaluation of whether a restriction of a bank’s right 
to invoke set-off is desirable and should be provided for in our law. 
5 3 3 2 1 United Kingdom 
English law recognises a type of set-off referred to as “combination of accounts” (or 
merely “combination”)67 or “current account set-off”.68  This right allows a bank to set 
off a debit balance in one account against funds in another,69 unless it is excluded 
contractually by the bank and its client in terms of an agreement to keep the accounts 
separate.70  The same principles apply in Scotland, where a bank is allowed to combine 
accounts unless there is an agreement to the contrary.71 
The provision of credit to consumers in the United Kingdom is regulated by the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended by the Consumer Credit Act 2006).  The Act 
contains no explicit provisions curtailing the right of credit providers to invoke set-off 
and no clauses similar to sections 90(2)(n) or 124 of the NCA.  However, section 55A 
 
                                            
65  24. 
66  Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review August 2003: Summary of Findings of the 
Technical Committee” National Credit Regulator 3; M Kelly-Louw “Consumer Credit” in WA Joubert 
& JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 8 3 ed (2014) para 5 n 7; M Kelly-Louw “The Prevention 
and Alleviation of Consumer Over-indebtedness” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 200 207 n 29.  
67  Also referred to as “a right to combine accounts” (R Derham The Law of Set-Off 3 ed (2003) 645). 
68  See Derham The Law of Set-Off 645, 646; PR Wood English and International Set-Off (1989) 91, 
93. 
69  See Derham The Law of Set-Off ch 15; Wood English and International Set-Off ch 3; EP Ellinger 
Modern Banking Law (1987) 139 sqq.  It is sometimes argued that the right to combine accounts is 
not set-off, but merely an accounting matter (Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd v Westminster 
Bank Ltd [1971] 1 QB 46; Derham The Law of Set-Off 647-655; R Goode Legal Problems of Credit 
and Security 3 ed (2003) 255; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 128).  According to Wood 
English and International Set-Off 92, “current account set-off has often been treated as not being 
set-off at all”.  In terms of this view, there is only one debt, and therefore the book-keeping entry 
which consolidates the two accounts does not constitute payment (Derham The Law of Set-Off 647). 
70  Wood English and International Set-Off 96; Ellinger Modern Banking Law 147. 
71  United Rentals Ltd v Clydesdale and North of Scotland Bank Ltd 1963 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 41; WW 
McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland 3 ed (2007) 743 n 133. 
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of the Consumer Credit Act requires creditors to provide consumers with an adequate 
explanation of, inter alia, 
“the features of the agreement which may operate in a manner which would have a 
significant adverse effect on the debtor in a way which the debtor is unlikely to foresee [and] 
the principal consequences for the debtor arising from a failure to make payments under 
the agreement at the times required by the agreement including legal proceedings and, 
where this is a possibility, repossession of the debtor's home”.72 
It could be argued that these provisions oblige creditors to inform debtors of the 
possibility of set-off when the credit agreement is concluded, but they do not prescribe 
any conditions for the exercise of such a right. 
The Lending Code,73 to which most banks in the United Kingdom subscribe,74 contains 
several guidelines on the exercise of set-off by banks.  In terms of that Code, banks 
are required to inform the client about the circumstances that will usually lead to the 
bank invoking its right to set-off.75  This information must be conveyed at the time when 
the bank is considering or is likely to invoke set-off.76  Banks are also required to use 
the information at their disposal to establish whether the client is experiencing financial 
difficulties, and to ensure that the client is left with sufficient funds to meet living 
expenses and priority debts.77  Generally, banks are only allowed to recover the most 
recent missed payment by way of set-off, although in certain circumstances they can 
collect more.78  Furthermore, banks are required to inform the client after set-off has 
been utilised for the first time.79 
The Financial Ombudsman has also issued some guidelines to banks.80  In terms of 
these guidelines, banks are requested to inform the client that it has appropriated 
 
                                            
72  Ss 55A(2)(c) and 55A(2)(d) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
73  British Bankers’ Association & The UK Cards Association “The Lending Code” (28-09-2015) Lending 
Standards Board <http://www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/docs/ lendingcoderevised0915.pdf> 
(accessed 30-11-2015). 
74  See a list of subscribing banks at http://www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/subscriberlist.php. 
75  British Bankers’ Association & The UK Cards Association “The Lending Code” Lending Standards 
Board para 195. 
76  Para 195. 
77  Para 196. 
78  Para 198. 
79  Para 199. 
80  Financial Ombudsman Service “Banking: Firms’ Right of ‘Set Off”’ (2004) 40 Ombudsman News 3-7 
<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ ombudsman-news/40/40.pdf> (accessed 30-
11-2015); Financial Ombudsman Service “Recent Banking Complaints Involving ‘Set Off’”’ (2010) 84 
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money as soon as possible after a transfer is made81 and the duty of the bank to treat 
clients fairly is emphasised.82 
Clients are also protected against the possible adverse effects of set-off by inferring a 
tacit agreement between the bank and the client to exclude the operation of set-off.  
According to Wood, “[t]he implication that a loan account and a current account are to 
be kept separate will usually arise by reason of the fact that the client would otherwise 
have no security in drawing cheques if the loan account exceeds the credit balance”.83  
A similar agreement will be inferred where the bank is aware that an account is kept 
for a special purpose, for instance for payment of a specific creditor.84 
Generally a bank is not required to give notice to a client before effecting set-off.85  
However, it has sometimes been stated that notice might be a requirement,86 and the 
position is not yet clear.87  Notice might also be required based on the agreement 
between the parties, for instance where the bank decides to cancel an agreement not 
to combine the accounts.88   
Although the right of combination of accounts is normally exercised by a bank, Wood 
is of the opinion that it is also possible that the client may invoke the right and instruct 
the bank to treat two accounts as one.89  Goode does not agree, and argues that the 
client only has the right to request the bank to transfer the credit balance from one 
 
                                            
Ombudsman News 3-11 <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/ publications/ombudsman-
news/84/84.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
81  Financial Ombudsman Service 2004 Ombudsman News 4. 
82  Financial Ombudsman Service 2010 Ombudsman News 4. 
83  English and International Set-Off 688-689, with reference to Bradford Old Bank Ltd v Sutcliffe [1918] 
2 K.B. 883.  Also see Goode Credit and Security 257, who states that in the absence of such an 
inferred agreement, the customer could never safely draw a cheque if the balance of his current 
account does not sufficiently exceed that of his loan account. 
84  Wood English and International Set-Off 689; Ellinger Modern Banking Law 149-150. 
85  Ellinger Modern Banking Law 154. 
86  See for instance National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] 
AC 785 810, where Lord Cross of Chelsea said that: “the bank would be obliged to honour cheques 
drawn up to the limit of the apparent credit balance before the company became aware that the bank 
was consolidating the accounts and so it might be said that notification to the customer was not a 
condition precedent to the exercise by the bank of its right of consolidation but only a measure of 
precaution which the bank might take to end its liability to honour cheques.” 
87  Ellinger Modern Banking Law 155. 
88  154-155. 
89  Wood English and International Set-Off 96, with reference to Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers 
Trust Company [1987] 2 F.T.L.R. 509. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   132 
 
  
account to another, but that this does not amount to exercising a right to set-off.90  
Again the position is unclear, but it is recognised that set-off might in certain instances 
be required for protecting a consumer’s rights.91 
5 3 3 2 2 European Commission 
Consumer credit in the European Union is regulated by Directive 2008/48/EC92 (the 
Consumer Credit Directive).  It was adopted by the European Commission in 2008 and 
serves as a minimum standard with which the legislation of member states must 
comply.  In terms of the Consumer Credit Directive, the right of credit providers to 
invoke set-off is not limited and again there are no provisions similar to sections 90 or 
124 of the NCA. 
The Consumer Credit Directive only refers to set-off in the context of protecting the 
consumer’s right to rely on it.  Despite objections by the banks,93 it provides that where 
the creditor assigns his rights under a credit agreement, the consumer retains any 
rights he would have had against that creditor, including the right to rely on set-off.94  
Similarly, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms95 prevents a supplier from excluding a 
consumer’s right to rely on set-off.96 
This does not mean that member states do not set their own restrictions for a bank’s 
right to invoke set-off.  In fact, in Europe “the view is widely held that set-off should not 
be allowed to deprive a person of claims (such as those for maintenance or wages) 
which provide him with a minimum level of subsistence”.97 For instance, in Austria this 
is done by protecting certain payments from any manner of attachment, including set-
 
                                            
90  Goode Credit and Security 255. 
91  Item 1 of Sch 2 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 contains a non-
exhaustive list of terms which may be regarded as unfair, and includes a term “inappropriately 
excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier or another party 
in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier 
of any of the contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or 
supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him”. 
92  Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC. 
93  RF Brennan “Consumer credit and the EEC” in RM Goode (ed) Consumer Credit (1978) 363 381. 
94  Art 17(1) of Directive 2008/48/EC. 
95  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
96  Art 3(3), read with Annex 1(b). 
97  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 57.  This consideration is also reflected in the UK Lending 
Code, discussed above (see 5 3 3 2 1). 
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off.  These include payments for social support received during maternity leave or 
money received for raising children.98  France excludes set-off of amounts received as 
maintenance.99  These exclusions are not limited to a certain type of debtor or creditor, 
but rather depend on the nature of the funds.  Practically, this places an impossible 
burden on the bank, as it will require the bank to differentiate between amounts 
deposited in a bank account based on the source of such funds.100 
Certain exclusions and requirements are also established based on the nature of a 
contract of deposit (which includes the deposit of money with a bank).101  For instance, 
both the Swiss Code of Obligations102 and the French Code Civil103 provide that the 
obligation to repay a deposit cannot be discharged by set-off, although this can be 
varied contractually.104  German law, although containing no explicit limitations to the 
right to invoke set-off in order to protect consumers, will not allow set-off where it 
contravenes the purpose of the contract (for instance where that purpose is to ensure 
that the client has access to liquid funds) as this would be contrary to the principle of 
good faith in Article 242 of the German Civil Code.105 
5 3 3 2 3 New Zealand 
In New Zealand, consumer protection in the context of credit agreements is regulated 
by the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003.  Save to entrench a creditor’s 
right to set off statutory damages and penalties payable against the indebtedness of 
the consumer,106 no mention is made of set-off.  However, the Act does provide that: 
“A creditor may subsequently adjust debits or credits to a debtor’s account and account 
balances so as to accurately reflect the legal obligations of the debtor and the creditor.”107 
 
                                            
98  Ss 290 and 293 of the Enforcement Act; W Faber "Austria" in A C Ciacchi & S Weatherill Regulating 
Unfair Banking Practices in Europe: The Case of Personal Suretyships (2010) 45 49 n 29. 
99  Art 1293(3) Code civil. 
100  See Wood English and International Set-Off 680.  He further states (in the context of English law) 
that because it is too onerous to expect banks to differentiate between funds received based on the 
source of such funds, money which would normally be protected against set-off, such as 
maintenance or public pension, would lose this character once it is paid into a general bank account, 
and would therefore be susceptible to set-off by the bank 
101  See Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 283-287 for a full discussion. 
102  Art 125(1). 
103  Art 1293(2). 
104  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 284. 
105  284. 
106  S 24(1) of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003. 
107  S 47(2) of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003. 
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This provision is repeated verbatim in section 112(3) of the NCA.  It is not clear whether 
this refers to merely adjusting the account balance where payment is received in 
respect of that account, or whether the bank is also thereby authorised to state the 
position after set-off has been effected by the bank.  The contexts in which both these 
provisions appear support the former interpretation.  
5 3 4 Conclusion 
It has been seen that none of the factors considered above unequivocally point to a 
specific interpretation of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA.  Considerations 
regarding the spirit and purposes of the NCA are ambiguous at best: they support some 
restrictions to the credit providers’ right to invoke set-off, but not as restrictive as those 
found in these sections (if interpreted in the manner advanced by the NCR). 
The origin of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA are also unclear.  Neither the study 
of the policy documents prepared in the drafting of the NCA, nor the evaluation of the 
jurisdictions which influenced the drafting of the NCA explain where they came from.  
Searches in various jurisdictions on different keywords and phrases contained in these 
sections have also yielded no results.  This leads to the conclusion that sections 
90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA have not been adopted from similar legislation in either 
the jurisdictions discussed above or other jurisdictions which the legislature might have 
considered. 
However, this analysis reveals that it is recognised in most jurisdictions that some limits 
are required to protect consumers from the potentially harsh consequences of set-off, 
although there is not a uniform manner in which this is done.  Yet, the protection rarely 
amounts to a complete exclusion of the right of a bank to rely on set-off by setting such 
stringent requirements for exercising this right (such as those found in section 124 of 
the NCA), that it may only be exercised in accordance with a contractual authorisation. 
It is further evident that in most cases, it is felt that a consumer should not be deprived 
of his right to invoke set-off.  This shows that set-off can also operate in favour of the 
consumer, and it should therefore not be viewed only as a mechanism to be used by 
the bank to the detriment of the consumer.  It was also seen that allowing a bank to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   135 
 
  
invoke set-off within reasonable limits can in certain instances lead to a more 
favourable outcome for the consumer.108 
5 4 Other considerations which may influence the interpretation of 
sections 90 and 124 of the NCA 
It remains to be considered whether any other provisions of the NCA will frustrate the 
interpretation of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA favoured by the banks.  Because 
banks, as credit providers who also take deposits, will be especially affected by 
sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA, the impact of the Code of Banking Practice on 
a bank’s common-law right to set-off must also be considered. 
5 4 1 The “plain language” requirements, disclosure requirements and reckless 
credit provisions contained in the NCA 
Let us assume that the banks correctly maintain that sections 90 and 124 of the NCA 
only apply if the right to set-off is stipulated in the contract.  The question then arises 
whether the failure to mention the bank’s right to rely on set-off amounts to a 
contravention of section 64 of the NCA.109  This section requires documents delivered 
to a consumer in terms of the NCA to be in plain and understandable language.  Plain 
language is language that will enable the ordinary consumer with the average literary 
skills and minimal credit experience to understand the content, significance and import 
of the document, having regard to inter alia the context, comprehensiveness and 
consistency of the document.110  This includes the requirement that the language in 
the document should be of such a nature “that the consumer is not required to consult 
 
                                            
108  See ch 5 (5 3 2 2). 
109  Ss 64(1) and 64(2) of the NCA read as follows: 
“Right to information in plain and understandable language. 
(1) The producer of a document that is required to be delivered to a consumer in terms of this Act 
must provide that document— 
(a) in the prescribed form, if any, for that document; or 
(b) in plain language, if no form has been prescribed for that document. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a document is in plain language if it is reasonable to conclude that 
an ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the document is intended, with average 
literacy skills and minimal credit experience, could be expected to understand the content, 
significance, and import of the document without undue effort, having regard to— 
(a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the document; 
(b) the organisation, form and style of the document; 
(c) the vocabulary, usage and sentence structure of the text; and 
(d) the use of any illustrations, examples, headings, or other aids to reading and 
understanding.” 
110  S 64(2) of the NCA. 
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an external source to clarify or interpret any part of the document”.111 In Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini112 the court said that: 
“purposively interpreted [sections 63 and 64 of the NCA] embody the right of the consumer 
to be informed by reasonable means of the material terms of the documents he signs [and 
means] the credit provider bears the onus to prove that it took reasonable measures to 
inform the consumer of the material terms of the agreement.”113 
In the light of the fact that the ordinary consumer will not be aware of the bank’s right 
to apply set-off, it can be argued that the failure to make the consumer aware of this 
important consequence of concluding the credit agreement contradicts the purpose of 
the so-called plain-language requirement contained in section 64 of the NCA.  
However, the section specifically states that credit provider must ensure that “the 
document [is] in plain language”114 and it can be argued that the focus is on the 
language used in the text of the document, rather than what should be included in the 
document.  It can thus be argued that the interpretation by the court in Standard Bank 
v Dlamini115 is more expansive than what the wording of the sections allow.116 
To determine what information the credit provider should include in the document 
which constitutes the credit agreement, regard should be had to the disclosure 
requirements set by the NCA.117  The focus of the disclosure requirements is mostly 
on the cost of credit,118 and does not require a disclosure of the common-law rights 
enjoyed by the credit provider.  Although it can be speculated that the legislature would 
have provided for the disclosure of the right to set-off if the issue had been brought to 
its attention during the process of drafting the NCA, as the Act stands non-disclosure 
of the right to set-off by a credit provider does not amount to a contravention of the 
NCA. 
 
                                            
111 Scholtz et al National Credit Act 6-8. 
112  2013 1 SA 219 (KZD). 
113 Para 48. 
114  S 64(1) of the NCA (own emphasis).  
115  2013 1 SA 219 (KZD). 
116  M Nortje “Informational Duties of Credit Providers and Mistake” 2014 TSAR 212 216-217. 
117  Chapter 5 Part B of the NCA. 
118  See ss 100 – 106 of the NCA.  The need for proper disclosure of the cost of credit was also 
highlighted by the Technical Committee (Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review 
August 2003: Summary of Findings of the Technical Committee” National Credit Regulator 12, 20). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   137 
 
  
It can further be argued, as contended by Nortje,119 that the duties of disclosure arise 
from the provisions of the NCA relating to reckless credit.120  Section 81(2)(a) obliges 
a credit provider to take reasonable steps to assess the proposed consumer’s 
“general understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the proposed credit, and 
of the rights and obligations of a consumer under a credit agreement”. 
If a credit provider fails to make the consumer aware of the possibility that set-off might 
be invoked, the credit provider may fall short of its duty in terms of this provision.  This 
can lead to a court setting aside all or part of the agreement or suspending its force 
and effect.121  However, it seems unlikely that a credit agreement can be classified as 
reckless merely because the consumer was unaware of one of the credit provider’s 
common-law rights. 
5 4 2 The Code of Banking Practice 
The last consideration, which is of relevance specifically for banks, is the provisions of 
the Code of Banking Practice122 (the Code).  Most South African banks are also 
members of the Banking Association of South Africa,123 and therefore subscribe to the 
Code.  An amended Code was accepted by the Banking Association of South Africa 
pursuant to the commencement of the NCA.124  Section 7.5 of this Code provides as 
follows: 
“When you open an account, we will provide you with information that will include clear and 
prominent notice of any rights of set-off that we may claim over credit and debit balances in 
your different accounts.125  
When you obtain credit from us, we may require your consent to set-off any outstanding 
amounts against funds available in other accounts you hold with us. Any such arrangement 
 
                                            
119  Nortje 2014 TSAR 221-222. 
120  Specifically ss 80 and 81 of the NCA. 
121  S 83(2) of the NCA. 
122  The Banking Association of South Africa “Code of Banking Practice” (01-12-2012) The Banking 
Association of South Africa <http://www.banking.org.za/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/code-of-banking-practice-2012.pdf?sfvrsn=10> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
123  See a list of member banks at http://www.banking.org.za/about-us/member-banks. 
124  The new Code was accepted in June 2011 and applied from 1 January 2012 (The Banking 
Association of South Africa “Code of Banking Practice” The Banking Association of South Africa 3, 
37). 
125  A similar requirement can be found in s 7.1.5 of the Code, which obliges banks to advise the client 
regarding the right to invoke set-off at the time of opening the account. 
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will be concluded in terms of the requirements of the NCA, if the credit agreement is subject 
to the NCA.  
We will inform you promptly after we have effected set-off in respect of any of your accounts. 
You will receive timely statements (if statements are generally produced on the relevant 
account), which will reflect the setoff position.  
Prior to setting off your debit and credit balances, we may elect to place any of your funds 
on hold pending a discussion with you on any amount owed to us.” 
These provisions, read with section 90(2)(n) of the NCA, create a difficult situation for 
a bank.  In terms of the Code, a bank is required to inform the client of its right to invoke 
set-off when the client opens an account with the bank; this presumably means that a 
clause to that effect must be inserted in the credit agreement.  However, if the bank 
inserts such a clause it will have to comply with the requirements of section 124 of the 
NCA.  This means that instead of just informing the client in general that any account 
might be susceptible to set-off should the client be in default, a bank will now have to 
obtain the specific authorisation contemplated in clause 124. 
The Code does not make it clear whether the bank must obtain consent before invoking 
set-off, merely stating that the bank may require the client’s consent.  It does provide 
that if such consent is required and the agreement is subject to the NCA, it will be 
obtained in conformance with the NCA.  It is thus uncertain whether the Code still 
allows a bank to unilaterally rely on set-off, especially in light of the fact that the 
Ombudsman for Banking Services acknowledged that they cannot prevent the bank 
from invoking set-off126 (although this statement was made before commencement of 
the new Code). 
The requirement of informing the client after set-off was effected is not contained in the 
NCA, but is to be welcomed, inasmuch as the bank must not already in terms of the 
common law declare set-off (to the client) in order to effect it.  It provides protection to 
the consumer, without detracting from a bank’s security.  It also does not place a too 
heavy administrative burden on a bank, while possibly preventing detriment to the 
 
                                            
126  Ombudsman for Banking Services “Consumer Information Note 5: Set-Off” Ombudsman for Banking 
Services 3. 
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client (such as the possibility of incurring the additional costs of a returned cheque or 
a declined debit order).127 
5 5 Suggestions for legislative reform 
In the light of all the factors mentioned above, it seems as if the courts will probably 
favour the interpretation advanced by the banks regarding the meaning of section 
90(2)(n) of the NCA.  However, it is evident that the current provisions create 
uncertainty and should be amended to clarify the situation.  Furthermore, if interpreted 
in accordance with the view of the banks, the illogical situation arises that non-
disclosure of a right is a prerequisite to retaining that right.  The outcome is also more 
detrimental for the consumer, since the credit provider will desist from inserting a 
clause in a credit agreement informing the consumer about the possibility of the credit 
provider invoking set-off. 
However, even if the courts interpret section 90(2)(n) as not restricting a credit 
provider’s common-law right to rely on set-off, this will provide little relief to a bank, 
who will be obliged to inform the client about the bank’s right to invoke set-off in terms 
of the Code of Banking Practice.  This means that a bank will in any event have to 
comply with the provisions of section 124 of the NCA.  As argued above, this does not 
necessarily lead to the best result for either the bank or the consumer.128   
It is submitted that the current requirements set by the NCA for enforcement of the 
bank’s right to set-off are too restrictive.  By insisting on a section 124 authorisation for 
any appropriation of funds from a client’s account, the legislature is throwing the 
proverbial baby out with the bathwater instead of finding a balance where set-off can 
benefit both the bank and the client. 
Undoubtedly, the bank’s right to invoke set-off without notice to the consumer can 
create difficulty for the consumer,129 and some form of regulation is required.  However, 
it can be argued that denying banks their common-law right to set-off will have an 
adverse effect both on the accessibility and the cost of credit, as it would compel banks 
 
                                            
127  See Sepinuck 1988 Wm. & Mary Law Review 65, where he expressed the opinion that American 
states that do not require such notice are delinquent, since it “requires minimal effort, can produce 
no harm and may actually serve a useful purpose.” 
128  See 5 3 2 2 above. 
129  Pretorius 2008 JBL 4. 
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to require some other form of security and to raise the interest rate to compensate for 
the increased risk. 
Ideally a solution should be found which provides a better balance between the 
interests of the credit provider and that of the consumer.  It was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal that 
“[t]he interpretation of the NCA calls for a careful balancing of the competing interests 
sought to be protected, and not for a consideration of only the interests of either the 
consumer or the credit provider.”130 
In line with the purpose of the NCA, and taking into account the approach followed in 
other jurisdictions, it is submitted that a sounder solution would be a combination of 
the approaches recommended by the Ombudsman for Banking Services, the Code of 
Banking Practice and the United Kingdom’s Lending Code. 
It is therefore suggested that the following conditions should be set for the exercise of 
a credit provider’s common-law right to invoke set-off: (i) the client must be informed 
of the credit provider’s right to rely on set-off when an account is opened or a loan 
granted to the client; (ii) the credit provider should only be able to recover the most 
recent missed payment, except in exceptional circumstances (for instance where the 
client has an account which is mostly dormant with insufficient funds to cover the debt, 
the client has defaulted more than once before despite the bank making several 
attempts at contacting the client, and a large amount is suddenly deposited in the 
client’s account); and (iii) the credit provider must inform the client promptly after it has 
exercised its right to set-off. 
The first condition is acknowledged by the South African Banking Code, which requires 
banks to inform a client of the possibility of set-off when an account is opened.131  This 
will also be in line with the aim of the NCA to inform the consumer as fully as possible 
of his rights and obligations. 
The second condition is similar to the approach recommended in the Lending Code, 
which suggests that banks should only rely on set-off in respect of the most recent 
 
                                            
130  Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 2.  Also see s 3(d) of the NCA. 
131  Ss 7.1.5 and 7.5. 
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missed payment.132  It is also in accordance with the approach recommended by the 
Ombudsman of Banking Services, who has requested banks to apply set-off as fairly 
as possible.  It is further recommended by the Ombudsman that banks should not 
attach a client’s entire salary, but limit it to a reasonable portion, in order to prevent a 
snowball effect where clients are unable to service their other debts.133  
Lastly, the South African Code also compels a bank to inform the client as soon as 
possible after set-off has been effected.  The manner in which this must be done is not 
specified; presumably a text message or e-mail would suffice.  This prevents the client 
from incurring additional costs due to debit orders or cheques that are declined or 
returned.  It also allows the client to contact the bank as soon as possible if he is of the 
view that he has been treated fairly unfairly or can raise a defence against the bank’s 
claim.  Although a declaration of set-off may already be required in terms the common 
law (depending on which approach is followed), inserting this condition will provide 
protection even if the automatic approach to set-off is adhered to and will further 
prevent a bank from contractually excluding the requirement of notice.134 
Achieving a proper balance between the respective rights and responsibilities of credit 
providers and consumers is not only an objective of the NCA,135 but it also benefits 
both the consumer and the credit provider.  This balance cannot be achieved without 
an in-depth consideration of the effect of a provision included in the NCA on the 
respective role players.  It is submitted that this evaluation was lacking in respect of 
sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA, and the legislature would do well to reconsider 
the requirements set for the exercise of a credit provider’s right to set-off. 
 
 
                                            
132  See 5 3 3 2 1 above. 
133  Ombudsman for Banking Services “Consumer Information Note 5: Set-Off” Ombudsman for Banking 
Services 3. 
134 Also see ch 6 (6 3). 
135  S 3(d) of the NCA. 
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6 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6 1 Introduction 
No uniform answer exists to the question of how set-off operates in the South African 
law: it is held either to operate automatically as soon as its requirements are met or to 
require a declaration by one of the parties, in which case it operates with retrospective 
effect.1  This dissertation considered the uncertainty and problems surrounding these 
two opposing approaches to the operation of set-off.  After tracing the historical 
development of the principles of set-off in order to determine the origin of these 
approaches,2 their application in modern law, both in South Africa and elsewhere, was 
considered.3  It became apparent that neither of the approaches to set-off followed in 
South African law provides an adequate explanation of the way in which set-off is 
applied in practice and consequently both are subject to a range of exceptions. 
An analysis of international developments showed that 
“there is general convergence – although still ongoing – towards a regime of set-off by 
notice, even in those systems based on automatic set-off, with good reasons to provide for 
a more prospective effect.”4 
The following questions are implicit in this statement and also central to this thesis: 
(i) what would the reasons be for such a general trend, even in systems which have 
traditionally recognised the automatic operation of set-off, towards the view that set-off 
can only be effected by means of a notice;5 and (ii) what would the justification be for 
ascribing a prospective effect to this notice?6 
These questions were considered specifically in the South African context, and the aim 
was to evaluate whether, in the light of the problems experienced with the current 
approaches to set-off and international developments in this regard, a need exists for 
legal reform in South Africa.  This evaluation included an examination of the applicable 
principles where a party’s right to invoke set-off is excluded based either on an 
 
                                            
1  See ch 3. 
2  See ch 2. 
3  See ch 3. 
4  P Pichonnaz & L Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration and Commercial Transactions (2014) 170. 
5  See ch 3. 
6  See ch 3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
   143 
 
  
agreement between parties or the ostensible intention of one of the parties not to 
invoke set-off.7 
Another aspect which was considered is the impact of current consumer legislation, 
and specifically sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA), 
on the right of a credit provider to invoke set-off.  This discussion included a 
determination of the extent to which legislative measures are desirable in order to 
protect consumers from the consequences of set-off.8 
The conclusions arrived at during the course of the study, both with regards to the 
operation of set-off and the impact of the NCA, are briefly outlined below.  They are 
followed by suggestions for possible reform of the South African approach to the 
operation of set-off. 
6 2 Overview of findings 
6 2 1 Findings regarding the operation of set-off 
Set-off has evolved from a fragmented and purely procedural mechanism in classical 
Roman law to the extra-judicial process found in modern law.9  The decrees of 
Justinian, which describe set-off as an extinction of debts that takes place ipso iure, 
were an important influence on this development.10  With this, the Emperor generalised 
the approach to set-off, and made its operation independent of the discretion of the 
judge.  However, it was not clear exactly what Justinian meant by the phrase “ipso 
iure”, and attempts to interpret these decrees have led to generations of jurists focusing 
on whether set-off operates automatically, and thus irrespective of the will of the 
parties. 
Uncertainty in this regard, together with the practical difficulties experienced in the 
application of the automatic approach, led to the development of a second view, 
namely that a declaration is required to effect set-off.  Attempts to reconcile this 
approach with the automatic approach resulted in the notion that this declaration, 
although required for the operation of set-off, has a retrospective effect.  In terms of 
 
                                            
7  See ch 4. 
8  See ch 5. 
9  See ch 2. 
10  Inst IV 6 30; C 4 31 14. 
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both approaches it was thus accepted that the effect of set-off dates back to the 
moment its requirements are first met.11 
These developments led to the two opposing views which enjoy support in current 
South African law: set-off is held either to operate automatically (although it has to be 
pleaded in court),12 or it has to be declared by one of the parties, whereupon it operates 
retrospectively at the moment when the debts first became susceptible to set-off.13  It 
has been shown that both these approaches are based on a possible misinterpretation 
of Justinian’s decrees,14 or what Pichonnaz and Gullifer refer to as a “creative 
interpretation” of Roman law sources.15  More importantly, the debate regarding the 
operation of set-off in jurisdictions that derive their rules relating to set-off from Roman 
law has focused on the interpretation of historical sources, rather than on adopting a 
pragmatic approach to determine which approach to set-off best supports its role and 
function in modern society.16  This is also true in the South African context.  It can thus 
be argued that legal development has suffered as a result of historical uncertainties 
and that “die Suid-Afrikaanse reg eintlik in ‘n groot mate by Martinus vasgehaak het.”17  
This lack of a practical dimension to the debate in South African law therefore directed 
the focus in chapter 3 on the effect of the two possible approaches to set-off on 
everyday commercial transactions.  It also motivated the discussion in chapter 4 on 
the exclusion of the right to set-off, either by means of an agreement between the 
parties18 or where one of the parties has waived the right to invoke set-off.19 
It has been shown that a strict application of the ipso iure approach (which is favoured 
in the majority of cases) is largely irreconcilable with practical reality.  The biggest 
objection to this approach is that it affords insufficient recognition to the autonomy of 
contracting parties.  This incompatibility with the principle of freedom of contract leads 
 
                                            
11  P Pichonnaz “The Retroactive Effect of Set-Off (Compensatio): A Journey through Roman Law to 
the New Dutch Civil Code” 2000 TR 541 563; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 165. 
12  See ch 3 (3 4 1 n 86). 
13  See ch 3 (3 4 1 n 95). 
14  Ch 2 (2 4 4).  Also see Pichonnaz 2000 TR 541-546. 
15  Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off in Arbitration 140. 
16  See n 27 below. 
17  “The South African law largely remained stuck at Martinus” (own translation) – S Scott 
“Skuldvergelyking – Toe (ex tunc) en Nou (ex nunc)” 2006 TSAR 595 601. 
18  See ch 4 (4 2 2). 
19  See ch 4 (4 3). 
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to various inconsistencies in the practical application of the automatic approach.  This 
is illustrated by the fact that parties are still allowed to exclude the operation of set-off 
contractually, even after the debts become susceptible to set-off,20 and by allowing a 
party to waive his right to invoke set-off, even though the debts were already 
extinguished due to the automatic operation of set-off.21  Even in cases where payment 
has been made after the debt was susceptible to set-off, some authors still allow the 
debtor to disregard the operation of set-off and reclaim the original debt.22 
A further problem with the ipso iure construction is the fact that the debts are regarded 
as extinguished from the moment the requirements for set-off are met.  However, if an 
action is instituted in respect of one of the debts and the defendant fails to raise the 
defence of set-off, it cannot be taken into account.23  This again demonstrates the 
divergence between theory and practice, because it reveals that a court will give 
judgement on a debt which the law regards as already settled. 
The minority view, namely that set-off depends on a declaration, addresses the 
problem of autonomy.  It recognises the fact that set-off depends on the will of the 
parties.  However, the retrospective effect attributed to the declaration of set-off 
renders the practical application of this approach similarly incapable of regulating 
modern commercial relationships.24  The practical problems which are caused by 
attributing a retrospective effect to the declaration of set-off are particularly apparent 
when the following two consequences are considered: (i) any interest charged, for 
instance by a bank on two separate accounts, has to be adjusted retrospectively;25 and 
(ii) a party’s default, for instance in the form of non-payment of the rent in terms of a 
lease agreement, will be cured retrospectively.26  Like the ipso iure view, it is clear that 
the retrospective approach 
 
                                            
20  See ch 4 (4 2 2). 
21  See ch 4 (4 3). 
22  See ch 3 (3 4 2 4 n 142). 
23  RH Christie & GB Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 495. 
24  See ch 3 (3 6 and 3 8). 
25  See ch 3 (3 4 2 5). 
26  See ch 3 (3 4 2 6); Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 4 SA 494 (C). 
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“is not based on convincing rational arguments but rather constitutes an unreflected 
continuation of a thinking pattern… based upon Justinian’s obscure pronouncements on the 
ipso iure effect of set-off.”27 
It is evident that both approaches to set-off currently adopted in South Africa are 
unsuitable to govern modern business relationships.  A reconsideration is therefore 
required of the manner in which set-off is applied, taking into account its role and 
function in modern society. 
Such a reconsideration is reflected in the drafting process of the PICC and the PECL.28  
In formulating the principles applicable to set-off, the respective committees not only 
considered the historical development of set-off, but also (and perhaps more 
importantly) evaluated the practical merits of the different approaches.  Pragmatic 
considerations led them to conclude that although most civil law jurisdictions follow 
either the automatic or retrospective approach, neither approach offers an ideal 
solution.  Therefore, both committees decided that it was necessary to deviate from 
these approaches and adopt an approach in terms of which set-off operates 
prospectively upon it being declared by either party.29 
This process and eventual conclusion can be very instructive when evaluating the 
South African approach.30  However, in order to determine whether the proposition that 
set-off should operate prospectively from the moment that a notice is given is sound, 
it is necessary to assess the suggested approach by considering its practical 
 
                                            
27  O Lando, H Beale, A Prüm & R Zimmermann (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law: Part 
III (2003) 153-154 n 2. 
28  See specifically P Pichonnaz “Set-Off” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (2005) 1033; P Pichonnaz “Set-Off 
Compensatio: From Diversity to Unity – Comments on the Principles of European Contract Law Part 
Three” in A Vaquer (ed) The Principles of European Contract Law Part III (2005) 281; Lando et al 
European Contract Law; R Zimmermann Comparative Foundations of the European Law of Set-Off 
and Prescription (2002); R Zimmermann “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts 2004 in Comparative Perspective” 2006 Tul Eur & Civ LF 1; C Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 
2000 Study L – Doc 62 bis: Position Paper” (2000) UNIDROIT 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2000/study50/s-50-062bis-e.pdf> (accessed 30-11-
2015); C Jauffret-Spinosi “UNIDROIT 2001 Study L – Doc 71: Draft chapter” (2001) UNIDROIT 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2001/study50/s-50-071-e.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2015). 
29  Arts 13:104 and 13:106 PECL; Arts 8.3 and 8.5 PICC. 
30  See also Scott 2006 TSAR 595, where she argues that as a part of the world community, South 
Africa should take note of international developments. 
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consequences,31 as well as the effect it will have on other legal phenomena such as 
waiver and estoppel. 
6 2 2 Findings regarding the National Credit Act 
As mentioned above, this dissertation also considered the impact of the NCA on the 
right of a credit provider to invoke set-off.  It has been shown that, whether intentionally 
or not, sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA limit the right of a credit provider to insert 
a provision in a credit agreement which provides for set-off.32  Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that these sections will be interpreted in a manner that also affects the 
common-law right of credit providers to rely on set-off.  However, if they are read 
together with the South African Code, these provisions leave little scope for a bank to 
rely on set-off.33  The Code obliges a bank to inform a client that it might invoke set-
off, presumably by inserting such a clause in a credit agreement.  This, in turn, means 
that the clause authorising set-off will have to comply with the requirements contained 
in section 124 of the NCA.  Therefore, in order to appropriate money from an account 
of the client to reduce or settle an obligation of that client, the bank will have to obtain 
the authorisation contemplated in section 124 of the NCA, and will only be allowed to 
appropriate funds in accordance with that authorisation. 
A study of sections 90(2)(n) and 124 of the NCA reveals not only that the ambit of 
these provisions is uncertain, but also that their application leads to an illogical situation 
where a credit provider has to refrain from stipulating a common-law right in a credit 
agreement in order to retain that right.34  Furthermore, while certain limitations on the 
right to invoke set-off are justified,35 and recognised in most jurisdictions,36 prohibiting 
set-off by banks in its entirety is not beneficial either to banks or their clients because 
it could have a negative impact on both access to credit and the cost of credit.37  These 
consequences are clearly not in line with the spirit of purpose of the NCA, and 
 
                                            
31  Also see ch 3 (3 8), where the practical consequences of the prospective approach are discussed. 
32  See ch 5. 
33  See ch 5 (5 4 2). 
34  See ch 5 (5 2 4). 
35  See the reasons given at ch 5 (5 3 2 1). 
36  See ch 5 (5 3 3). 
37  See ch 5 (5 3 2 2). 
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undoubtedly these sections have to be revised to clarify and improve the protection 
granted by them. 
6 3 Suggestions for reform 
If set-off is effected by a notice which operates ex nunc, the consequences will be 
similar to payment being made at that moment.38  In other words, the debt is settled or 
reduced from the moment notice is given and interest will stop running.  A declaration 
of set-off will not result in the breach of contract caused by late payment being cured 
retrospectively.  The creditor will therefore still be allowed to rely on any remedies 
based on the debtor’s late payment, such as invoking an acceleration clause in a loan 
agreement or evicting a lessee.  Not only does this solve the practical problems 
experienced with the application of both the ipso iure and retrospective approaches, 
but it also enhances legal certainty. 
Most of the problems faced by the ipso iure construction in respect of the exclusion of 
the right to invoke set-off are also resolved if a declaration is required to effect set-off.  
These are primarily (i) the problematic notion of allowing the parties to exclude or waive 
the operation of set-off, even though set-off supposedly operates independently of the 
wills of the parties; and (ii) the problems which arise where the operation of set-off is 
excluded or waived after the debt has already been extinguished by the automatic 
operation of set-off.  Requiring a declaration for set-off to operate clearly recognises 
the autonomy of the parties, and there is no difficulty with the parties agreeing to 
exclude set-off or one party waiving his right to give notice of it.  The problem of this 
agreement being concluded or waiver taking place after set-off has taken effect will 
rarely arise, because a declaration is required for set-off to become effective, and it is 
unlikely that the exclusion of set-off will happen after notice of it has already been 
given.39  
Admittedly, it does not make a difference in this regard whether the declaration has a 
prospective or retrospective effect.  In terms of either alternative, set-off cannot operate 
before notice of set-off is given.  However, attributing an ex nunc rather than ex tunc 
effect to the declaration may make a difference with regards to the question whether a 
 
                                            
38  Pichonnaz “Compensatio” in Principles of European Contract Law 297; Pichonnaz & Gullifer Set-Off 
in Arbitration 184-185.  Also see ch 3 (3 7) for a discussion of these consequences. 
39  See ch 4 (4 2 2 1 and 4 3 1). 
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bank is deemed to waive its right to set-off, or can be estopped from invoking set-off, 
based on the fact that the bank charges interest separately on two accounts of the 
client.  In this regard, it will be recalled that it may be argued that sending a statement 
which indicates that the bank charges or pays interest separately on two accounts of 
a client, the one standing to his debit and the other to his credit, suggests that the bank 
does not intend to rely on set-off.40  This argument is more persuasive where set-off 
occurs automatically, because in that case the operation of set-off would mean there 
is only ever one debt.  In other words, by charging interest separately on the two 
accounts, the bank is acting in a manner which contradicts the automatic operation of 
set-off.  The client could therefore argue that the bank indicated its intention to waive 
its right to rely on set-off. 
A similar argument can be advanced in terms of the retrospective approach: a reliance 
on set-off will result in interest having to be adjusted retrospectively, therefore charging 
interest separately on the two debts is also not consistent with the intention to invoke 
set-off.  However, if set-off operates prospectively from the moment it is declared, it 
means that until such time as a declaration is made, there are two debts.  Therefore, 
treating the debts as separate and charging two interest rates before notice of set-off 
is given does not contradict the effect of set-off, and cannot necessarily be taken as 
an indication that the bank will not rely on set-off.  This result is preferable, as standard 
banking practices should not prevent the bank from relying on its right to invoke set-
off. 
Three possible complications may arise if a declaration of set-off is attributed an ex 
nunc rather than ex tunc effect.  The first scenario is in the case of cession, where the 
requirements for set-off are met before the debt is ceded, but set-off is only declared 
thereafter.  Instead of set-off operating automatically or taking effect retrospectively 
before the cession,41 the prospective effect of set-off would mean that it cannot be 
relied on after the debt has been ceded.  The second scenario is where one of the 
parties becomes insolvent after the debts became susceptible to set-off, but before 
 
                                            
40  See ch 4 (4 3 3 1). 
41  See ch 3 (3 4 2 2). 
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set-off was declared.  Once again, the ex nunc approach will exclude the possibility of 
set-off taking effect before the insolvency of the party.42 
In these cases, it must be examined whether there are policy considerations which 
suggest that set-off should be allowed, despite the fact that notice of set-off is only 
given after the requirements for set-off are no longer met.  It has been shown that in 
the case of cession, there are in any event two qualifications arising from this area of 
the law which offer protection to the debtor: he will be allowed to enjoy the benefit of 
cession where he in good faith attempts to set the debt off before becoming aware of 
the cession; or where the cession is made mala fide.43  It is doubtful whether there are 
additional policy considerations justifying even greater protection in the event that a 
debt capable of set-off is ceded and the debtor, due to the prospective effect of set-off, 
is no longer able to rely on its operation. 
In the case of insolvency, there are indeed policy considerations which might play a 
role in determining the operation of set-off.  On the one hand, there is the notion that it 
might be unfair to expect a debtor to pay his entire debt, but only receive a part of the 
debt owed to him by the creditor.44  For example, A and B are mutually indebted for 
the amount of R100, and B is declared insolvent before notice of set-off is given.  If A 
is not allowed to rely on set-off, he would have to pay R100 to B’s estate, but would 
only receive a dividend, for instance R80, of the debt owed to him, which may seem 
unfair towards A.  On the other hand, there is the idea that all creditors should be 
treated equally upon insolvency.45  The alternative to the previous example is thus that 
A is allowed to rely on set-off, which will in effect enable him to enforce the entire debt 
owed by B.  This places him in a better position than another creditor of B who will only 
receive 80 cents in the rand instead of his full claim.  If the prospective approach to 
set-off is followed, it would prevent a creditor of an insolvent from relying on set-off 
after concursus creditorum, since no action by creditors of the estate which will 
prejudice the rights of other creditors are allowed after that moment46 and set-off would 
 
                                            
42  Both these scenarios have been discussed in some detail in ch 3 (3 8). 
43  See ch 3 (3 8). 
44  This consideration was possibly also recognised in classic Roman law – see ch 2 (2 2 2 2).  Also see 
R Goode Legal Problems of Credit and Security 3 ed (2003) 238. 
45  R Derham The Law of Set-Off 3 ed (2003) 245. 
46  RD Sharrock “Insolvency” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 11 2 ed (2008) 
para 199. 
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not be deemed to have occurred before insolvency.  The result would therefore be 
similar to the first scenario mentioned above.  If it is found in terms of policy 
considerations within the law of insolvency that the first consideration, namely the 
unfairness towards A, carries more weight than the latter, namely the equal treatment 
of creditors, provision can be made in existing insolvency laws to provide for a form of 
automatic set-off upon insolvency.47 
It is thus clear that the two situations which may require special treatment if the 
prospective approach to set-off is followed, are in any event subject to the specific rules 
applicable in those contexts.  Therefore, where a deviation from the normal 
consequences of set-off is required based on policy considerations, it can easily be 
provided for in the rules dealing with cession and insolvency respectively. 
The third and final possible objection to the prospective approach may be that it offers 
insufficient protection to a debtor who is unaware of the requirement of notice and who 
believes, in good faith, that his debts are settled by way of set-off.  The possible flaws 
in this argument have been discussed in some detail in a previous chapter.48  However, 
it should be mentioned here that this unintended adverse consequence can be 
mitigated by not making the declaration subject to strict formal requirements.  If an 
informal, extrajudicial, unilateral notice, which may also be given orally, suffices to 
effect set-off, this problem would arise much less often.  It is only in rare circumstances 
that a creditor will not make at least one demand in order to place the debtor in mora, 
and it is submitted that it is not unreasonable to expect that a debtor in those 
circumstances will indicate to the creditor that he regards the debt as settled by way of 
set-off.  Furthermore, it is accepted in our law that in certain circumstances ignorance 
of the law is no excuse,49 and it has been generally stated with regards to the maxim 
ignorantia iuris neminem excusat that 
“it can be expected of a person who, in a modern State, wherein many facets of the acts 
and omissions of the legal subject are controlled by legal provisions, involves himself in a 
 
                                            
47  See the criticism against this function of set-off in ch 1 (1 2 2 n 45). 
48  See ch 3 (3 6).  Also see Pichonnaz 2000 TR 560-561. 
49  Kyriacou v Minister of Safety and Security 1999 3 SA 278 (O) 290; Ghandi Square Property Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v Pension Fund Adjudicator 2014 JDR 0183 (GNP) 14. 
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particular sphere, that he should keep himself informed of the legal provisions which are 
applicable to that particular sphere”.50 
It can thus be seen that the prospective approach offers a solution which, amongst 
other benefits, does not require 
“a set of rules that is (i) based on a somewhat artificial fiction (both obligations ‘must be 
taken to have been discharged at the moment’ [that they are first susceptible to set-off]) and 
therefore difficult to explain doctrinally, (ii) detrimental to legal certainty, [and] (iii) not 
practicable without recognizing a number of exceptions”.51 
With regards to consumer legislation restricting the right of a credit provider to invoke 
set-off, is preferable to find a more balanced solution than the one currently offered by 
the NCA.  An ideal solution should offer the client sufficient protection without 
completely removing the security and convenience surrounding a bank’s right to invoke 
set-off.  In this regard, the suggestion was made that the following conditions should 
be set for a credit provider to exercise its right to set-off: (i) the client must be informed 
of the credit provider’s right of set-off when concluding an agreement with the credit 
provider; (ii) only a reasonable amount should be appropriated by the credit provider, 
in most cases only the amount of the most recent missed payment; and (iii) the client 
must be informed as soon as possible after the credit provider has used its right to set-
off.52 
The last requirement might seem unnecessary if the prospective approach to set-off is 
accepted, because the bank would in any event have to give notice to the client in 
order to effect set-off.  However, since the requirements for set-off can be amended 
contractually,53 legislation preventing the bank from contractually excluding the 
requirement of notice is advisable. 
A further suggestion, should the prospective approach be followed, would be for the 
legislature to provide that a client cannot be in default while the bank is able to recover 
arrear payments by way of set-off.  In the absence of such a provision, it would mean 
that despite the client having sufficient funds in one account to cover a loan payment 
 
                                            
50  S v De Blom 1977 3 SA 513 (A) 514; Ghandi Square Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Pension Fund 
Adjudicator 2014 JDR 0183 (GNP) 14. However, this maxim is applied in a nuanced manner – see 
Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 4 SA 202 (A) 223. 
51  Zimmermann European Law of Set-Off 42-43. 
52  See ch 5 (5 5). 
53  See ch 4 (4 2 3). 
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which is due, the bank could decide not to invoke set-off and act on the client’s breach.  
Unlike in the case of either the automatic or retrospective approach, the client cannot 
cure his breach by subsequently invoking set-off.  If the legislature provides for this 
form of protection, set-off operates not only as a security measure for the bank, but 
also protects the client against the consequences of breach (such as the bank invoking 
an acceleration clause) as long as there are sufficient funds in his accounts to cover 
payments which are due and payable. 
6 4 Concluding remarks 
A study of the South African approach to set-off, and the lack of development based 
on pragmatic or legal comparative grounds, proves the statement by Hutchison and 
others that: 
“Old habits die hard, and nowhere more so than in a precedent-bound system of law.”54 
Despite compelling reasons for reconsidering our approach to set-off, this has received 
little judicial attention.  Failure to take note of international legal developments in this 
regard means that we remain constrained by a system which is out of touch with 
commercial reality and which has to recognise a range of exceptions in order to 
accommodate important principles like autonomy and contractual freedom.  There is 
little justification for this, since our approach to set-off is in any event a matter of debate 
and thus far from settled.55  In this thesis it has been suggested that the solution is for 
South African law to move towards an approach which has not only gained 
international recognition, but which also offers a much more consistent and satisfactory 
solution to the questions of how and when set-off should operate. 
The question which naturally arises is how such reform can be achieved.  Two 
possibilities present themselves, namely judicial development of the common law, or 
statutory reform.  The latter is perhaps not the most suitable for an essentially doctrinal 
issue such as the nature of set-off.  Furthermore, including provisions regarding set-
off in existing legislation, for instance the NCA, will only affect its operation in 
 
                                            
54  D Hutchison “Forms of Breach” in D Hutchison & C-J Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South 
Africa 2 ed (2012) 277 299. 
55  Scott 2006 TSAR 601. 
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transactions subject to that Act.  It is therefore suggested that we rather look to the 
courts for reform of the common law relating to set-off. 
While such a proposal may indeed appear far-reaching, it is certainly not without 
precedent.  As Innes CJ acknowledged in an oft-repeated dictum: 
“There come times in the growth of every living system of law when old practice and ancient 
formulae must be modified in order to keep in touch with the expansion of legal ideas, and 
to keep pace with the requirements of changing conditions.”56 
In Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government57 it was also confirmed that  
“[Roman-Dutch] law is a virile living system of law, ever seeking, as every such system 
must, to adapt itself consistently with its inherent basic principles to deal effectively with the 
increasing complexities of modern organised society.”58 
Ultimately, courts are entitled to resort to their inherent power to develop the common 
law in order to serve the interests of justice.59  This power is confirmed in section 173 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has stated that 
“without abandoning our legal heritage, the courts can and should examine how developed 
legal systems cope with common problems. By appropriate application of the knowledge 
thus derived, a modification of our existing law may better serve the interests of justice when 
the existing law is uncertain or does not adequately serve modern demands on it.”60 
In the light of the problems surrounding the current operation of set-off  in South African 
law, and taking into account international developments, it is submitted that this is 
indeed an instance where the court should exercise its power to develop the common 
law in order to ensure that it meets modern demands.  This is strengthened by the fact 
 
                                            
56  Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890 905.  This was confirmed inter alia in Mineworkers Investment 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Modibane 2002 6 SA 512 (W) para 28; Janse Van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 
1 SA 315 (C) 324; Ongevallekommissaris v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 251 (SCA) 259; Willis Faber 
Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 4 SA 202 (A) 220; Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 320; Kommissaris Van Binnelandse 
Inkomste v Willers 1994 3 SA 283 (A) 332-333. 
57  1934 AD 560. 
58  563.  This was confirmed inter alia in Mineworkers Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v Modibane 2002 6 SA 
512 (W) para 28; Janse Van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 324; Willis Faber 
Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 4 SA 202 (A) 220; Kommissaris Van Binnelandse 
Inkomste v Willers 1994 3 SA 283 (A) 332-333. 
59  Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 3 SA 283 (SCA) para 25. 
60  Para 25. 
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that historical sources are inconclusive and there is thus scope for their re-
interpretation.61 
Courts are further obliged to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Right 
when developing the common law.62  In this regard, section 10 of the Bill of Rights, 
which grants everyone the right to dignity, is of particular relevance in the context of 
set-off.63  In Barkhuizen v Napier64 the Constitutional Court opined that  
“[s]elf-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs … is the very essence of 
freedom and a vital part of dignity.”65 
It is submitted that the automatic approach to set-off, in terms of which the claims of 
the parties are extinguished based on a rule of law, rather than the wishes of the 
parties, undermines the parties’ ability to regulate their own affairs.  It thus potentially 
undermines the principle of self-autonomy and limits the parties’ right to dignity, leaving 
scope for judicial development of the common law relating to set-off in terms of section 
39(2) of the Constitution. 
There is little doubt that the current law regarding the operation of set-off is both 
uncertain and unable to cater for modern commercial relationships.  Not only is there 
no uniform agreement on the manner in which set-off operates, but neither of the 
accepted approaches offer a solution which is consistent with the demands of practice.  
As previously argued,66 there is little justification for sacrificing legal certainty to 
maintain a status quo which is based on questionable historical foundations and, more 
importantly, is clearly unsatisfactory.  It is thus argued that South African courts should 
take note of international developments regarding the operation of set-off and opt for 
 
                                            
61  See ch 2 (2 4 4) and ch 3 (3 1 n 1).  Also see Pichonnaz 2000 TR 541-546. 
62  S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
63  Another fundamental right which may be relevant is s 25(1) of the Bill of Rights, which grants 
everyone the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his property.  It was confirmed in National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 63 that intangible property, such as the right to 
restitution of money paid, falls within the definition of property in the context of s 25(1) of the 
Constitution.  On the question of what constitutes a deprivation, see Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v 
Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 37-39; National Credit Regulator 
v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 66; Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 474 (CC) para 
38.  However, this deprivation will in all likelihood not be arbitrary (see First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100) and the right to dignity therefore offers 
a more convincing basis for the judicial development of the common law relating to set-off.  
64  2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
65  Para 57. 
66  See ch 3 (3 8). 
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a solution which is more in line with modern commercial reality.  Developing an 
approach in terms of which set-off operates prospectively upon notice being given will 
reduce the divergence which currently exists between legal and practical reality and 
will better serve the interests of justice by recognising the autonomy of contracting 
parties and ensuring legal certainty. 
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